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This dissertation analyzes social and legal influences on Texas death-sentenced 
prisoners who hastened their own execution.  Using variables derived from research on 
other types of decisions to hasten death, I compare these prisoners with other similarly-
situated condemned prisoners who did not seek to hasten execution, and develop a 
theoretical model for their decisions.  In addition, I examine both how these prisoners 
explain their decisions, and how court proceedings can shape these explanations.  The 
dissertation concludes with a discussion of the sociolegal construction of different rights 
to die.   
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The Things that Death will buy 
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Escape from Circumstances— 
And a Name— 
 
With Gifts of Life 
How Death's Gifts may compare— 
We know not— 
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In this dissertation, I examine Texas death-sentenced prisoners who successfully 
hastened their execution (“execution-hasteners” or EHs).1  Nationally, execution-
hasteners constitute about 11% of those executed, and about the same number of 
execution-hasteners (about 137) have been executed as death-sentenced prisoners have 
been exonerated (about 140) (Death Penalty Information Center 2012).  While the 
exonerated have prompted condemnations of the legal processes leading to their death 
sentences, we are less certain how to interpret execution-hasteners.  Are they committing 
suicide?  This is a population widely believed to be disproportionately burdened by 
mental illness, a risk factor for suicide.  Are they asserting an autonomy we should honor 
as part of some commitment to fundamental human dignity?  A lot of people go to prison 
who do not want to be there.  Prisons do not therefore permit them to take their own lives.   
Others have argued execution-hasteners usurp the sovereign’s power by deciding 
their own punishment and wresting authority over legitimate killing from the state’s 
exclusive purview (Thurschwell 2009:290-291),  Further, for every execution-hastener, a 
death penalty conviction and sentence is not reviewed.  Legal errors with potentially 
systemic implications may continue uncorrected.  How do we balance the effect of their 
individual decision not to appeal on the overall legitimacy of the death penalty system 
                                                 
1 Death-sentenced prisoners who drop their appeals in order to hasten their executions are commonly called 
“volunteers” (Brisman 2009; Harrington 2000).  To avoid the connotations of free will and civic-
mindedness associated with the word “volunteer,” I instead call them “hasteners.” 
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which relies, at least in part, on the legal testing of the appropriateness of the death 
penalty?   
 This dissertation takes a sociological approach to desires to hasten death to 
examine who these prisoners were and how, when, and why some abandoned their 
appeals and hastened execution.  In addition, it integrates a discussion of legal processes 
into its analysis.  While being an execution-hastener is a social and psychological 
experience, it is also one substantially constructed by the law.  If there were no appeals, 
one could not be a “volunteer.”  By the same token, if the law prohibited appeal waivers, 
one could not be either.  I therefore discuss the ways in which the law and litigation 
define and structure the execution-hasteners’ experience.   
This study proceeds in three parts.  The first section sketches the literature 
regarding decisions to hasten death and proposes a theory of execution-hastening.  It then 
outlines the legal procedures that enable a condemned prisoner to expedite his execution 
and particularly influential Texas cases regarding EHs.  Finally, it describes this research 
was conducted.  The second section describes the data supporting the proposed theory for 
decisions to hasten execution, as well as the meanings constructed for EHs’ deaths.  The 
third section considers the operation of the law in this context.  It analyzes courtroom 
discourses to examine how at least some of these meanings are produced, and reflects on 
the profoundly different legal framework surrounding rights to die for condemned 





Review of Literature on Decisions to Hasten Death 
Certain basic narratives dominate American popular debate over what execution-
hasteners are doing.  Those who oppose a condemned prisoner’s request for execution 
often cite the prisoner’s history of mental instability and frame the prisoner’s decision as 
a product of suicidal depression.  Related to this narrative is one that links death row 
conditions to the prisoner’s decision to hasten death.  Conditions, in this account, 
contribute to the decision to abandon appeals by wearing the prisoner down to the point 
that he loses the will to live, or because of “death row syndrome,” an evolving psychiatric 
diagnosis describing a mental condition that some prisoners develop as a result of living 
under a death sentence in highly socially isolating and stark conditions of confinement.  
Other narratives focus on ideas of rational choice and personal autonomy.  This narrative 
emphasizes prisoners’ desire to control their own destiny and the civic virtue of 
respecting autonomy and choice, even for the least among us (Muschert, Harrington, and 
Reece 2009; Smith 2008).  
The empirical support for any of these narratives is sparse.  Only two studies have 
conducted an empirical investigation beyond the individual case study.  John Blume 
(2005) asked whether EHs nationally resembled the non-incarcerated or “free-world” 
American suicide population.  After collecting questionnaire responses from legal team 
members in cases involving EHs and attempted EHs, Blume reviewed the literature on 
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free-world suicide.  He concluded that important similarities existed between free-world 
suicides and death row execution-hasteners.  In addition to being a predominantly white 
male phenomenon, both groups have significant histories of mental illness and substance 
abuse.  In addition, he found some support for the proposition that like suicide, one 
individual execution hastening can spur other to do the same, i.e., can be “contagious.”  
Blume found little support for the contention that prison conditions affect decisions to 
hasten execution.   
The primary limitation of this study is the absence of a comparison group of non-
execution-hastening death row population.  As Cunningham and Vigen (2002) have 
pointed out, the death row population as a whole has a high prevalence of mental illness 
and substance abuse and addiction.  In addition, Blume measured contagion by execution 
date, rather than by point of decision, which, I argue below, is the more relevant date. 
 Vandiver, Giacopassi, and Turner (2008) overcame the comparison group 
limitation in part by comparing all EHs nationally to all executed non-EHs.  Their study 
provided a statistical profile of EHs (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3 and 4), and 
proposed an “exploratory typology” of EHs based on “reviews of academic studies, 
newspaper interviews of volunteers, published accounts of volunteers’ backgrounds and 
crimes, final statements given by volunteers before their executions, discussions with 
defense lawyers and mitigation specialists, and the experience of one of the authors in 
several cases” (id., 188, 195).  They suggested that EHs could be categorized as “tough 
guy,” “martyr,” “suicidal,” “remorseful,” or “mentally ill,” citing two or three individuals 
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who illustrated the traits of this type.  While not quantifying the number of EHs who fell 
into the different categories, they noted that “martyrs,” i.e., individuals who committed 
their capital offense to further a larger political message, was a rare phenomenon.    
The limitations of this study, however, are at least three-fold.  First, they also used 
execution date rather than decision-point data.  In addition, as with the Blume study, they 
analyzed EHs executed nationally, which could conceal important state-level variation.  
Some counties – like Harris County, Texas, for example – are responsible for more 
executions than several states combined.  Some states such as Nevada (11 out of 12), 
Oregon (two out of two), and Washington (three out of five) have executed almost 
exclusively execution-hasteners (Death Penalty Information Center Execution Database).  
Some states execute so few that a prisoner might expect to live decades on death row 
before facing execution.  Death row conditions also vary across states.  If any of these 
factors matter, it is reasonable to believe that the dynamics in hastening execution could 
be very different in different places.  Comparing all execution-hasteners with all those 
executed in the modern era would erase these differences.   
Finally, Vandiver and her colleagues relied on the database created by the Death 
Penalty Information Center (DPIC).  In my study, I found that while invaluable in many 
ways, some of its coding decisions regarding who was a “volunteer” risked overlooking 
important information.  For example, and as I discuss below, DPIC lists one Texas 
prisoner as a “volunteer” because he declined the opportunity to pursue a second round of 
appeals, i.e., so-called “successor” litigation, which is not routinely advanced by Texas 
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death-sentenced prisoners.  In fact, most prisoners do not have counsel at this stage as 
counsel will generally not be appointed by any court.  Therefore, the considerations for 
forfeiting that opportunity likely vary considerably.  At the same time, DPIC does not 
include anyone who changed his mind.  While I do not include every Texas death row 
prisoner who changed his mind, I did include two who changed their minds repeatedly as 
they approached execution.  In the heat of execution-eve litigation, what they really 
wanted was not clear.  In addition, I identified two Texas prisoners who abandoned their 
appeals, but were simply not listed as “volunteers” in the DPIC execution database.   
This study contributes to the limited empirical basis for the popular debates about 
EHs, and extends Blume’s and Vandiver, Giacopassi, and Turner’s findings by 
overcoming some of the limitations of their research.  It conducts the first comparison of 
execution-hasteners with group of similarly situated non-EH death row prisoners.  It 
trades the national view for the specificity of Texas and condemned prisoners’ common 
experiences of its death penalty system and death row.  It also did not rely on a single 
source for identifying EHs, instead conducting an original investigation into who 
abandoned appeals.  It moves beyond typology to introduce a theoretical model for the 
processes that contribute to decisions to hasten execution.  In addition to comparing 
certain characteristics between populations (such as experiences with mental health 
problems), it broadens the analysis to include a larger number of characteristics linked to 
suicide, and particularly prisoner suicide.  Further, it deconstructs some of the variables 
believed to be associated with prisoner suicide to try to understand what aspects of those 
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variables may make them significant.  For example, recognizing the prisoners convicted 
of violent crimes are at a higher risk of suicide, this study considers whether certain 
features of the capital crime may be significant in distinguishing who among capital 
murderers may be more likely to seek to hasten execution.  Finally, this study represents 
the only effort I am aware of to examine how the legal system structures decisions to 
hasten execution.   
SOCIOLOGICAL RISK FACTORS FOR SUICIDE 
Durkheim staked a claim for sociology in the study of self-destruction in On 
Suicide, where he adopted the definition of suicide that I use in this dissertation: “any 
death which is the direct or indirect result of a positive or negative act accomplished by 
the victim himself” (Durkheim [1897] 1966:42).  Durkheim, examining the problem on 
an aggregate level, theorized that suicide should be understood along two axes:  social 
integration and social regulation.  He identified four types of suicide, reflecting different 
combinations of the extremes of each axis.  Social integration offered “a sense of social 
belonging and inclusion, the love, care, and concern that can flow (or not flow) from 
social ties” (Wray, Colen, Pescosolido 2011:507).  This integration could provide an 
emotional buffer for people during difficult times and therefore help stem the desire for 
self-destruction.  Too much integration could lead to “altruistic” suicide, i.e., destroying 
the self in order to benefit the whole.  Too little, the individual was susceptible to 
“egostic” suicide.  Regulation, by contrast, consisted of social controls that constrained 
individuals and thereby protected them from “desires and expectation that will exceed 
their grasp, with the resulting failures and frustrations leading to continuous states of 
despair” (id., 508).  Too little social regulation led to “anomic” suicide, and too much, to 
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“fatalistic” suicide.  While famously relegated to a footnote, the question of “fatalistic” 
suicide is naturally raised in the highly regulated prison setting.   
Vandiver and her colleagues drew on Durkheim’s theory of suicide in arguing that 
the “tough guy” resembled Durkheim’s egoistic suicide and the “remorseful,” the highly 
integrated altruistic suicide.  They contend that generally anomic suicide is not relevant, 
with the little-known fatalistic suicide of the highly regulated more so.  Overall, they 
argue that Durkheim’s macro-level approach is a bad fit for this population because of 
death row’s extreme environment and the population’s history of childhood abuse, 
dysfunctional families and mental illness (Vandiver et al. 2008).   
Maris (1981) used a life-course perspective to conceptualize the “suicidal career.”  
He argued that suicide should be understood as the outcome of a developmental process, 
a process neglected by a focus on vital statistics data.  He explained: 
Most people do not suicide.  Suicidal resolution of the human condition tends to 
occur (a) when one’s life is and has been exceedingly harsh; (b) when nonsuicidal 
alternatives are blocked or used up (what I refer to as a ‘constriction of the 
adaptive repertoire”); (c) when suicide is positively valued, prescribed, 
encouraged by suicidal role models, etc.; (d) when tolerance thresholds for coping 
with the human condition have been breeched [sic] repeatedly; (e) when 
individuals are male and/or aged or when individual s are otherwise “unfit” for 
coping with life struggles (e.g., genetically); and (f) when individuals are isolated 
from love and support (Maris 1981:xix). 
Maris could well have been describing suicidogenic aspects of modern day 
incarceration.  Prisoners, especially those convicted of serious crimes, generally face very 
harsh conditions of confinement.  Further, a signal pain of imprisonment is their isolation 
from love and support.  As Sykes noted, not only does prison degrade social ties to the 
loved ones on the outside, but it also constitutes “a deliberate, moral rejection of the 
criminal by the free community” (1958:65).  “[T]he loss of that more diffuse status which 
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defines the individual as someone to be trusted or as morally acceptable is the loss which 
hurts most” (id., 67).    
They are also usually male (and in this study, all male), have had unusually 
difficult childhoods, and have some “unfitness,” such as histories of addiction, 
personality disorders, or mental illness (see also Wray, Colen, & Pescosolido 2011; Nock 
et al. 2008; Cunningham & Vigen 2002).  Cunningham and Vigen’s critical review of the 
literature on death row prisoners noted that 11 out of 13 clinical studies of death row 
prisoners found “a high incidence of psychological symptoms and disorder, ranging from 
maladaptive defenses to pervasive depression, mood lability, and diminished mental 
acuity to episodic and chronic psychosis” (2002:200).  Death row prisoners also “appear 
to have a disproportionate rate of serious psychological disorders relative to a general 
prison population” (Cunningham & Vigen 2002:200).  Neurological abnormalities and 
neuropsychological impairments are “frequently observed,” as are histories of substance 
abuse and intoxication, and childhood family dysfunction (Cunningham & Vigen 
2002:201-02). 
Not all prisoners, of course, suicide.  Research into prisoner suicide is potentially 
fraught with even more reporting concerns than in the free-world as, e.g., prisons 
potentially fear legal liability for failing to prevent suicide.  Liebling has complained that 
prison suicides are also underreported because prison deaths are officially identified as 
suicides when they conform to expectations of what suicide “looks like” (1999:290).   
Further, most prison suicide studies have been based on relatively small populations, 
which raises questions about the reliability of their findings (Borrill 2002; Lester and 
Danto 1993).  With those caveats, prison researchers have identified certain 
characteristics associated with higher rates of suicide.  Generally prisoners who commit 
10 
 
suicide are male, relatively young (generally less than 35 years old), and white (Fazel 
2008; Liebling 1999; Anno 1985).   
Prison sentences matter.  Long and indeterminate sentences are associated with 
increased risk of suicide (Fazel 2008; Crighton and Towl 2008; Liebling 1999; Anno 
1985).  An early study of suicides on death row between 1977 and 1982 found 
remarkably high rates of suicide given how hard it was to commit suicide in death row’s 
heightened security (Danto and Lester 1993).  A more recent study found that between 
1978 and 1999, death row prisoners had significantly higher rates of suicide compared to 
non-death row prisoners, but that the rate declined as the death row population grew 
(Tartaro and Lester 2008).   
Prison suicide has temporal pattern, with a “very robust finding… that the early 
stages of custody show the highest rates of self-inflicted deaths in prisons” (Crighton and 
Towl 2008:188).  Only after about two months in detention does the risk of suicide 
subside (Crighton and Towl 2008).  A British study of prisoners serving life sentences, a 
category of prisoner already known to be at a higher risk for suicide, examined a 
somewhat different pattern in the suicidal lifers’ time between prison reception and death, 
but one that attests to how early in their incarceration prisoners are likely to suicide.  
About half were likely to kill themselves within a year of conviction, and about half after 
a year (Borrill 2002).  
Prisoners who commit suicide have had childhoods marked by, e.g., poor family 
support, delinquency, or psychiatric treatment, and have slightly more prior convictions 
than those who do not commit suicide (Liebling 1999).  They tend to have committed 
crimes against people, with those committing homicides having the highest rates of 
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suicide (Crighton and Towl 2008; Borrill 2002; Lester and Danto 1993; Anno 1985; but 
see Liebling 1999:297, citing contradictory findings).   
Liebling (1999) and Anno (1985) suggest that those who killed their own family 
members are at particularly high risk of suicide.  The higher risk for those who killed a 
family member suggests a possible continuum between those who suicide in custody for 
an IPV-related homicide and conventional murder-suicides.  Perpetrators of murder-
suicides are generally male and their victims are generally their current or estranged 
wives or girlfriends.  They typically are white and are older than other murderers.  The 
offenses are usually linked to a disruption in the romantic relationship where the 
perpetrator fears losing the victim.  They tend not to have serious criminal histories, but 
do have a history of depression (Eliason 2009; Liem, Hengeveld & Koenraadt 2009; 
Liem, Postulart, & Nieuwbeerta 2009; Starzomski and Nussbaum 2000; Stack 1997).   
One study of homicide-parasuicides also found that uxoricides (homicide of a 
spouse), whether or not committed by a suicide attempt, were typically motivated by 
“fear of abandonment or narcissistic rage” (Liem, Hengeveld & Koenraadt 2009:506).  In 
the latter case, “[w]hen self-esteem is lowered or threatened by rejection or divorce, 
aggression arises as in instrument of recovery” (id. at 511).  The suicide attempt was 
linked to “feelings of guilt related to the homicide, fear of judicial consequences, or a 
wish to be reunited with the victim in death” (id. at 509).   
Liem and her colleagues speculate that the older age of homicide-suicide 
perpetrators:  
[C]an be ascribed to the difficulty to respond [sic] to life-changing events that 
jeopardize self-concept, such as … a breakdown in the marital relationship.  
Replacing these identity supports … as an intimate partner is more difficult for an 
older person than it is for a younger person in the same predicament (Liem, 
Hengeveld & Koenraadt 2009:510).   
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Mental illness puts prisoners at higher risk for suicide, though not always in ways 
we might expect.  As in the free world, suicide in prison is associated with histories of 
substance abuse and/or mental illness (Fazel 2008; Baillargeon et al 2009), but not at the 
same rate as in the free world.  Liebling (1999) found that only about a third of prisoners 
who completed a suicide had a history of mental illness, in contrast with 80%-90% in the 
free world.  She explains: “A high proportion are found to have psychological difficulties 
falling short of a formal psychiatric diagnosis, such as alcohol or drug problems, 
personality disorders or borderline personality disorders, self-reported anxiety and 
depression” (Liebling 1999: 296).2  Liebling notes that a “disproportionate number” were 
diagnosed with personality disorders (1999:318).  The review of Texas prisoner suicides 
undertaken by Baillargeon et al. (2009) found major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, 
schizophrenia and nonschizophrenic psychotic disorder put prisoners at higher risk of 
suicide.   
Prison conditions also matter and may interact dangerously with mental disorders.  
Those in more secure, segregated, or single cells have higher rates of suicide (Fazel 2008; 
Tartaro and Lester 2008; Liebling 1999; Lester and Danto 1993).  The administrative 
segregation conditions in which Texas death row prisoners now live have been linked to 
heightened anxiety and paranoia, hallucinations, self-mutilation, suicidal ideation and 
suicide attempts, hopelessness, and aggression (Haney 2003).  In addition, people with 
certain psychological disorders, particularly those related to impulse control problems, 
brain damage, and personality disorders, appear to be at particular risk (Madrid v. Gomez 
                                                 
2  This discrepancy may also reflect barriers to mental health care in prison and reluctance to characterize a 
prisoner’s behavior as the product of mental illness (Rhodes 2004). 
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1995).  These are among the problems Cunningham and Vigen (2002) identified death 
row prisoners as having.   
While the literature on prisoner suicide helps structure an examination of the 
Texas EH data, it does not capture another critical aspect of these prisoners’s lives, 
namely that they live under a death sentence.  Managing this confrontation with mortality 
– facing how to “get dead” (Green 2008:18) – is a different task than contending with the 
pains of imprisonment.  Therefore, I consider some of the research on desires to hasten 
death among those with terminal illness.  The analogy between living under a literal 
death sentence and living with a diagnosis of a terminal illness is sometimes invoked in 
these cases by mental health professionals and also in some of the legal literature (D. 
Martinez, federal court order July 29, 2007, 3; Milner 1998; Johnson 1981).  
Unfortunately, it is generally uninformed by empirical research on those living with 
terminal illness.  Those who use this analogy treat as a given that those living with a 
terminal illness want to hasten death, and/or that individuals living under a death sentence 
will inevitably face execution.  Research on decisions to hasten death (DHD) among 
people with severe and terminal illness reflects their nuanced thinking with respect to 
hastening death (Nissim, Gagliese, Rodin 2009).  Further, even Texas’s vigorous use of 
the death penalty does not result in the execution of everyone sentenced to death (Snell 
2011). 
Among those living with terminal illness, researchers have found that desires to 
hasten death are transitory (Hudson et al. 2006; see also Covinsky et al. 2000 regarding 
transient wishes for CPR among those with serious illness).  In addition, they are often 
occasioned by particularly discouraging events (Nissim, Gagliese & Rodin 2009; 
Johansen et al. 2005).  Some patients report that their desire to hasten death “was most 
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profound at the time of diagnosis.  For others, it was triggered by waiting for medical 
appointments, by receiving disappointing test results, or by the exacerbation of physical 
symptoms” (Nissim, Gagliese & Rodin 2009:169).  This is consistent with suicide 
research findings that stressful life events increase risk of decisions to hasten death (Nock 
et al. 2008).   
Family ties could help very ill patients maintain a desire to live, whether to see 
children grow up and/or because of a “sense of duty and commitment” toward their 
children (id. at 169).  They also feared that hastening their deaths would pain and 
stigmatize their children.  Some individuals with terminal illnesses, however, connected 
their desire to hasten death to the burden they perceived as imposing on others, including 
family members (Mak and Elwyn 2005). 
TOWARDS A THEORETICAL MODEL 
Based on this literature, I identified the following variables as potentially 
associated with decisions to hasten death:  sex, age, temporal patterns with respect to 
when the decision occurs within the span of incarceration, triggering events, childhood 
factors such as poor family support, delinquency, or childhood psychiatric treatment, 
number of prior convictions, crimes against people, killing family members, mental 
illness, and prison conditions.  
 
In addition to coding data related to these variables, I also sought to adapt my 
inquiry to the specific situation of the population under study, namely that all were in 
prison for having committed a violent offense.   
To discriminate among violent offenses, I separated gun deaths from non-gun 
deaths, since the amount of effort required to kill someone with a gun is usually less than 
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with other lethal instruments.  If it is the experience of inflicting violence that contributes 
to hastening decisions to hasten death, distinguishing between those who fire a gun and 
those who, e.g., use their bare hands or blunt instruments, could be useful.  (None of the 
cases involved less violent lethal methods such as poisoning.) 
Social scientists have also found important differences in group and individual 
offending.  Acting in groups may encourage offending by diffusing responsibility 
(Alarid, Burton, and Hochstetler 2009).  Conversely, solo offending may concentrate a 
sense of greater responsibility in the individual actor, both in the eyes of actor and those 
around him.  This greater responsibility may be linked to a conclusion that the individual 
offended for dispositional rather than situational reasons (Feldman and Rosen 1978).  
Shame and guilt have been linked to an increased risk of suicide (Lester 1997; Hendin 
and Haas 1991).  To capture this dynamic of intensified responsibility, I coded whether 
the offender committed the capital crime with another person.   
 While I propose a theoretical model, the small population prevents any testing in 
the conventional sense.  Instead, I use it as a tool to organize conceptually the processes 
and factors that may lead to abandoning appeals.  As the figure indicates, I hypothesize 
that multiple processes contribute to persuade a condemned prisoner to abandon his 
appeals.  One, negative childhood experiences, such as parental abuse or neglect, 
delinquency or psychiatric intervention, may make him vulnerable to desires to hasten 
death.  Two, experiences related to the capital crime and prior offending may shape the 
prisoner’s sense of self and his “just deserts.”  I call this “social culpability” to invoke the 
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social constructedness of feelings of guilt.  Third, I incorporate both prison conditions 
and dynamic factors as contributing to an enhanced motivation to waive appeals.  The 
role of social integration is less clear as the literature on those with terminal illness shows 



















































CONSTRUCTING MEANING IN DEATH 
Wray et al. complain that sociologists have neglected the “social and cultural 
meanings” of hastening death (2011:509).  While objective indicators such as the type of 
prison or the number of prior convictions and characteristics of the capital crime can help 
us identify pathways to desires to hasten execution, how EHs explain their deaths also 
warrants attention.  I therefore examine the subjective meanings of hastening execution to 
highlight the social context of the desire to hasten death (Scourfield et al. 2012).  While 
the data may suggest that EHs in fact resemble prison suicides in important ways, their 
normative significance and subjective meanings may be quite different.   
Jack Douglas (1967) has emphasized the importance of incorporating questions 
about meaning into sociological studies of suicide.  Those hastening death make their 
decision within a certain cultural framework.  As Douglas points out, there are different 
kinds of suicide and the ambiguity of the language of suicide reflects the ambiguity of the 
social meaning of suicide (Douglas 1967:248).     
There are … many shared associated terms:  despair, unhappiness, life is not 
worthwhile, escape from harsh realities, etc.  And there do seem to be certain 
basic dimensions of meaning for which these are slightly variant means of 
expression.  But these terms are also clearly not sui generis to the phenomena 
themselves.  On the contrary, they are terms from many other areas of experience.  
They are terms adopted from various spheres of experience for the purposes of 
constructing meanings for these suicidal phenomena. … [T]here is variability, 
ambiguity, and conflict in the imputations of the linguistic categories, including 
the fundamental category of ‘suicide,’ (or ‘suicidal’) itself (1967:247) (emphasis 
in original).   
As Maris observed, self-destruction can be “positively valued, prescribed, 
encouraged by suicidal role models” (1981:xix).  Decisions to hasten death among the 
condemned are situated within a specific cultural setting of the death penalty, and all of 
these acts of self-destruction involve individuals convicted of murder and sentenced to 
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death.  This common denominator provides some idea of “the fundamental significance 
of the ways in which specific events, symbols, etc., are related by individuals to each 
other” (Douglas 1967:252) (emphasis in original).  The acts of self-destruction in the 
context of the death penalty may be socially constructed as positive social acts.   
In addition, the social meaning of a particular self-destructive act does not depend 
solely on social context.  Individuals are also active in constructing the meaning of the 
self-destruction, which can therefore vary from the perspective of the individual. 
I would argue that the structure one finds in the meanings of specific suicidal 
phenomena is not given by the transmitted culture, though some of the specific 
meanings and criteria that make this structure possible are so given, but that the 
individuals involved construct this structure of meanings.  Though the possible 
(or plausible) meanings of these phenomena are primarily determined by the 
shared, cultural meanings which are culturally defined as relevant to these 
phenomena (including the criteria of various sort) and by the shared context of 
meanings given to the individuals involved by their past interactions, the specific, 
actualized meanings of these phenomena will be in large measure determined by 
the intentional actions of the individuals involved. (Douglas 1967:253)  (emphasis 
in original).   
In striking a balance for a larger understanding of the situated meaning of 
hastening execution, I sacrifice Douglas’ fine-grained contextual analysis, but adhere to 
his larger vision of “work[ing] from the clearly observable, concrete phenomena upward 
to abstractions about meanings” (1967:253) through careful readings of the explanations 
for their actions offered by EHs and those who knew them.  I examine “the influence of 
imitation and cultural norms on the patterning of suicide rates” (Wray, Colen, and 
Pescosolido 2011:515), by taking into account the repertoire of cultural norms EHs draw 





Procedural and Historical Overview of Hastening Execution 
This chapter first outlines the system of appeals ordinarily pursued in Texas death 
penalty cases to contextualize the EHs’ actions.  While Texas’ system has a few 
peculiarities – such as its “unitary” system (discussed below) and two courts of final 
resort (the Supreme Court for civil appeals and the Court of Criminal Appeals for 
criminal appeals) – it largely resembles that of other states.  The chapter then describes 
the United States Supreme Court cases that establish the contours of the legal inquiry 
guiding execution-hastening, as well as particularly important Texas execution-hastening 
cases. 
THE TEXAS DEATH PENALTY CONVICTION, SENTENCING, AND APPEALS PROCESS 
 
If a defendant is sentenced to death, he has three principal and basically sequential 









                                                        
 




Figure 2:  Structure of legal appeals. 
The first appeal is called a “direct appeal,” in which the prisoner typically argues 
to the Texas’s highest criminal court, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA), that 
the trial judge made erroneous legal rulings in the course of the trial (“record claims,” 
i.e., claims based on the court record of the case).  This appeal is automatic by statute 
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and automatically to the highest state court with jurisdiction over criminal cases 
“promote[s] the evenhanded, rational, and consistent imposition of death sentences under 
law” (Jurek v. Texas 1976: 276).  Some of the TCCA’s rulings can be reviewed by the 
United States Supreme Court, but such review is discretionary and rarely granted. 
The second appeal, variously called a “collateral attack,” “post-conviction 
appeal,” or “state habeas proceeding,” provides the prisoner an opportunity to argue to 
the state court that he deprived of a fair adjudication of his case by events outside the trial 
(“nonrecord claims,” i.e., errors that are not reflected in the record because they occurred 
outside the courtroom).  Typical claims allege prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory or 
mitigating evidence, ineffective performance by defense counsel at trial or on appeal, 
and/or misconduct by the jury.  The trial court enters “findings of fact” and “conclusions 
of law” and forwards those to the TCCA for review.  The TCCA then decides whether to 
grant or deny relief (Texas CCP Art. 11.071 §§4, 8, 9, 11).  Some of these rulings can 
also be appealed to the United States Supreme Court, although the success rate of such 
requests for discretionary review is lower than on direct appeal. 
The 1995 revision to Texas’ state habeas procedures, among other things, 
instituted a “unitary” system in which the state habeas proceedings are initiated before 
the direct appeal was completed.  Under the new statute, the state habeas petition must be 
filed either 180 days after direct appeal counsel is appointed – which is to occur 
immediately after trial – or 45 days after the State’s brief on direct appeal, whichever date 
is later (Tex. CCP Art. 11.071§4(a)). 
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The final avenue of appeal essentially combines all federal constitutional claims 
raised on direct appeal and state habeas.  These claims are presented to the federal district 
court in a petition for writ of habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. 2254).  An adverse adjudication 
by the federal district court may be appealed to the federal appellate court, in Texas, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.  Since the passage of the 1996 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, federal appeals are permitted on an issue-
by-issue (and no longer on a case-by-case) basis.  Permission to appeal a particular legal 
issue must be granted by either the district court or the Court of Appeals (28 U.S.C. § 
2253).  If the Court of Appeals affirms the district court’s denial of relief, the condemned 
prisoner may seek discretionary review of the Court of Appeals’ decision in the United 
States Supreme Court.  After this point, a few prisoners may have the option of filing a 
new, “successive” petition in state or federal court (Texas CCP Art. 11.071 Sec. 5; 28 
U.S.C. § 2244(b)).  Because there is no constitutional or statutory right to counsel for this 
kind of appeal, and because the legal requirements for obtaining review of a successive 
petition are even more stringent than those for succeeding in the other three types of 
appeals, few claims qualify and the prospects for success are slim. 
REPRESENTATION BY COUNSEL 
 
In Texas’s modern death penalty era, counsel have been appointed for indigent 
litigants at trial, on direct appeal, and in federal habeas proceedings (21 U.S.C. § 848).  
Until the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 11.071 was enacted in 1995, counsel 
were occasionally, but rarely, appointed for Texas state habeas litigants.  Prior to Art. 
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11.071, the State would ask the trial court to set an execution date after the TCCA 
affirmed the conviction and sentence on direct appeal.  At this juncture, a federally-
funded organization called the Texas Resource Center attempted to recruit counsel to 
represent these prisoners pro bono.  (In a minority of cases, the Texas Resource Center 
agreed to represent the prisoner.)  The execution date essentially served as a de facto 
deadline for state or federal habeas proceedings as prisoner’s counsel asked courts to stay 
the execution to enable the court to hear the prisoner’s claims.     
The introduction of appointed counsel in state habeas represented an important 
juncture for the Texas history of execution-hastening procedurally, if not substantively.  
Where some would previously simply accept the post-direct appeal execution date and 
decline further proceedings, the 1995 statute created a formal juncture where the decision 
to be represented by counsel (and impliedly pursue appeals) is made.  The State of Texas 
has also abandoned its policy of asking courts to set execution dates in order to expedite 
the review of the prisoner’s case.   
Fewer execution dates create fewer opportunities to abandon appeals.  At the 
same time, the 1995 statute introduced an earlier decision-point.  Art. 11.071, which 
governs only state habeas proceedings, provides in relevant part: 
If a defendant is sentenced to death the convicting court, immediately after 
judgment is entered under Article 42.01, shall determine if the defendant is 
indigent and, if so, whether the defendant desires appointment of counsel for the 
purpose of a writ of habeas corpus (Art. 11.071§2(b)). 
 
In other words, Art. 11.071 established a formal mechanism to ascertain whether 
the prisoner desired to represent themselves and proceed pro se.  As discussed in greater 
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detail below, Texas execution-hasteners commonly moved to proceed pro se to prevent 
further appeals.  They would be permitted to represent themselves and then would take 
no further action on their own behalf.  Art. 11.071 created the mechanism through which 
they could accomplish this. 
In addition, Art. 11.071 formally designated a decision point for electing to go pro 
se that follows very shortly after a death sentence is pronounced.  The court must 
determine “immediately” after judgment whether the prisoner wants representation in 
post-conviction.  Art. 11.071 also increased the formality of the waiver proceedings.  
Prior to Art. 11.071, the prisoner’s decision to waive further appeals would usually 
surface in the course of a hearing to set an execution date.  These proceedings, while 
usually transcribed, at least in part, would not be reviewed by the Court of Criminal 
Appeals.  Since Art. 11.071, the TCCA has required the trial courts to make the required 
findings (sometimes remanding the case back to the trial court in order to obtain those 
findings), and issued orders reflecting the TCCA’s review of the record supporting those 
findings.  Because the waiver of appeals is subject to appellate review, the documentation 
of the waiver has become more formal and centralized in the TCCA files. 
COURT CASES SETTING LEGAL STANDARDS FOR HASTENING EXECUTION 
 
Courts evaluate decisions to abandon appeals according to four criteria: the 
prisoner must make a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his rights to appeal 
and must be mentally competent (Godinez v. Moran 1993; Rees v. Peyton 1966).  These 
criteria are commonly applied in other parts of the criminal justice system.  In accepting a 
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guilty plea, for example, the court engages in a (usually rote) colloquy with the defendant 
designed to elicit the defendant’s agreement that he understands that by pleading guilty, 
he abandons certain constitutional trial rights (the “knowing” criterion), that he has not 
been coerced into giving up these rights (the “voluntary” requirement), and this decision 
reflects that the defendant, having been advised by counsel, understands of the charges 
against him and the consequences of his plea (the “intelligent” waiver) (Brady v. United 
States 1970). 
The competency determination is the crux of the legal life of the execution-
hastener.   Only if the prisoner is found incompetent can others – such as parents – move 
to intervene as a “next friend” to continue the appeals (Gilmore v. Utah 1976; Whitmore 
v. Arkansas 1999; Baal v. Demosthenes 1990). 
In the context of death-sentenced prisoners waiving appeals, courts also generally 
cite the Supreme Court’s 1966 decision in Rees v. Peyton, which asked whether the 
prisoner had the “capacity to appreciate his position and make a rational choice with 
respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation or on the other hand whether he is 
suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may substantially affect his 
capacity in the premises” (1966:314).  In Rumbaugh v. Procunier (1985), the Fifth 
Circuit confronted a tension inherent in this standard as mental health professionals 
testified that Rumbaugh grasped the logical consequences of his decision, but his 
decision was substantially affected by a mental disease, namely severe depression.  The 
Fifth Circuit then refined its interpretation of Rees by restricting the judicial 
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determination of competence to whether the prisoner’s decision was “the product of a 
reasonable assessment of the legal and medical facts and a reasoned thought process” 
(1985:402).   That this “rational decision-making process” took place within a severe 
depression that “contribute[d] to his invitation of death” was legally irrelevant so long as 
he was aware of his situation and his options (id).  In other words, the court need only 
“inquire about the discrete capacity to understand and make rational decisions concerning 
the proceedings at issue, and the presence or absence of mental illness or brain disorder is 
not dispositive” (Mata v. Johnson 2000:329 n.2). 
After the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Rumbaugh, the Supreme Court considered the 
case of Godinez v. Moran (1993), where it had to decide whether certain types of waivers 
required different types of mental competencies.   Similar to Rumbaugh, Moran had a 
prior suicide attempt, “deep depression,” and took psychiatric medication (Godinez v. 
Moran 1993:409-411).  Harmonious with Rumbaugh’s holding, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the Constitution required only a single type of mental competency, namely that the 
prisoner have “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable 
degree of rational understanding” and have “a rational as well as factual understanding of 
the proceedings against him” (Godinez v. Moran 1993).  Therefore, it found the trial 
court correctly permitted Moran to plead guilty to capital murder and discharge his 
attorneys in order to prevent the presentation of evidence against the death penalty.  
Moran was: 
[C]ompetent in that he knew the nature and quality of his acts, had the capacity to 
determine right from wrong; that he understands the nature of the criminal 
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charges against him and is able to assist in his defense of such charges, or against 
the pronouncement of the judgment thereafter; that he knows the consequences of 
entering a plea of guilty to the charges; and that he can intelligently and 
knowingly waive his constitutional right to assistance of an attorney (Moran v. 
Godinez 1993:392). 
 
The Moran dissenters protested: “the majority upholds the death sentence for a 
person whose decision to discharge counsel, plead guilty, and present no defense well 
may have been the product of medication or mental illness” (1993:409).  The majority 
opinion noted, “[r]equiring that a criminal defendant be competent has a modest aim:  It 
seeks to ensure that he has the capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist 
counsel” (1993:402). 
IMPORTANT TEXAS CASES 
 
Two Texas cases in addition to Rumbaugh warrant mention.  In Mata v. Johnson, 
(2000), the Fifth Circuit reversed a district court determination of competency where the 
district court refused to hold an evidentiary hearing and based its ruling on limited and 
dated information.  In that case, the federal district judge found Mata competent in 1998, 
based on expert reports prepared in 1985.  The Fifth Circuit held: 
[I]f the evidence before the district court raises a bona fide issue of petitioner's 
competency to waive collateral review of a capital conviction and death sentence, 
the court can afford such petitioner adequate due process by ordering and 
reviewing a current examination by a qualified medical or mental health expert, 
allowing the parties to present any other evidence relevant to the question of 
competency and, on the record and in open court, questioning the petitioner 
concerning the knowing and voluntary nature of his decision to waive further 




Mata is important insofar as it established that a hearing to determine 
contemporaneous competence was required where there is evidence of incompetence.  
However, because so few execution-hasteners wait until federal court to waive their 
appeals and because most state courts conduct some kind of hearing (however 
problematic, as outlined in Chapter 6), the case of George Lott has had a greater impact. 
In 1992, George Lott was accused of entering a Tarrant County courtroom and 
shooting to death two lawyers and seriously injuring three others, including two judges.  
After the shooting, Lott went to a local television station and gave an interview about 
committing the crime.  A former attorney, Lott represented himself at trial.  He contested 
his guilt, presenting a case that the eyewitnesses testifying against him were mistaken, 
and that his post-crime television interview simply represented an opportunistic effort to 
air his many quarrels with the judicial system by falsely taking responsibility for the 
crime.  Unpersuaded, the jury convicted him and then sentenced him to death. 
At the conclusion of trial, Lott indicated he would continue to represent himself 
on appeal.  The TCCA explained the subsequent sequence of events: 
On June 1, 1993, appellant filed a motion for an extension of time to file the 
statement of facts and requisite affidavit. Appellant's motion was granted on June 
4, 1993, and the Statement of Facts [transcript of the trial testimony] was filed on 
July 15, 1993. Appellant's brief was due to be filed on or before August 16, 1993. 
On September 10, 1993, we advised appellant that his brief had been due on 
August 16, and directed him to either file his brief or seek an extension of time. 
Having received neither a brief nor a request for an extension of time, on October 
4, 1993, we ordered appellant to file his brief on or before January 14, 1994. We 
also informed appellant that no request for an extension of time beyond that date 
would be entertained, and that in the event no brief was filed on or before that 
date, the cause would be submitted for summary decision without the benefit of 




 In other words, Lott indicated he wanted to appeal and took the necessary 
preparatory steps.  However, he failed to file a brief, even after the TCCA wrote ordering 
him to file a brief.  It did not hold a hearing to find out why he had not filed any briefs 
(id. at 688 n.2).  The TCCA reasoned that had Lott been represented by counsel, a 
hearing would have been required.  Since he represented himself, none was.   
The TCCA then found: 
Appellant has not filed a brief on his behalf in this appeal.  We therefore 
submitted the case without the benefit of briefs and, in the interest of justice, 
reviewed the entire record.  Having found no unassigned fundamental error, we 
affirm the judgment of the trial court (id. at 688) (footnotes omitted). 
 
The Texas Resource Center subsequently filed an motion urging the court at least 
to convene a hearing at which Lott could be questioned regarding his failure to file a 
brief, and if necessary, to inquire into his competency (Suggestion by Amicus Curiae that 
the Court, on Its Own Motion, Extend Time for Filing Motion for Reharding and Order 
Other Appropriate Relief, filed May 10, 1994).  The TCCA denied the Texas Resource 
Center’s motion. 
The TCCA’s resolution of Lott’s situation was noteworthy in at least three 
respects.  First, the TCCA invented a new legal category – “fundamental error” – that is 
undefined and used in no other legal context.  Therefore, it is not clear what the TCCA is 
looking for as it reviews the trial record for error.  Second, it created a new category of 
non-adversarial legal review.  The law already provided for a quasi-non-adversarial 
mechanism to review direct appeal cases that appear to have no viable legal claims 
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(Anders v. California 1967).  In those cases, a brief must be filed that identifies possible 
legal errors, and provides legal argument why the law is clear that those errors do not 
undermine the reliability of the verdict.  The appellate court considers this briefing in 
deciding whether to affirm the conviction and sentence.  In Lott’s case, the TCCA did not 
even have the benefit of this minimal briefing.  Finally, and perhaps most disturbingly, by 
not requiring Lott to account for his failure to file a brief, the TCCA had no way – at least 
reflected in its court files – to know whether Lott may have been either mentally or 
physically incapable of filing an appeal.  The TCCA file contains no indication that Lott 
wanted to drop his appeals other than his non-responsiveness to the Court’s 
correspondence.  On the contrary, it documents his efforts to prepare the record for an 
appeal.  Before Lott, attorneys and prisoners believed that where the Texas statute said 
that direct appeal was “automatic,” it meant that that briefing at that stage could not be 
waived.  After Lott it was clear that was not case.   
If there were any doubts of the TCCA’s willingness to decide death penalty cases 
without the benefit of briefing, they were dispelled in Christopher Jay Swift’s case.  
During the sentencing phase of his trial, Swift refused to permit his lawyers to present 
mitigating evidence, i.e., information intended to persuade the jury to sentence him to life 
rather than death.  Swift explained to the court he wanted the death penalty because 
voices in his head “haunt me daily, and I feel that, you know, death is going to be the 
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only thing that takes them away” (State v. Swift RR 35:34).3  Swift’s direct appeal lawyer 
filed a substantial brief arguing that imposing the death penalty under these 
circumstances violated the Constitution.  After Swift was granted the right to proceed pro 
se, the TCCA “unfiled” or removed from the record of the case the brief filed by counsel, 
and did not consider it in affirming Swift’s conviction and sentence (Sept. 20, 2006, 
Order).  As detailed below, the TCCA’s two-page opinion in Lott has had significant 
consequences for hastening execution in Texas.   
SUMMARY 
There are essentially three different primary stages of appeal:  direct appeal, 
which challenges legal rulings by the trial court; state habeas, where the petitioner argues 
that events outside the courtroom (like a cheating prosecutor or an incompetent defense 
lawyer) deprived him of a constitutional trial; and federal habeas, where federal 
constitutional issues previously raised on direct appeal and state habeas are presented 
first to the federal district court, and, if a court permits, to the federal court of appeals. 
Until 1995, condemned prisoners were not provided with counsel for state habeas 
proceedings.  Instead, a network of volunteer counsel was tapped to provide 
representation.  State courts would use execution dates as a way to spur filing of state and 
federal habeas petitions.  Since 1995, appellate counsel is appointed soon after trial, and 
the 1995 statute also provides the condemned the opportunity to waive state habeas 
counsel immediately after trial.  Since the 1994 Lott decision, the condemned have been 
                                                 
3 Citations to the court transcript or “Reporter’s Record” are noted “RR,” followed by the volume number.  
The Clerk’s Record is referred to as “CR.”  For simplicity, I do not use the conventional caption of State v. 
[appellant] and Ex parte [habeas petitioner], and simply cite them here by last name.  “Supp. CR” and 




permitted to waive adversarial review of direct appeal, the first appeal after conviction 
and sentencing. 
In order to waive appeals, the condemned prisoner must make a knowing, 
voluntary and intelligent decision.  He must also be mentally competent, which has been 
narrowly interpreted to require him to have only the capacity to understand the 
proceedings and, through a reasoned thought process, appreciate the logical consequences 
of his decision to waive appeals.  The fact that mental illness contributes to the thought 
processes does not make the prisoner incompetent.  Family members may intervene to 





Study Design and Method 
This is a study of condemned Texas prisoners who succeeded in hastening their 
execution.  To be included in the study, the prisoner must have succeeded in abandoning 
the legal appeals conventionally pursue by death row prisoners, namely direct appeal to 
the TCCA, state habeas, and federal habeas. Not included in this study are death-
sentenced prisoners who waived appeals and then managed to resume them in part 
(usually with dramatically limited legal claims).  Prisoners who expressed a desire to 
waive appeals to courts, the media, or others but who did not act on this desire were also 
not included.  Therefore, this study reflects a very conservative estimate of desires to 
hasten death among condemned prisoners and represents a relatively narrow study of 
EHs.  A review of the files of the comparison group (that was admittedly selected to 
include prisoners believed to have expressed at some point desires to waive appeals, as 
long as they met the other sample criteria) revealed that almost of quarter of that group 
took some formal action to waive appeals.   
DEVELOPING DATA REGARDING SUBJECT POPULATION 
This study is designed as a sort of “sociological autopsy” where I examined 
individual case files in order to identify social phenomena (Scourfield et al. 2012).  
Identifying the subjects of this study was an unexpected challenge.  I first searched the 
Death Penalty Information Center (DPIC) Executions Database 
(http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions) for prisoners executed by the State of Texas 
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whom DPIC coded as “volunteers.”  DPIC codes as “volunteers” those prisoners who 
waive available legal appeals.  It excludes, therefore, prisoners who pursue legal 
remedies, but do not seek clemency.  It also excludes those prisoners who abandoned 
their appeals at one point, but then changed their minds, regardless of whether the courts 
permitted them to resume their appeals (Vandiver et al. 2008).   
I then reviewed court files and consulted with longtime Texas death penalty 
attorneys to confirm these individuals indeed met my criteria for execution-hasteners.  I 
also asked informants whether they were aware of any other condemned prisoners who 
sought to waive their appeals.  A few identified some who had mentioned it or who had 
waived one stage of proceedings, only to pick them up later.  Newspaper reports 
sometimes provided leads.  In covering the execution of one EH, they might mention 
others as historical background.  Case citations would sometimes signal a prisoner’s 
decision to abandon appeals.  In general, however, legal database searches of court 
opinions in Texas were poor sources of information regarding execution-hasteners.  As 
discussed in greater detail below, many abandoned their appeals in state habeas 
proceedings.  Any orders from the trial-level courts interacting with the prisoner would 
generally not be included Westlaw, the legal database I used.  Until 1995, these decisions 
were not even reviewed by the TCCA.  Even now, when the TCCA does review these 
decisions, it issues one or two page orders affirming the trial court’s factual findings and 
legal conclusions about the waiver of appeals.  Neither these orders nor the trial courts’ 
rulings are generally reported in Westlaw.  Further, whether a prisoner forfeited a stage of 
review and then managed to resume his appeals may not be explicitly noted in any 
opinion or order submitted to electronic legal research databases.   
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Based on my criteria – that the prisoner succeeded in waiving his conventional 
course of appeals and was executed without resuming those appeals – I eliminated one 
prisoner listed by DPIC (Peter Miniel) because, as mentioned above, this man decided 
against “successor” litigation, which is not routinely pursued by Texas death-sentenced 
prisoners.  I ultimately included two individuals, Danielle Simpson and Robert 
Streetman, apparently excluded by DPIC because they tried at some juncture to reinstate 
their appeals.  I considered it appropriate to include them in this study because their 
wavering appears to have occurred only after last minute intervention of new lawyers 
specialized in death penalty litigation.  These lawyers are generally taught to oppose 
client efforts to waive appeals (Inf. 20:4).  In addition, what the prisoners ultimately 
wanted is hard to discern in the heat of litigation under the pressure of an execution date.   
Through the NAACP Legal Defense Fund publication “Death Row USA” and 
professional networks, I also identified two other prisoners (Richard Foster and Robert 
Anderson) who abandoned their appeals, but were not listed as “volunteers” in the DPIC 
execution database.  A complete list of my subject population, as well as of my 
comparison groups, is provided in the Appendix.  Based on this research, I concluded 31 
prisoners had been executed by the State of Texas after abandoning their appeals.   
 Once I identified the prisoner as a subject, I requested the file from either the 
Texas State Library and Archives Commission or the TCCA.  Those files had to be 
reviewed on-site.  This is not a perfect system.  At least two cases appear not to have 
been recorded, making them unfindable.  In Jeffrey Barney’s case, the TCCA listed a 
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cause number for a habeas action, but appears to have no file associated with it.  (I 
ultimately examined Mr. Barney’s file in the trial court.)  According to a federal court 
opinion, Charles Rumbaugh filed a habeas action to stave off next-friend litigation, but 
the TCCA had no record of it.  James Smith’s file appears to have been lost.  (I was able 
to piece together the file from the Texas Resource Center documents at the Dolph Briscoe 
Center for American History and next friend’s counsel’s file.)  Fortunately, the more 
recent case files are more systematically maintained. 
 In reviewing the files, I took detailed, often verbatim notes.  Depending on the 
complexity of the case (often associated with the age of the case), my summaries ranged 
from three to 44 single-spaced pages.  Occasionally, I made copies of particular 
proceedings.  I did not read carefully every document in every file, but I looked at every 
loose page in the file.  In addition, I read certain documents that regularly yielded useful 
information.  If any of those documents suggested anything of interest in another part of 
the file, I would read that other part of the file.   
More specifically, in examining the court file, I read five basic sets of documents.  
I reviewed the docket sheet that logs all trial events.  This document alerted me to 
unusual events, as well as the pedestrian.  Through docket sheets, I learned of James 
Smith’s suicide and escape attempts during trial and that “Defendant  [Robert Atworth] 
sentenced to Death at 7:10 pm.  Defendant laughed during sentencing” (CR 7).  I was 
particularly attentive to any remarks involving the defendant.  Notes that the defendant 
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testified or made requests in the courtroom sometimes reflected efforts by the defendant 
to, e.g., proceed pro se or circumscribe the presentation of evidence.   
 Another critical source of information was the “Clerk’s Record,” a compilation of 
all the official court documents filed at trial.  In addition to containing the docket sheets, 
the Clerk’s Record (CR) includes all the motions filed in the court and the court’s orders.  
Sometimes the CR contains mental health reports.  I took very careful notes on these 
reports not only to gain some appreciation of how the defendant appeared to a mental 
health evaluator at the time, but also to get a more general sense of what the defendant 
was like outside the more constraining court proceedings.  The CR would also sometimes 
contain handwritten motions and letters from the defendant.  These could provide some 
clues about the defendant and what he wanted out of the trial.  I would also review the 
index of documents in the CR to have some sense of how aggressively litigated the case 
was.  I ultimately decided not to code for this, concluding that the fact that a case was not 
aggressively litigated did not reliably indicate that the defendant did not want an 
aggressive defense.  It might have simply reflected poor performance by counsel.   
I also looked at the appellate briefs to get a sense of the type of crime that had 
been committed and any unusual events at trial.  In addition, I used the State’s brief to 
corroborate my understanding of the defendant’s criminal history since that was usually 
an important part of its statement of facts of the case. 
I scanned transcripts of court proceedings (the “Reporter’s Record” or RR) for 
instances when the defendant spoke or testified.  I would read more closely pretrial 
39 
 
proceedings because, as these are not conducted in the presence of the jury, judges 
seemed more likely to address the defendant directly, if only to ask, e.g., whether he had 
any complaints about his representation.  Defendants would sometimes use this time to 
raise grievances with or make requests to the judge.  In addition, I read mental health 
testimony in both the guilt/innocence and punishment phases of the case, as well as the 
punishment phase case, particularly any testimony from close friends or family members.  
I scanned trial exhibits to see whether they contained any writings by the defendant.  If 
the file contained documents regarding mental competence at any stage, I read those 
documents closely.   
A surprisingly rich source of data came from a manila folder contained in almost 
every file.  The folder would have the case number handwritten vertically on the front 
flap.  This folder contained correspondence between the court reporters and lawyers and 
the court regarding extensions of time.  I often found correspondence from EHs in this 
file asking for appeals to be halted.  (Christopher Jay Swift was sufficiently prolific to 
have an entire manila folder for his correspondence.)   
 In addition to noting the substantively interesting contents of the documents, I 
created a timeline of the case based on these documents.  This timeline included 
information such as the date of the offense, the date of trial, the periods of jury 
deliberations, filing of appellate briefs and opinions, court orders, correspondence from 
the prisoner, any competency or waiver court proceedings, execution date, etc.  I also 
noted the names of individuals who might have information about the prisoner.      
40 
 
Where I had reason to believe the Archives or TCCA files did not reflect all the 
litigation surrounding the waiver,4 I examined files maintained by the trial court and 
accessible to me, but I did not review all trial court records in each case.  When I learned, 
e.g., that Richard Beavers had undergone some kind of competency evaluation, I went to 
Harris County to review that file.  (I would learn of these events through interviews 
and/or media coverage.) 
My access to federal court files was considerably more limited because of the 
relative inaccessibility in the federal archives.
5
  For federal court proceedings, I either 
obtained transcripts of the federal court hearing, reviewed the court orders disposing of 
the prisoners’ request, or read media coverage. 
For each member of the subject population, I also conducted LEXIS-NEXIS news 
searches usually with their names and “Texas,” and sometimes “murder” and/or 
“capital,” depending on the results.  In addition, for both the subject population and the 
comparison group, I conducted google searches by the prisoner’s name and “Texas Death 
Row” and “Texas execution.”  I relied heavily on two sites that routinely aggregated 
TDCJ information, news stories and press releases from the Attorney General’s Office – 
txexecutions.org and clarkprosecutor.org.  In addition, I used TDCJ’s website on 
“Executed Offenders” and Bill Crawford’s Texas Death Row (2006), which compiles 
certain public information on executed Texas prisoners.  Most of Crawford’s information 
                                                 
4 Prior to 1995, for example, records regarding waiving appeals would not necessarily be in the TCCA 
files. 
5  Fortunately for this project, and as discussed below, the overwhelming majority of these prisoners sought 
to hasten their executions while in state court.  
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repeats the information available on the TDCJ website, but it fills certain gaps, including, 
for example, written final statements.  The TDCJ site and Crawford’s book, which is 
based on TDCJ information is not without mistakes and omissions.  If the sources 
disagreed, I used information from the court files.  Through open records requests to 
TDCJ, I obtained lists of execution witnesses for the EHs, and whether they were buried 
in the prison cemetery. 
I also conducted 30 semi-structured interviews with individuals who knew one of 
my subjects, and had briefer conversations with three other in lieu of an interview.  I was 
not able to interview someone in connection with each subject.  The interviews averaged 
a little over 62 minutes, and were conducted in person at a location of the interviewee’s 
choosing or by phone.  I obtained an informed consent from each informant pursuant to 
the terms of the University of Texas’s Institutional Review Board Protocol Number 2010-
04-0068. 
CREATING THE COMPARISON GROUPS 
Matched Sample One (MS1) 
 
I created two comparison groups.  First, I selected a sample of prisoners (Matched 
Sample 1 (MS1) (n = 73)) who had been executed, but not as a result of abandoning their 
appeals.  I identified prisoners who entered TDCJ’s death row within six months of the 
individual subjects.  I then selected two to four of the same race and closest in age for 
each subject.  (One EH, Christopher Jay Swift, had no one of the same race entering 
death row within six months of his arrival.  Therefore I selected no match for him.)  
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Where there were multiple possible matches, I selected those convicted from counties 
similar in geographic location or urban development to those of the subject.  I recorded 
information regarding prior convictions, educational attainment, and social contacts at the 
time of execution from TDCJ’s website, court opinions, txexecutions.org, and other news 
sources.  I obtained information regarding execution witnesses and burial through Open 
Records Act requests to TDCJ. 
Matched Sample Two (MS2) 
 
In addition, I reviewed media coverage and parts of the court files of at least one 
of each group of matches associated with an EH that I developed in MS1.  I selected this 
subset of MS1 – Matched Sample 2 (MS2) (n=38) – with particular attention to 
characteristics that appeared to recur in the EHs’ files, namely whether the match 
confessed to the crime,6 ever sought to waive appeals, and/or had any history of 
depression and/or suicide. 
I reviewed portions of the court files for MS2, following a protocol substantially 
similar to that followed with the subject population.  The main difference in the 
comparison is that I generally did not review trial transcripts for MS2.  Since I had 
identified the main variables of interest, and since information on those did not generally 
require reviewing the trial transcript, I did not think that was necessary.   Also, since 
these individuals had gone through more appeals, more information from their trials was 
                                                 
6 I initially speculated that confessions might be tied to efforts to abandon appeals.  After finding that many 
in both the subject and comparison groups confessed, and that coding the variations in types of confessions 
(contradictory, partial, etc.), was very challenging, I abandoned this consideration.  
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available in the appellate briefs and post-conviction habeas petitions.  Therefore, for this 
group, I reviewed the docket sheet, the CR, the appellate briefs, state post-conviction 
petitions, the manila court correspondence file, and all loose documents in the file.  In 
these documents, I was looking for information on prior criminal history, experiences 
with incarceration, descriptions of the offense, any information regarding mental illness 
(including depression), suicidality, childhood neglect or trauma, juvenile delinquency, 
and any efforts to waive appeals.     
CODING QUALITATIVE DATA 
 
As Bowker and Star (1999) make clear, all coding is a social construction.  
Analyzing the explanations prisoners gave for their desire to drop their appeals was 
necessarily an interpretive process.  In conducting this study, I was not able to enhance 
the reliability of my findings through the assistance of another coder.  That said, I have 
read and re-read the data on multiple occasions, separated by significant stretches of time.  
In addition, I used conventional qualitative techniques intended to enhance the reliability 
of my findings.  I created a set of categories based on multiple re-readings of the different 
accounts.  I then used Atlas.ti to code them.  Through the process of coding these 
categories were refined (Creswell 2003; Esterberg 2002).  Once I had derived my 
categories, I used Excel to code and calculate these results as well as the data from 
interviews and media reports.  I was attentive to the possibility of different categories of 
meanings in the press and other information sources.  Indeed, after reviewing these other 
sources, I refined the “autonomy” category to distinguish between assertions of a right to 
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choose to hasten execution (generally asserted in court) and a desire to exercise control 
over one’s life.   
LIMITATIONS ON DATA 
 
Finally, to clear out the underbrush of limitations of this study, I note first the 
most obvious:  the small population.  Second, the data sources each suffered from various 
imperfections.  With the passage of time, interviewees not surprisingly forgot detail that 
can bring out important nuances.  In addition, and also not surprisingly, I came to believe 
that their memories were often as informed by their own theories of why the subject had 
chosen to hasten death as by their memories, a phenomenon noted by other researchers.  
Scourfield et al. observed that reasons for suicide attributed by others were sometimes 
rooted in “common sense assumption that [those were] an understandable reason for a 
suicide” (2012:469).  Douglas reflected that memory may selectively retain “socially and 
personally meaningful” information (1967:259) (emphasis in original).  One interviewee, 
for example, confidently and vigorously asserted that a particular prisoner had sought 
execution because he could no longer bear the oppressive prison conditions.  When I 
asked for an example of the kinds of things he complained about, the informant affirmed 
that the prisoner never spoke or wrote about his conditions of incarceration.  
Contemporaneous documents, namely court files and news articles, offered more 
detail, but they too suffered from unreliability.  One news story reported that a man 
confessed to committing a terrible murder because he sought to return to prison.  A 
subsequent psychiatric interview with the man revealed that he had been hallucinating at 
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the time of the crime, but realized after the fact that he would return to prison because of 
what he had done.  Documents in court files, while in many ways the best sources of 
information, varied in their richness depending on the quality of counsel and the legal 
issues salient at the time of the litigation.  For example, before Texas jurors were 
permitted to consider evidence of mental impairments for any purpose other than future 
dangerousness, defense lawyers had few incentives to investigate and develop evidence 
of mental dysfunction. 
That said, some patterns readily emerged despite these limitations.  Further, these 
methodological frustrations forced a useful shift from more individualistic and 
psychological concerns to a sociological and sociolegal analysis. 
PROFILE OF SUBJECTS 
 
All of Texas’s EHs were men.  Whites made up 64.5% (20) of the EHs; 22.6% (7) 
were Latino, and 12.9% (4) were African-American.  White EHs constitute 9.2% of 
whites executed; Latino EHs constitute 8.5% of Latinos executed; and African-American 
EHs constitute 2.3% of African-Americans executed.  This ranking, if not the 
proportions, resembles Vandiver, Giacopassi, and Turner’s findings that, nationally, 
17.6% of whites executed were EHs; 12.9% of Latinos executed were EHs; and 1.7% of 
African-Americans executed were EHs (2008:181).  The Texas’ EH proportions might be 
lower simply because Texas’ rate of execution is so much higher than the national 





EHs entered TDCJ at an average age of 31.4 years.  Those with a prior prison 
record averaged 32.6 years old; those without were an average 29.1 years old when 
admitted to TDCJ.  This may reflect simply that they did not have as much time in the 
free-world as the older EHs to be arrested, convicted, and sent to prison before 
committing their capital offense.  If those offenders whose capital crimes were tied to 
domestic crises are removed from the group without any prior incarceration, however, the 
average age at reception of those without a prior record drops to 24.4 years old.7  This 
group, which is not restricted to those who killed their intimate partners, is referred to as 
IPV-EH and discussed further below.   
I also calculated the average age at which EHs expressed their desire to die, even 
informally, and the age at which the EH took a formal action intended to expedite his 
execution, whether by instructing his attorneys to select death penalty oriented jurors, 
limit mitigating evidence, asking the jury for the death penalty, or writing the court 
asking for an execution date.  Calculating this age is fraught with complication.  Some 
ages are estimates based on when certain pleadings were filed and execution dates set.  
Some reflect interview recollections, some of which may have been self-serving insofar 
as they may have reassured the interviewee that s/he had done all s/he could to urge the 
prisoner to stay alive.  Others are reflected in court transcripts or correspondence with the 
court.  With those caveats, I present information regarding apparent ages of waiver.  
                                                 
7  Among those with a prior criminal record, the age at reception remains the same, even after the three 
IPV-related offenders (average age 35) are subtracted.   
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About a third (32.3%) of EHs desired to waive their appeals when they were in 
their 20s, and 48.4% desired to waive when they were in their 30s.  The following 
reflects the overall age distribution of EHs’ desire and action to waive appeals. 
 
Figure 3:  Distribution of ages at which expressed and acted upon desire to waive 
appeals. 
While the numbers are small to be sure, breaking them down further offers 
possible insights into the dynamics of waiving appeals.  Excluding the EH-IPV, for 
example, EHs were 32.7 years old on average when they expressed the desire to abandon 
appeals, and 33.9 years old when they acted on that desire.  Non-IPV EHs with no prison 
experience expressed their desire to waive appeals on average at age 27.1 and acted upon 


















 Average age desire expressed Average age action taken 
Overall 33.8 35.1 
EHs w/o IPV 32.7 33.9 
IPV-EH 37 38.5 
 




Table 1:  Ages at which desire expressed and action taken to waive appeals. 
This finding is consistent with the literature finding that most prison suicides are 
committed by those less than 35 years old, and that most murder-suicides involving 
spouses are committed by older men.    
Vandiver and her colleagues also calculated the percent of EHs according to age 
at execution nationally (2008:191).  These data are less revealing because age at 
execution can be beyond the control of the prisoner – it may depend, for example, on 
efforts by others to contest competency to waive appeals or the aggressiveness of the 
State in setting an execution date – but for the purposes of comparison, I offer the 








Age at execution National Texas 
20s 17.9% 13.2% 
30s 11% 5.7% 
40s 10% 6.7% 
50s 14.9% 3.6% 
60s 3% 0% 
Table 2:  Age at execution, percent EH nationally and  in Texas. 
The different proportions, particularly for those in their 50s, may reflect state-
based variation, including how long prisoners remain on death row before they waive 
appeals.  In Texas, only three EHs lived on death row for more than ten years.   Robert 
Anderson, Richard Foster, and David Martinez lived on death row for about 12-14 years.  





Educational attainment  
 
EHs’ average educational attainment8 was very slightly higher than the non-EHs’ 
education attainment (grade 10.2 v. 9.8), with 10 years of education being the median 
number for both groups.  Of those with more education, 16.1% (5) of the EHs had 12 
years of schooling, and 9.7% (3) had more than 12 years of education.  By comparison, 
14.9% (11) had 12 years, and 12.2% (9) of MS1 had more than 12 years of school. 
Education EHs (N=30)
9
 MS1 (n = 73) 
Average 10.2 yrs 9.8 yrs 
Median 10 yrs 10 yrs 
12 years of education 16.1% (5) 15.1% (11) 
More than 12 years 9.7% (3) 12.3% (9) 
Table 3:  Educational attainment. 
  
                                                 
8 Consistent with TDCJ, I used only the last grade completed by the incoming prisoner.  Where TDCJ did 
not have the information, in the case of the EH, I derived the information from court documents.  I assigned 
13 years for all who had more than 12 years of education, in part to avoid the complexities of, e.g., 
assigning a value to number of college credits. 





Pathways to Hastened Execution 
This Part outlines the findings regarding the three primary domains identified in 
my proposed theoretical model: vulnerabilities, criminological characteristics, and 
motivation enhancements.    
VULNERABILITIES 
As outlined above, both popular narratives of hastening execution and empirical 
work on both prison suicides and execution-hasteners identify mental illness as a 
contributor to decisions to hasten execution.  In addition, research on prison suicide 
suicide suggests that negative childhood experiences such as parental neglect, 
delinquency, and psychiatric treatment elevate the risk for suicide.  The problem, of 
course, is that death row prisoners as a whole have a high incidence of both bad 
childhood experiences and adult mental dysfunction.  By comparing the EH group with a 
group of similarly situated death-sentenced prisoners, this is the first study to take into 
account this population’s already high risk for deciding to hasten death.   
  I coded as “1” any individual whom court records revealed had childhood 
experiences with adjudications of delinquency, time in juvenile detention, foster care, 
early drug use, and/or chaotic childhood environments.  I found roughly similar 
proportions of childhood trauma and dislocation between the EHs and MS2.  Within 
MS2, 47.4% had some indicator of personal vulnerability; of the EHs, 43.8% did.   
Again relying on court records, in both groups, I coded whether the prisoner had 
ever been believed to have been depressed or suicidal.  While proportionately more EHs 
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experienced depression at some point during their lives, and/or had some kind of 
experience with suicidal ideation or attempt, overall, they are not so different from the 






Effort to waive? 31 9 
Prior suicide attempt or ideation 51.6% (16) 42.1% (16) 
Depression 54.8 (17) 42.1 (16) 
 
Suicidal ideation or attempt + depression 




Suicidal attempt or ideation + depression 
w/o waiver attempt 
 
 6 
Table 4:  History of suicidality and/or depression. 
As Blume (2005) has noted, other forms of mental illness can elevate the risk of 
suicide.  With respect to other kinds of mental illness, members of MS2 also score high, 
with 1010 reportedly diagnosed with a mental illness or having a history of psychiatric 
hospitalization.  This is higher than the prevalence of mental illness other than depression 
among the EHs.  Swift was diagnosed with schizophrenia; Hayes with manic depression; 
Porter with PTSD and depression with psychotic features; Foster with PTSD.  Beavers 
                                                 
10 Robert Black, James Colburn, James Collier, Kenneth McDuff, John Moody, Paul Nuncio, Michael 
Perry, Lamont Reese, Angel Maturino Resendiz, Larry Robison.  
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had periods of psychiatric hospitalization.  I have not found a diagnosis for James Smith 
but have heard him described as psychotic.  He had previously had a criminal charge 
dismissed based on insanity.   
Certainly, many of the EHs were motivated to suppress information regarding 
mental illness, as discussed in Chapter 6.  The court records may well understate the 
prevalence of mental disorder.  Court records are also problematic sources of information 
because their quality depends in large part on defense counsel’s diligence in obtaining 
historical information about the client, having the resources required to conduct a 
comprehensive investigation, and counsel’s strategic decisions about what information to 
elicit.  These data support the general proposition that death row prisoners on the whole 
are a psychologically vulnerable group.  The connection between these vulnerabilities 
and hastening execution is less clear.     
CRIMINOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS 
The theoretical model also connects certain personal involvement in crime and 
types of crimes to decisions to hasten execution.   
Criminal history and experiences with incarceration 
Prison suicide researchers have found that prisoners convicted of violent crimes 
were at a higher risk of suicide.  The death penalty can be imposed only in cases 
involving a homicide; therefore all had been convicted of murder.  In order to explore 
possible differences between EHs and non-EHS, I created an index of criminality to 
gauge EHs’ prior experience with criminal offending and the criminal justice system that 
was weighted toward a propensity to violence, as measured by convictions for crimes 
against persons.  To maintain consistency with TDCJ practices and therefore the 
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comparison groups, I excluded juvenile and misdemeanor adjudications, and included 
only adult felony convictions.11  In a few instances (namely Stephen Morin, Richard 
Foster and Ynobe Matthews), the prisoners were convicted of additional offenses after 
they were sentenced to death for offenses they committed prior to their capital murder 
trial.  I included those offenses in their criminality score, though not in calculating prior 
crimes against persons.  I assigned one point for the first felony, with two points added if 
the prisoner had any additional felonies.  Each crime against a person was assigned two 
points.  The EH criminality index had almost a “W” distribution. 
 
 
Figure 4:  Distribution of execution-hastener prior conviction scores. 
I found that relative to the comparison group, EHs had a higher criminality index 
score and were generally more likely to have been previously convicted of a felony.   
MS1 was created in part by selecting comparably-aged prisoners, which diminishes the 
relevance of their age, but it did have a slightly younger average age – two years younger 
than the EHs.  This could account for MS1’s relatively lower prior criminal involvement.  
                                                 
11 Texas capital sentencing trials routinely include evidence of any prior bad acts committed by the 
defendant, whether or not those allegations were proven in a court of law.  I did not include these so-called 
“unadjudicated offenses” in my count to be consistent with TDCJ practices, but also because they are 












MS2, which was selected from MS1 to include individuals believed to have sought to 
waive appeals, however, also had greater incidence of crimes against persons than 
matched sample as a whole (MS1). 
 
 EHs (N=31) MS1 (n = 73) MS2 (n=38) 
Average criminality index 3.4 2.2 2.3 
Median 3 1 2 
No prior convictions 19.4% (6) 34.2% (25) 34.2% (13) 
No prior CAP convictions 48.4% (15) 68.5% (50) 60.5% (23) 
Table 5:  Criminal history comparison. 
This finding is consistent with the prison suicide literature connecting prior 
offending with an elevated risk of suicide. 
I also coded whether the EHs and sample groups had any history of 
imprisonment.  (I did not include time in jail.)  EHs were somewhat more likely to have 
prior prison experience, and this possible characteristic is echoed in the sometime-EHs in 
the comparison group.   Nineteen EHs had some prior experience with incarceration; 12 
had none.  In MS2, 20 had prior prison experience, and 18 had none; 36 of MS1 had 
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previously been in prison and 37 had not.  Of the nine in MS2 who sought to waive in the 
course of the legal proceedings,12 five had been previously incarcerated. 
 
 EH (N=31) MS1 (n=73) MS2 (n=38) MS2 waverers (n=9) 
Prior Prison Exp. 61% (19) 50.7% (37) 52.6% (20) 55.6% (5) 
Table 6:  Prior prison experience for execution-hasteners and comparison groups. 
These data suggest that EHs on average have more prior experience with 
incarceration.   
Characteristics of capital crime 
Intimate partner conflict related homicides 
Another story is possibly hidden by these overall EH numbers, however.  The 
literature indicates that those who kill their intimate partners are at higher risk for suicide.  
Separating those EHs who committed a capital murder in connection with a domestic 
crisis reveals their path to waiving appeals may be somewhat different.  Eight13 of the 31 
EHs committed their offense in connection with a domestic dispute.  This category 
includes not only those who murdered their intimate partners, but also those who 
committed murder ostensibly because of a domestic crisis.  For instance, when Eliseo 
Moreno’s brother-in-law refused to disclose the whereabouts of Moreno’s wife, Moreno 
murdered the brother-in-law, sister-in-law, and four others.  Robert Anderson attributed 
                                                 
12  Robert “Bob” Black, Jeffrey Doughtie, Michael Lockhart, John Moody, Robert Morrow, Jessie Joe 
Patrick, Angel Maturino Resendiz, Larry Robison, and Douglas Roberts. 
13  Robert Anderson, Larry Hayes, George Lott, David Martinez, Eliseo Moreno, Steven Renfro, Benjamin 
Stone, and Christopher Jay Swift. 
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his murder of a child to an argument he had had that day with his wife over her infidelity.  
She had told him that he needed to leave their house before she returned home (Graczyk 
2006).  George Lott is believed to have shot up a courtroom in order to express his upset 
with its handling of his divorce and child custody proceedings (and perhaps his stress 
over an upcoming trial on charges that he had sexually abused his child) (Walt 1994). 
The IPV group’s criminal experience was lower than the other EHs, whether 
measured by their prior convictions, crimes against persons, or time in prison. 
 
 EHs (N=31) Non-IPV EHs (N=23) IPV-EHs (N=8) 
Prior conviction index 3.22 3.48 2.5 
No prior convictions 19.4% (6) 17.4% (4) 25% (2) 
No prior CAP convictions 48.4% (15) 47.8% (11) 62.5% (5) 
No prior prison 38.7% (12) 30.4% (7) 62.5% (5) 
Table 7:  Execution-hasteners’ criminal experience breakdown. 
Commission of crime 
Compared to MS1, the EHs were more likely to have used a gun in the murder,14 
and less likely to have committed the crime with another person.  This difference remains 
even after the IPV-related offenses are excluded.  (All of the IPV-EHs acted alone; half 
used a firearm.)   
                                                 




Offense EHs (N=31) MS1 (n=73) 
Involved firearm 61.3% (9) 49.3% (36) 
Involved co-participant 29% (9) 49.3% (36) 
Table 8:  Domestic crisis-related offense characteristics. 
Vandiver, Giacopassi, and Turner (2008) found a statistically significant 
relationship between the number of homicide victims in the capital offense and the 
likelihood of dropping appeals.  Texas EHs also appear to have this relationship.   
 
 National Texas 
One victim 9.6% (78) 5.7% (23) 
Two victims 17.7% (36) 10.9% (5) 
Three or more victims 23.7% (9) 16.7% (3) 
Table 9:  Percent EH nationally and  in Texas of execution-hasteners and number of 
victims. 
 There are two problems with these measures, however.  First, Vandiver and her 
colleagues looked at the number of “victims for whom the death sentence was imposed” 
(2008:193).  At least in Texas, the actual number of homicide victims may exceed the 
number for whom the death sentences was imposed.  For example, Eliseo Moreno killed 
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six people in the course of a single (if protracted) crime spree.  However, he was tried 
and sentenced only for the murder of the police officer who was killed during this string 
of homicides.  While including him in those EHs with three or more victims increases the 
apparent significance of this statistic (largely because the numbers are so small), at the 
same time it highlights that we do not know the actual number of victims of the others 
executed.  They too may have been convicted on the case for which it was easiest to 
obtain the death penalty, rather than the number of homicide victims related to the capital 
offense.   
 In addition, other dynamics may be at work.  For example, seven of the eight EHs 
who killed more than one person in the course of committing their capital offense were 
IPV-EHs.  What appears to be an association between number of victims and a desire to 
hasten execution may reflect (in whole or in part) the uxoricide trajectory described 
above.   
ENHANCED MOTIVATION 
Timing and triggers 
 
Informants and court files generally indicated that EHs’ had long-standing desires 
to hasten execution.  To the extent informants had known other death row prisoners, these 
EHs were unlike those others precisely because of their steadfast desire to be executed.  
Nonetheless, records indicate that more than two in five (22.6%) reportedly went back 
and forth in their desire, whether because of outside pressures from lawyers or family, or 
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because of an internal struggle. (Jeffrey Barney, Richard Beavers, David Martinez, Scott 
Porter, Michael Rodriguez, Danielle Simpson, and Robert Streetman are in this group.)   
Lawyers play some role in staving off waivers, at least for a time.  The case files 
reflect some prisoners’ frustration because their lawyers were ignoring their instructions 
to waive appeals.  Richard Smith wrote the Harris County District Attorney: 
 Sir, 
  I ask that you help me in my effort to drop my appeal. 
  I’ve ask my attorney back in Nov. 98, to do this for me. 
As of this date I’ve not been ordered back to court to drop my 
appeal. 
I’ve called my attorney Guy L. Womack and spoke to him by 
letter.  I’m being stalled.  
I wrote Judge Godwin & Guy L. Womack.  Please help me (letter 
to Johnny Holmes, 4/21/99) 
     
Some lawyers reportedly temporized when receiving these kinds of requests, 
asking for more information, sending books to distract, and sometimes trying to help “the 
underlying sources of [ ] pain and frustration” (Inf. 66:1; Inf. 44:11; Inf. 20:5).  Michael 
Rodriguez, apparently wanted to hasten execution, but did not want to disappoint his 
attorney by halting appeals. 
She’s always knew that it was in the back of my mind of foregoing any appeals, 
and at her behest she’s – she’s a wonderful person.  She’s very nice and she 
started crying, saying please let me enter the state habeas and then we’ll talk 
again.  What happened is after the state habeas finally got affirmed, I told her, I 
said, ‘Lydia, you’re done now,’ and I said, ‘If you were any other person I’d tell 
you to, you know, you’re fired, go away,’ but she was such an endearing person 
that I let her talk me into it, and back for me, she knew that I was always going to 
vacate federal.   When the time came she said, ‘Now we’re going to federal 
court,’ and I said, ‘No, we’re not; we’re done,’ and that’s when she filed a motion 
to the court, I believe it was to this court, about a conflict of interest….She 
stepped down, but she stepped down because she could not accept that I would 




Beavers, Streetman, and Simpson were all represented (at least at the end) by 
death penalty lawyers affiliated with specialist death penalty organizations in their final 
appeals.  This may account for their sometime decisions to resume appeals.  David 
Martinez, who said he deserved the death penalty in his confession upon arrest, would 
subsequently maintain his innocence.  This public stance may have curbed his desire to 
hasten execution, at least for a time.  (In his final statement, he acknowledged 
responsibility.)  Further, as detailed below, some prisoners who indicated privately that 
they accepted the death penalty at trial would themselves raise legal claims while on 
appeal.  This could indicate wavering, or, as argued below, some other psychosocial 
processes.   
The crime 
 
Informants never identified any triggers common to research on suicide such as 
the breakup of a significant relationship.  To the extent EHs’ decisions were triggered by 
any event, it may have been the crime, conviction, and/or sentence may have provided 
the enhanced motivation.  Most EHs decide to abandon appeals very early in the criminal 
process, a finding that is consistent with the literature on prison suicide.   
Related to the commission of the offense, the anniversary of the capital crime 
could be an important triggering event for some.  Some prisoners experience trauma from 
the crime they committed; Robert Anderson said he had frequent powerful dreams 
involving his victim.  He reportedly told the court in the course of his competency 
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hearing that “The victim in my case has appeared to me at several times in various stages 
of the assault” (McBride 2004).  Using only those cases where the prisoner took an 
action, such as filing a pro se motion or writing a letter to the court to drop appeals, I 
found the following: 
Anniversary of Offense Defendant’s Act 
Within four or fewer weeks 38.9% (7) 
Within eight or fewer weeks 27.8% (5) 
Within twelve or fewer weeks 11.1% (2) 
More than twelve weeks 22.2% (4) 
Table 10:  Effort to waive around the time of the anniversary of the crime. 
Therefore, two-thirds acted to waive appeals within eight weeks of the 
anniversary of the offense. 
The appeal 
 
Other junctures could also trigger action.  Foust indicated he waived his appeals 
only after arriving on death row because he learned there that he could do so (Graczyk 
1999), but others appear more specifically legal.  Like Rodriguez, several EHs decided to 
abandon appeals after an opinion rejecting their legal claims, or at the beginning of a new 
stage of appeals (e.g., Brimage, Jenkins, Morin).  Not counting the two EHs who 
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represented themselves throughout trial and on appeal (and who therefore did not have to 
ask the appellate court for permission to waive), and those for whom the record is not 
clear, 57% of 21 EHs acted within one to eight weeks after an important court action, and 
over 80% acted within 12 weeks.15  While some of the court records do not provide 
complete information, this table illustrates the span of time between a court action and an 
act intended to waive appeals.  (The data regarding the anniversary of the offense are 
provided for comparison.) 
Court Action Defendant’s Act Anniversary of Offense 
Within four or fewer weeks 38.1% (8) 38.9% (7) 
Within eight or fewer weeks 19% (4) 27.8% (5) 
Within twelve or fewer weeks 23.8% (5) 11.1% (2) 
More than twelve weeks 19% (4)
16
 22.2% (4) 
Table 11:  Effort to waive after court action. 
This could be simply an example of deciding to end their lives after bad news, but 
it could also reflect a more complex phenomenon.  It could manifest instead an effort to 
stop appeals before some new process began that the prisoner felt may be difficult to halt.   
                                                 
15 It is generally not possible to ascertain when the prisoner learned of the court action. 
16 Three of these acted more than seven months after the court action.  One acted within 14 weeks. 
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In this passage, while the prisoner is cut off, one could infer that what he meant 
by “too late” was that the lawyer had filed the state habeas petition: 
 
Attorney: During the time when i was representing you on your state writ 
[for habeas relief], did we talk about whether to proceed with it or 
to dismiss it? 
Porter:  Yes. 
Attorney: What did you want me to do at that time? 
Porter:   At one point to proceed. 
Attorney: At one point to proceed. 
Porter:   And then to drop, to stop it. 
Attorney: And when did you decide to, did you decide during the state 
process you wanted to drop it? 
Porter:   Yes. 
Attorney: But I didn't do that, did I? 
Porter:   I think it was too late.  You had done -- 
Attorney: I tried to talk you out of it. 
Porter:   Yes (January 30, 2004, 27) (emphasis added). 
The end of one phase and the beginning of another could be seen as an 
opportunity to intervene to prevent the perpetuation of “lies” (Rodriguez (Graczyk 2008); 
Hayes (Kimberly 2003); Beavers (Associated Press 1994); Cook (Grazcyk 1993)).   
Benjamin Stone appears to have been driven by profound shame and 
embarrassment.  One person recalled: 
[I]t was more he just really didn't want-.  It’s like, if you do something really bad 
and you just don’t want to think about it.  And if you appeal, you’re just focusing 
on it and focusing on it.  And he just said, let’s just forget about it.  I did it.  Let’s 
forget about it.  Let's move on.  The only way he could do that-. If I remember it, 
he didn't really want to have a trial or anything (Inf. 73:2, 7). 
In addition to requiring the prisoner to think about his appeal, legal junctures 
often occasion increased media coverage.  A prisoner could choose see abandoning 
appeals as a way to avoid this unwanted attention.  
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The importance of legal junctures could also reflect a kind of contingency-based 
thinking, and indeed, some informants believed this was the case for certain individuals.  
If, for example, the jury handed down a death sentence, the prisoner would abide by their 
decision.  “He said, if the [ ] jury finds that I deserve the death penalty, then so be it” (Inf. 
62:2).  Other EHs may have wanted to give up to avoid future disappointments.  One 
informant thought the EH he knew changed his attitude after losing his appeal, and was 
mad at himself for getting his hopes up (Inf. 8:18).  Leo Jenkins, who won his case on 
direct appeal, only to have the TCCA reverse itself on rehearing, lost all faith in the 
judicial system.  “[H]e was in a state of no matter what you do, you just can’t get 
anybody to listen to you.  I’m tired of this.  That’s the state of mind he was in” (Inf. 
93:3).   
When asked what specifically the EH was tired of, the informant elaborated on 
the toll the process of litigation takes: 
Just the daily grind.  Death row is an emotional roller coaster.  It has a lot of ups 
and downs.  One day you might get good news and then turn around next week 
and tell him that news is no good anymore.  Today you might get a letter from 
your lawyer saying that you’re going to have a hearing on an issue that you’re 
hoping to get it on.  And then next week, you might out the hearing is canceled.  
A lot of ups and downs, ups and downs, just pulls and tugs at your heart all day.  
You get tired of that.  Especially those who have done something but don’t think 
they deserve to be on death row for what they’ve done.  They just get tired of the 
pull and tug at their emotions that they just don’t want to do it no more.  Just give 
up (Inf. 93:3). 
A legal event might galvanize a prisoner to action, if only to stop the “pull and tug 
at their emotions.”  The appellate process, above and beyond life on death row and 
individual adverse court decisions, can contribute to uncertainty and anxiety.   
The process could be stressful not only because of the ups and downs of litigation, 
but also because it involves waiting.  Robert Atworth explicitly complained about the 
66 
 
stress of waiting.  In asking to waive his appeals, he told the court that “[t]here’s nothing 
anyone can say to get me to change my mind unless, of course, I was told I would have to 
sit down there for an extended period of time to wait which I don’t see the Court and 
certainly not the DA’s Office making that effect [effort?] (May 12, 1999 hearing, 11).  
Atworth explained to the court: 
Atworth:  [The prosecutor] Mr. Shook has made comments about six months to a 
year, probably somewhere around six months.  That sort of time – I think you 
could appreciate, since I am here to initiate this process myself, that that sort of 
time to sit with a weight of a date over your head and to look at the calendar 
every day and dwell on that, well, I think the anxiety would kill me before the 
State would.  So my only concern is time. 
Judge:  You just want me to set a date as soon as possible?  Is that what you’re 
saying? 
Atworth: Within reason.  I think I’m going to need about six to eight weeks to, 
you know, wrap up my personal affairs.  But anything beyond 60 days I think 
would be rather torturous (May 12, 1999 hearing, 7) (emphasis added). 
Charles Rumbaugh wrote a friend: 
[I]f they were to come to my cell and tell me I was going to be executed 
tomorrow, I would feel relieved, in a way.  The waiting would be over.  I would 
know what to expect.  To me, the dying part is easy; it’s the waiting and not 
knowing, that’s hard” (Stubben 1980:215). 
 
   The motivational force of waiting exposes the absence of distraction on death 
row, another particular pain of imprisonment, and not one confined to the isolation 
confinement at Polunsky.17        
  
                                                 
17 Both Atworth and Rumbaugh hastened their executions while at Ellis. 
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Others’ efforts to hasten execution 
 
Researchers have observed that suicides can occur in clusters, which is sometimes 
referred to as a “contagion” effect (Nock et al. 2008).  This raises the question whether 
one individual’s decision to hasten execution could affect others.  Blume (2005) found 
contagion could be a dynamic affecting decisions to hasten execution.  My data question 
that finding insofar as the bulk of my subjects sought to hasten execution before they 
even got to death row.   
More importantly, however, using execution dates to measure contagion is 
problematic given that the length of time between a decisive step to hasten execution and 
the execution itself can vary.  Groups of prisoners executed at around the same time may 
not have acted around the same time to halt their appeals.  This table, based on some of 




Date of Step 
Hastening Execution 




Foust 6/98 4/99 10 
Tuttle 12/97 7/99 19 
R. Smith 4/99 9/99 5 
Atworth 3/99 12/99 9 
    
Gonzales 11/95 9/96 11 
Brimage 11/96 2/97 3 
Stone 6/96 9/97 15 
Table 12:  Dates of execution as compared to dates of steps to waive appeals. 
                                                 
18 While I believe Jenkins, Hernandez, and Moreno first acted to waive their appeals when they were given 
an execution date after they lost their cases on direct appeal, this is an inference from other material in the 
file.  Therefore I do not include them in this table.     
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Further, the dates I have are based on correspondence to the court, which is likely 
after the prisoner made up his mind.  Some of the EHs limited evidence that could be 
presented at trial, or instructed their lawyers to select jurors who favored the death 
penalty.  Richard Smith wrote his lawyers in November 1998 – soon after receiving a 
learning he had cirrhosis and Hepatitis C19 – but subsequently contacted the court when 
they failed to act.  Therefore, the time gaps recorded in Table 11 are likely 
underestimates.   
I want to stress, however, that these data do not lead me to reject the contagion 
hypothesis.  Inclinations and desires may well have been reinforced once they got to 
death row.  Therefore, attention to decision points rather than execution dates may yield 
more useful information.   
Beavers, Lott and Cook all took steps hastening execution within a three month 
period in late 1993.  Both Beavers and Cook were highly religious, and Beavers is 
believed to have been part of a very religious group of white men from East Texas that 
included Cook (Inf. 13 pt. 1:12’’39).20  One individual also believes that he talked to one 
about the other, reinforcing the possibility that they knew of each other’s inclination to 
waive appeals (Inf. 13 pt. 1:49’’19).  Another described Cook as “consistent,” 
“enthusiastic,” and “charismatic” (Inf. 25: 1”46; 2”24).   
                                                 
19 TDCJ Clinical Notes from November 23, 1998 put into the court record in the course of Smith’s appeal 
waiver proceedings reflect: “He has cirrosis [sic] and Hepatitus [sic] C – feels he is terminally ill, and 
wants to ask for a date for execution.  He says he wants to avoid the pain of execution rather than die of 
natural causes.” 
20 Interviews with Informants 13 and 25 have not been transcribed, so the references are to the time the 
statement was made, rather than to the transcript page number.   
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Stone and Brimage acted within five months of each other, and Porter and 
Matthews within a month of each other.  While Stone and Porter certainly seemed highly 
motivated to hasten execution during trial, they could have conceivably have influenced 
Brimage and Matthews, respectively.  (Foster and Hayes also decided within about six 
months of each other.)  At least on Ellis, at least some prisoners knew of others giving up 
appeals.  A news report from Morin’s execution recounts: 
A group of inmates seeking quick executions for themselves pointed to Morin as 
supporting their effort.21  “The principle of our action, he agreed with,” said 
James Smith, who is among about 10 inmate who desire to have all appears 
dropped and their executions carried out (Associated Press 1985). 
 
One informant suspected chaplains told prisoners about other prisoners 
contemplating giving up appeals (Inf. 13 pt. 1:12”47, 49”44).  This could also provide a 
contagion pathway.   
Death row culture, however, could operate as a brake on contagion by 
stigmatizing those who express a desire to hasten execution.  Prisoners may feel some 
reticence about discussing their desire to drop their appeals because “if someone does 
something like that, it spreads like wildfire” (Inf. 93:3) to other death row prisoners who 
generally disapprove of the decision.  One former prisoner interviewed in connection 
with this study initially suggested compassion towards those considering hastening 
execution. 
Q: How would you describe people's attitudes about giving up appeals? 
 
A:  People understand.  That’s the thing.  People can’t say, you're wrong.  People 
                                                 
21 Morin was Texas’s first prisoner to hasten execution. 
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can’t say, you’re a coward.  Because they understand.  And more likely, they’ve 
had the same thought, they just didn’t follow through with it.  And it’s all because 
of the way you’re living.  You’re living less than human.  You’re being treated 
like an animal.  And some people are just tired of it.  So when someone talks 
about dropping their appeals, even though it’s something I wouldn’t do, but I'll 
say-. What can you say?  Because you know the conditions that you’re living 
under.  And they’re harsh.  And some people, after fifteen, twenty years decide, I 
can't do it no more.  And they’re looking at another five or ten years down the 
road and still it’s possible that they’re going to get executed. So they say, why 
wait? (Inf. 93:3)22 
 
Later in the interview, however, he related a harsher reality. 
Q:  Do you remember either at Ellis or Polunsky, did people talk openly about 
giving up their appeals? 
 
A: No, not really. 
 
Q: Why not, do you think? 
 
A: Because it’s a sign of weakness.  And that’s not what you want to display 
in that type of environment.  So that was something you discuss with your 
attorney or with someone you had gotten really, really close with.  But it wasn’t 
an open conversation.  Because when you show a sign of weakness in that 
place, you’re preyed upon.  People take advantage of the weak in there just like 
they do out here.  So that wasn’t a place to go around showing your weaknesses.  
So you kind of kept those things close to the vest.  You share that with your 
attorney.  Family member.  If you shared with anyone down there, it was someone 
you had grown extremely close to.  
 
Q: Would it be seen as weak because it was a sign that you sort of had no spirit or 
you weren’t prepared to defend yourself?  What was weak about it? 
 
A: Just giving up on your life, giving up on yourself.  That’s the weakness.  
                                                 
22 As described earlier, no successful Texas EHs was on death row for this long.  The three EHs with the 
longest stints on death row were on death row for about 12-14 years, most of which was spent at Ellis.  
Four others (Banda, Brimage, Rumbaugh and Simpson) were on death row for about nine years and all but 
Simpson never lived on Polunsky.  Informant 93’s perspective may reflect a difference between most of 
those who abandon their appeals and those who struggle with occasional despairing thoughts and feelings 
while living on death row.  These may reflect the transient desires to hasten death more commonly 




It’s one thing when other people give up on you.  But when you give up on 
yourself, that shows a big weakness.  In the man.  Shows he has no spirit, no 
courage to continue to fight.  You see that person and say, I would never want to 
be with him in a foxhole.  Because when the bullets start raining down, he might 
throw his gun down and come out with his hands up and we both get killed.  You 
don’t want to deal with that person.  So that’s why that person definitely wasn’t 
going to tell anybody.  It’s a sign of weakness.  What man gives up on himself 
unless he’s a coward?  That’s the thinking.  Even though you understand because 
you're living under the same conditions.  It's just they you have a fighting spirit.  
This guy here, he just don’t want to fight.  So that becomes a sign of weakness.  
And as I say, people prey upon the weak (Inf. 93:7-8)(emphasis added). 
 
Inhibiting discussion of waiving appeals could complicate the contagion effect.   
Legal structures 
The law also channels the ability of prisoners to act upon their desire to waive 
appeals.  The data indicate that almost 55% expressed a desire to waive appeals during 
trial or on the first appeal after conviction.  This is a conservative figure as the data do 
not include information regarding some of the oldest cases, where information has been 
harder to come by.  The fact that so many sought to abandon their appeals during state 
postconviction may well reflect the fact that until the TCCA’s 1994 Lott decision, this 
was the first stage at which condemned prisoners were permitted to discharge counsel 
















32.2% (10) 51.6% (16) 
 
Federal habeas: district court 
 
0% (0) 6.4% (2) 
 
Federal habeas: Court of Appeals 
 
12.9 (4) 12.9% (4) 
Table 13:  Desires and acts to waive appeals. 
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Legally required adversarial testing of the conviction and sentence may also 
create a space for prisoners to commit to their appeals.  For example, Charles Rumbaugh 
and Richard Beavers, both of whom indicated a willingness to accept the death penalty at 
trial, filed pro se supplements to the direct appeal briefs (Rumbaugh CR 111; Beavers 
4/30/90 pro se supplemental brief).  This could reflect a certain wavering in their desire 
for the death penalty, but it may also have reflected a sense that if they had to go through 
this legal review, they might as well speak their piece.    
After the TCCA permitted George Lott to waive all adversarial testing of this 
convictions and sentence, patterns of execution-hastening change.  Previously, appeals 
generally followed this sequence: 
 
                                                                      
       
                                                            
 
               
Figure 5: Pre-Lott appeals process.  
Trial 
Next step would be 
state habeas 




After Lott, adversarial proceedings could end at trial. 
                                                                             
       
 
                  
Figure 6: Post-Lott appeals process. 
 This figure shows the patterns of appeals prior to Lott.                               
 
Figure 7:  Desire, Act, First Non-Adversarial Stage pre-Lott (N = 15). 
The majority of EHs waived appeals after the end of direct appeals, even though 
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1 = Trial 
2 = Direct Appeal 
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4 = Federal  Habeas   
(district ct) 
5 = Federal Habeas  




This figure shows the distribution after Lott.   
 
Figure 8:  Desire, Act, First Non-Adversarial Stage post-Lott (N=15). 
More EHs waived earlier in the process.  As a result, fewer convictions and 
sentences were subjected to adversarial scrutiny.  While Lott does not account for the 
substantial increase in defendants who took some step to increase the possibility of 
execution at trial, it introduced more post-trial variation on when EHs act and possibly on 
when they desired to hasten execution.23  In addition, it enabled fewer adversarial 
proceedings.  These figures suggest that when they are allowed to, some EHs will waive 
even a single legal review of their trial.   
The dramatic difference in the time spent on death row also suggests the impact of 
Lott, at least in part.   
                                                 
23 The differences in trial-level desire for the death penalty may be an artifact of the formalization of the 
legal process.  Lawyers may now be putting this information on the record where they previously did so 
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Figure 9:  Time on Death Row for execution-hasteners convicted prior to Lott. 
 
Figure 10:  Time on Death Row for execution-hasteners convicted after Lott. 
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 These figures show that the proportion of time on death row has essentially been 
reversed.  Where 75% of EHs prior to Lott spent more than 48 months on death row, after 
Lott, only 27% did.   
Prison conditions  
Move into segregation 
 
This area yielded the most incomplete information regarding individual 
adjustment,24 yet it is an area of the most significant structural changes in the lives of 
Texas’ condemned men.  Until 1999, the men’s death row was housed at the Ellis unit in 
Huntsville, Texas, one of the oldest prisons operated by the Texas Department of 
Criminal Justice (TDCJ).  After a Thanksgiving 1998 escape attempt by a small group of 
death row prisoners, TDCJ decided to move25 the men’s death row to Polunsky,26 a newer 
facility in Livingston, Texas.  TDCJ moved death row to Polunsky over the course of 
1999 to a building in the Polunsky complex that was designed to hold difficult or 
dangerous prisoners (such as gang members).   
The architecture does much of the work of controlling the prisoners as they live in 
conditions of what is generally called “administrative segregation,” the contemporary 
                                                 
24 Informants generally had or remembered little information regarding whether the EH had been involved 
in productive activities on death row.  A few informants recalled instances of group activities and some 
news accounts related that a particular EH or another was involved in Bible study on death row, but it 
generally was very difficult to get a sense of the daily lives of the EHs.   
25 TDCJ denies the escape attempt precipitated the move, citing instead the fact that the death row 
population was growing larger than Ellis’s death row could house (The Victoria Advocate 1999). 
26  This facility was originally named Terrell, but was subsequently renamed Polunsky after Charles 
Terrell objected to having a death row on a prison bearing his name (Yardley 2001).    
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version of solitary confinement.  All prisoners are housed in single cells with solid doors.  
The only time a prisoner leaves the pod is to meet outside visitors in a neighboring 
building.  While they can communicate to prisoners in nearby cells by yelling or passing 
notes and small items on a string slid from cell to cell, they are otherwise isolated from 
other prisoners in every aspect of their lives.  They eat alone, recreate alone, and worship 
alone.  Depending on their disciplinary record, they are permitted from 3-12 hours per 
week of solitary out-of-cell time in larger recreation cell, and can have from 2-8 hours per 
month of non-contact social visits with people from outside the prison.  They have no 
access to television, and only the best behaved prisoners can own a radio.  Since moving 
to administrative segregation, death row prisoners participate in no educational, work or 
other structured activities of any kind.  This is a stark contrast to the conditions at Ellis, 
where death row prisoners engaged in a range of activities, including working in the 
garment factory, making handicrafts, group recreation, and congregate activities like 
religious worship and Bible study.   
Certainly more EHs and death row prisoners generally complain about the daily 
stress of life on death row at Polunsky as compared to Ellis.  While my data are 
insufficient to distinguish between EHs and non-EHs with respect to prison stressors, the 
change in institution toward a more highly segregated environment could theoretically 
contribute to higher rates of execution-hastening.   
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Based on annual tallies of Texas’ death row population (Carson 2012)27, I found 
that, starting in 1982, the year of the first EH, 1.06% of those executed while on Ellis 
were EHs.  Of those arriving at Ellis between January 1, 1982 and January 1, 1999, 
3.28% were EHs.  Measuring the Polunsky period as beginning on January 1, 2000, I 
calculated that of those executed between January 1, 2000 to January 1, 2011, 3.6% were 
EHs.  Of those arriving at Polunsky between January 1, 2000 and January 1, 2011, 4.39% 
were EHs.  Not included in the Polunsky statistics are the three prisoners (D. Martinez, 
Foster, and Anderson) who had lived on Ellis, but decided to hasten execution after the 
move to Polunsky.   
 Percent EH of those executed Percent EH of those received 
Ellis 1.06% 3.28% 
Polunsky 3.6% 4.39% 
Table 14:  Comparison of percentage of execution-hasteners of those executed and 
received while at Ellis and Polunsky. 
In other words, there is some support for the hypothesis that increased segregation 
has increased the proportion of prisoners seeking to hasten execution.  The significance 
of this finding, however, should not be overstated as other factors could confound this 
finding.  While happening prior to the move to Polunsky, the Anti-terrorism and 
                                                 
27 Unfortunately these data include the approximately 17 women sentenced to death.  These women live on 
a separate death row in Gatesville, Texas.   
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Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) threatened to sharply curtail federal court 
review of the prisoners’ state convictions.  While not all commentators agree that the 
AEDPA has in fact had such a dramatic impact (Blume 2006), at the time the AEDPA 
passed, many thought it would.  Further, Texas was particularly active in executing 
prisoners in the late 1990s, peaking in 2000.  Even though executions peaked prior to or 
around the time of the move to Polunsky in 1999, prisoners may well have been reacting 
to these increases in executions, whether because they had no reason to believe rates of 
execution would drop or because they had only a generalized sense that more people 
were being executed. 
Informant 93 also introduced another possibility in discussing the stigma and 
physical threat risked by those who discussed waiving their appeals.  The EH may 
become socially marginalized on death row at best, and victimized at worst since he is 
“weak” and therefore “prey.”  While this may inhibit the contagion effect by 
discouraging other prisoners from pursuing the same path, for those prisoners who enter 
prison committed to hastening execution, they may not be able to integrate into death row 
because of the stigma associated with their desire to abandon appeals.28  At the same 
time, Polunsky’s segregation could increase rates of hastening execution since the cost of 
marginalization decreases with the diminished opportunities to interact socially and 
segregation lowers the chances of victimization. 
  
                                                 
28 Alexander Martinez referred obliquely to the social risk of hastening execution in his final statement:  
“And thanks for the friends at the Polunsky Unit that helped me get through this that didn't agree with my 
decision - and still gave me their friendship” (TDCJ Executed Offenders 2012). 
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PROTECTING AGENTS  
 
Texas’s men’s death row has enough of a group culture to create and enforce 
norms about hastening execution.  This culture may also moderate some of the effects of 
living in administrative segregation.  Unlike some administrative segregation regimes, 
they do have some ability to communicate with one another by shouting cell to cell or 
from the dayroom to a facing cell.  Correctional officers would sometimes carry legal 
materials from one cell to another, and the prison has conjoined legal visit cages that keep 
two prisoners separate but permit them to discuss their legal cases (Inf. 93:19).     
Informant 93 acknowledged the new prison imposed limits on social interaction, 
but prisoners still eke out some meaningful group activity: 
Polunsky, it was hard to do a lot of things together. But what we would try to do, 
we would read a book. A couple of us would talk about it. Just to try to get a 
better understanding. We liked history. We tried to pay attention to politics down 
there. We used to love listening to Amy Goodman on Democracy Now. And we 
would go out and talk about it. We'd try to come together-. Those type of things. 
Talk about the death penalty, any changes in the death penalty (Inf. 93:17). 
 
In addition, the men’s death row engaged in some group protest activities. 
Conditions were just so bad, you feel like, they made you come together. Because 
the condition was just that bad. You have people come together, want to protest. 
What we would do as a protest, we would not go to rec. Everybody would decide, 
we're not going to rec. That's what the opposite like, [inaudible] have to do the 
work. But still, this was our way of showing solidarity. We might refuse a tray. 
We're not going eat off the food cart. Just trying to show some solidarity. When 
someone gets executed, we give a moment of silence. We don't eat off the food 
cart that day, we don't talk. We try to remember the person that was being 
executed. Those are moments of solidarity for us (Inf. 93:17). 
 
Restrictions on core concerns like visits or food created opportunities for demonstrations 
of solidarity that overrode racist and other group affiliations. 
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Q:  You said too that everybody was aware that there are different cliques and 
groups, but when there is a serious moment, everyone come together to get what 
needs to be done. 
 
A: Yes.  For example, if the food comes on the wing and it's dehydrated.  Just 
sitting there and plugged up with all this heat on it.  By the time you get it, 
everything is dried out.  No matter who's on the wing, no one wanted that food.  
And we knew by the rules that they were not allowed to serve us that.  So we 
would all refuse the try.  It might start with me.  And I might say, this food is 
dehydrated.  Don't take those trays.  Make them take it back.  And it doesn’t make 
a difference if it’s AB [Aryan Brotherhood] over there or whatever clique it is.  
Once they hear that, we don't want that, take that back, bring us something else.  
Then that's when we come together (Inf. 93:18).  
 
Texas prisoners also have ties to the free-world.  While imperfect proxies of the 
condemned’s connectedness to others, data from the Texas prison system regarding 
witnesses to executions indicate that most execution-hasteners had some social ties to the 
outside world.  Of the 29 execution-hasteners on whom I have information from TDCJ, 
27 invited witnesses to their execution, and of those, 25 had witnesses other than clergy 
or attorneys.  In addition, of 30 execution-hasteners, only five are buried in the prison 
cemetery.  Burial in the prison cemetery – where they are buried under their prison 
number, and not their name – is generally anathema to prisoners, who see it as the prison 
owning them even after their death.  Being buried elsewhere means that almost all 
execution-hasteners had relationships with people outside of prison strong enough that 
individuals committed to collecting their bodies and making arrangements to bury them 
privately.   
Based on these measures, MS2 appears to have had had greater social connection.  
Out of 37 for whom TDCJ had information, five were buried in the prison cemetery, and 
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only one had no personal witnesses.  Only two had only death row spiritual advisors 





Buried in prison cemetery 
Execution-hasteners 89.6% (26) 6.9% (2) 17.2% (5) 
Non-hasteners 97.3% (36) 5.4% (2) 13.5% (5) 
Table 15:  Comparison between groups of execution witnesses and burial arrangements. 
Prisoners may have had important social relationships not reflected in these data, 
however.  Anthony Cook, for instance, had only his spiritual advisor (who had previously 
witnessed several executions) present at his execution, but his mother, step-father, 
brother, sister, in-laws, and cousins joined the spiritual advisor at the funeral home after 
the execution (Blaustein 1994).  Cook was also buried in the prison cemetery.  This may 
reflect that his family simply could not afford the cost of paying to bury him.  Moreno 
had no one from his nuclear family as witnesses to his execution, but in his final days, he 
visited with his mother, brothers, first wife, and their four children (Bragg 1987).  At the 
same time, it is not uncommon for family with whom the prisoner has had little to no 
contact to resurface at the time of execution.   
As with those with terminal illness, family ties may both inhibit and motivate 
desires for hastened death.  Some EHs believed they would spare their families pain by 
hastening execution.  As Informant 93 said, “they don’t want to put their family through 
it no more” (Inf. 93:1).  Moreno, according to his attorney, “did not try to block the 
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execution because he did not want his family to despair.  He wanted to get the execution 
behind them” (Freelander 1987).  Gonzales, who represented himself at trial and asked 
for the death penalty, rejected an opportunity to plead to a term of years because he did 
not want to put his family through the experience of his incarceration (RR3:12).  Robert 
Atworth raised a subtler point.  He did not express concern about the burden imposed on 
families coming to visit on death row, or the ignominy or shame that the crime brought to 
the family.  Instead, he seems to have been unhappy that he was disconnected from his 
daughter, but saw no future in their relationship since he believed knowing him would 
harm her:  
He does not want to be a bad influence on his daughter who is apparently 8 ½ 
years old and does not know he is on death row.  He appears frustrated that she 
did not know the truth about him and his status.  He affirmed that it was now too 
late, because he had changed.  He reported that he had made her a wall hanging 
and written her poems.  He expressed concern that if they were to have contact 
now, it would only hurt her.  He also worried that he would be a bad influence.  
(11.071 CR46).   
 
While family and other social ties can bolster the will to live, these ties could be 
operating in reverse for death row prisoners who maintain family ties only with great 
difficulty.  Their continued life perpetuates the stigma of their offense and their sentence, 
whether through media coverage of their case or even the simple act of sending and 
receiving mail from not only a penal institution, but from death row.  One informant 
stressed death row’s higher profile compared to the rest of the prison.  He observed:  
“Everything that happens on death row is highlighted [to the outside world]. Where 
regular population, you may never hear about it” (Inf. 93:5).  Just as the DHD literature 
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regarding those with terminal illness suggests, family ties can have a dual and 
paradoxical effect in both sustaining and diminishing the desire to live. 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
My data suggest that EHs may not be that different from non-EHs in their 
vulnerability to desires to hasten death, at least as measured by their experiences with 
depression and other mental illness, suicidality, or negative childhood experiences.  As 
Cunningham and Vigen (2002) report, most death row prisoners shoulder these burdens.  
More sensitive analyses may be able to refine a better understanding of this relationship if 
one exists.   
On the other hand, other indicators are consistent with the suicide literature.  For 
example, most EHs acted on the desire to hasten death before age 35, and among those 
who were not IPV-EH and had no history of prior incarceration, they acted on average in 
their late 20s.  This is consistent with the finding that most prison suicides are committed 
by those less than 35 years old.   
In addition, as with other prisoners who suicide, EHs are more likely to have prior 
criminal convictions, prior convictions for crimes against persons, and prior experiences 
with incarceration than non-execution-hasteners.  The exception to this was among those 
sentenced to death for offenses involving a domestic crisis.  This group’s criminal 
experience was lower than the other EHs, whether measured by their prior convictions, 
crimes against persons, or time in prison.  This again is consistent with the suicide 
literature, which suggests that their desires to hasten death have a different pathway. 
The effort to deconstruct differences in capital crimes yielded some interesting 
results.  Compared to other similarly situated death row prisoners, the execution-
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hasteners were more likely to have used a gun in the murder, and less likely to have 
committed the crime with another person.  A relationship regarding solo offending and 
desires to hasten death is consistent with prior research finding intensified social 
responsibility for acts undertaken individually.  These prisoners may feel that they are 
more culpable for their crime than those who are able to diffuse responsibility onto 
another.  As a result, they may feel that they deserve their punishment, and so ask for 
execution.  Another darker dynamic may be at work, however.  These offenders may 
translate this sense of increased culpability into a statement about their disposition or 
character.  They may decide they are worthless and lacking the possibility of redemption 
in this life.  This feeling could combine with other stressors or vulnerabilities to motivate 
a decision to hasten death.  This more psychological dynamic deserves further 
exploration. 
The finding about gun use is also provocative because it suggests processes of 
responsibility that are different from those predicted, namely that hastening execution 
would be connected to crimes that involved greater interpersonal violence.  Instead, this 
finding suggests the possibility that the prevalence of gun deaths reflects more impulsive 
or intoxicated acts.  Steven Morin told a friend said that he did not intend to kill his 
victim – he had been in the middle of stealing her car when she confronted him – but 
“something came over him and the gun went off” (murderpedia.org n.d.).  Richard Foster 
described his gun homicide as an “accident” and “not intentional” (txexecutions.org; 
March 14, 2000 Order, 3).   This could contribute to greater regret and remorse.   
I also hypothesized that prisoners may have experiences that increase their 
motivation to hasten death.  While the literature on isolation confinement suggests a 
connection to elevated suicide risk, my data do not draw a strong connection between 
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conditions of confinement and hastening execution.  This is consistent with Blume’s 
(2005) finding.  While the percent hastening execution increased slightly at the Polunsky 
unit, this finding is confounded by other factors, such as changes in the law and increases 
in executions overall.  Interview data explain how prison culture could act as a brake on 
hastening execution by stigmatizing desires to hasten death.  At the same time, it suggests 
how isolation confinement could increase the possibility of hastening execution through 
dynamics other than increased suicidality.  Because prisoners have less interaction with 
each other, taking actions that mark the EH as “weak” carry less risk.  It may also inhibit 
a contagion effect because people have less contact with each other, and therefore less 
opportunity to talk about waiving appeals. 
Another important finding in this study is the very early point at which most EHs 
articulate and often act upon their desire to hasten execution.  This recasts the role of 
prison conditions.  Conditions may not play as prominent a role in initiating desires to 
hasten execution, though they may harden prisoners’ desire to stay the course in waiving 
appeals.  Certainly the EHs’ early desire to hasten execution is consistent with the prison 
research finding that the risk of suicide is particularly elevated early in the prison term.   
I explored the possibility of other temporal patterns associated with events.  I 
found that almost two out of five sought to waive appeals within four weeks of the 
anniversary of the homicide.  Two thirds opted to waive within eight weeks of the 
anniversary.  Almost two out of five sought to waive appeals within four weeks of a court 
action.  Over half opted to waive within eight weeks of a court action. 
This may reflect that litigation is one of the pains of death row imprisonment.  Its 
ups and downs of court decisions is difficult to bear (Harrington 2000), and death row 
offers few distractions from the waiting.  In addition, the increased media attention 
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occasioned by court decisions may also spur the prisoner to action, as may be his sense 
that he can improve his chances of hastening execution if he acts in between court 
actions, and not, e.g., while a petition is pending.   
The organization of legal appeals appears to shape efforts to hasten execution.  
EHs tend to express and act upon their desire for execution early in the criminal justice 
process.  Almost 50% expressed the desire at trial, and over 51% acted on it during state 
habeas proceedings.  When the law permits to waive early, they generally do.  Since legal 
changes permitting them to waive an adversarial first appeal, almost 75% live on death 
row fewer than four years.  This is a reversal of the percentage of EHs living on death 
row for more than four years prior to this court decision.   
This has both social psychological and legal implications.  We saw that in MS2, 
almost a quarter made formal efforts to end their appeals at some point.  While the 
evidence of wavering among EHs is not clear, many condemned prisoners plainly 
struggle with this decision – and decide to continue living.  Dismantling structural 
obstacles to desires to hasten death may increase the possibility that some who 
experience transitory desires to hasten death – which is characteristic of desires to hasten 
death among those with terminal illness – will have more opportunities to change their 
mind.  Given how early these prisoners took steps to waive their appeals – Joe Gonzales 
was on death row only 252 days – giving them time to acclimate to death row before they 
make final decisions to hasten execution may decrease execution-hastening. 
Of course, this raises the question whether there is anything wrong with 
facilitating executions of the apparently willing.  I suggest that there is.  Setting aside 
moral concerns about the death penalty, it is troubling that the current state of the law 
permits the execution of an individual without any meaningful (i.e., adversarial) appellate 
88 
 
review.  This concern is particularly weighty when evidence presented during the 
putatively adversarial proceeding – the trial – is limited by someone actively seeking the 
death penalty for himself.  This calls into question whether the death penalty is in fact 
being meted out to the “worst of the worst.”  
Finally, my findings regarding protective agents suggest that non-EHs have more 
social support.  However, I qualify this finding with the observation that these measures – 
of execution witnesses and burial in the prison cemetery – are imperfect.  They may 
reflect a prisoner’s desire not to put his loved ones through the sadness of witnessing his 
execution, and the family’s inability to pay for a private burial.  More research should be 







In this section, I examine how EHs and others interpreted their deaths.  Based on 
interviews conducted in connection with this dissertation, contemporaneous media 
reports that often featured interviews with the EHs and those close to them, final 
statements before execution, and court records, I identified categories of meaning.  These 
meanings may tell us something about the larger normative world EHs inhabit.  As 
Douglas observed, we draw “from various spheres of experience for the purposes of 
constructing meanings for these suicidal phenomena (1967:247) (emphasis in original).       
I describe these data not because I believe they should be accepted uncritically.  
In the following chapter, I deconstruct the production of these explanations in court 
processes (see Muschert et al. 2009 for media analysis).  I am also not arguing a causal 
relationship, e.g., that people are hastening death because of their religious beliefs.  
Instead, I am suggesting people use cultural touchstones to make sense of their 
experience. 
The frames are also not exclusive.  As one informant emphasized, persistent EHs 
have a “constellation” of reasons for giving up their appeals, whether because they want 
to take control, do not see the point of prolonging the proceedings, feel hopeless that 
litigation could make any difference in their lives, cannot stand the conditions, or feel that 
accepting execution gets them right with God.  In fact, this is what could make them so 
difficult to dissuade (Inf. 13 pt. 1:20”08).  Nor are they always distinct frames.  
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Expressions about the futility of appeals can include both ideas of indisputable guilt and 
complaints about the criminal justice system.  The table therefore simply reflects 
common frames as a rough typology.  It includes explanations described by informants 





Media, court documents, 




& speculative reasons 
 
Accountability/remorse/ 
accept verdict & sentence 
61.3% (19) 64.5% (20) 
Religious beliefs 58.1% (18) 64.5% (20) 
 
Fact of incarceration/ 
pointlessness of life in prison 
 
51.6% (16) 58.1% (18) 
 
“Get it over with”/ 
futility of appeals 
45.2% (14) -- 
 
Complaint about 
criminal justice system 
22.6% (7) -- 
 
Autonomy/choosing 
time of death 
19.4% (6) 22.6% (7) 
Prison conditions 16.1% (5) 29.0% (9) 
Other
29
 32.2% (10) -- 
Table 16:  Reasons for hastening execution. 
                                                 
29 These included desires to bring closure to survivors; spare their families pain; save taxpayer money; and 
fears of being too old when they got out, if they got out, to reintegrate into society. 
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MEANING OF HASTENING EXECUTION AND EXECUTION 
Accountability/remorse/acceptance of the verdict and sentence 
Over half of the EHs characterized their execution as a fair way to take 
responsibility.  Included in this category were any statements expressing remorse, being 
sorry, paying a debt, or accepting responsibility.   James Porter described himself as “the 
type of individual to face up to my responsibility and my mistakes” (Graczyk 2005).  
Similarly, Michael Rodriguez told a reporter: 
 
I have a lot of people here telling me how unfair the system is.  At some point in 
our lives, you have to have some sort of accountability.  I can't see how people in 
my situation deny that (http://off2dr.com/modules/extcal/event.php?event=191). 
He  wanted the victim’s family “to know how truly sorry I am, and I am willing to 
pay…. I think it’s a fair sentence.  I need to pay back.  I can’t pay back monetarily.  This 
is the way” (http://off2dr.com/modules/extcal/event.php?event=191). 
These statements often coincided with religious beliefs.  Eliseo Moreno, for 
example, said in his final statement, “I’d like to say I’m here because I'm guilty.  I have 
no grudges or anything against nobody. The word of God tells me the wages of sin are 
death. I'm willing to pay according to the laws of Texas because I know I'm guilty” 
(Associated Press 1987b).  
 Steven Renfro’s prosecutor and former classmate spoke with Renfro after the 
trial.  He described Renfro’s decision:  “By voluntarily going ahead and being punished, 
it’s like atonement” (Graczyk 1998).  In his final statement, Renfro said, “I would like to 
tell the victims’ families that I am sorry, very sorry. I am so sorry. Forgive me if you can.  
I know it’s impossible, but try.  Take my hand, Lord Jesus, I’m coming home” (Texas 
Department of Criminal Justice Executed Offenders, Renfro Last Statement). 
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Charles Tuttle, who at the time of the death death verdict invoked biblical 
language, saying “That’s what I want, that’s what I got.  An eye for an eye” (Graczyk 
1999b), addressed witnesses in his final statement:  
To Kathy’s family and friends that were unable to attend today, I am truly sorry. I 
hope my dropping my appeal has in some way begun your healing process. This 
is all I am going to do to help you out in any way for the nightmare and pain that I 
have caused you, but I am truly sorry and I wish I could take back what I did, but 
I can’t. I hope this heals you.  To my family: I love you. When the tears flow, let 
the smiles grow. Everything is all right.  To my family: I love you (Texas 
Department of Criminal Justice Executed Offenders, Tuttle Final Statement).   
 
Larry Hayes, who killed his wife and a convenience store clerk, told a reporter he 
was “torment[ed]… every day for what I’ve done” (http://www.txexecutions.org/reports/ 
310.asp).  In his final statement, he addressed the execution witnesses: 
I would like for Rosalyn's family and loved ones and my wife, Mary's, family to 
know that I am genuinely sorry for what I did.  I would like you to reach down in 
your hearts and forgive me.  There is no excuse for what I did.  Rosalyn's mother 
asked me at the trial, "Why?" and I do not have a good reason for it.  Please 
forgive me.  As for my friends and family here - thanks for sticking with me and 
know that I love you and will take part of you with me.  I would like to thank one 
of the arresting officers that I would have killed if I could have.  He gave me 
CPR, saved my life, and gave me a chance to get my life right.  I know I will see 
Mary and Rosalyn tonight.  I love you all (Texas Department of Criminal Justice 
Executed Offenders, Hayes Final Statement).   
 
Benjamin Stone told  the press that hastening execution was “it’s the only way I'll 
find peace of mind” (Graczyk 1997).  One interviewee described Stone’s experience 
succinctly: “It was just something he really couldn't live with. And he was pretty intent 
about getting killed…  It wasn't because…he was afraid of going to prison. Or he thought 
life in prison would be too harsh for him. I don't think that really entered into it (Inf. 73:2, 
5).   
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Richard Beavers told the court that, “I have a debt to pay and I’m ready to pay it” 
(March 2, 1994 hearing at 13).  Interestingly, while a competency report indicated that 
Beavers was not remorseful, saying “I guess I felt sort of bad for the families but I 
wouldn’t call it remorse” (Aug. 11, 1993 report, 1) – those who knew him recalled him 
differently.   Recalling he “truly was sorry” and “remorseful,” he “wanted to be 
punished” because he “felt like he should die for doing the crime that he did.”  He was 
“someone who was living with a lot of anguish,” “motivated by self-loathing,” and 
“wanted to die” (Inf. 10:1-6).   
Beavers is not the only one who may have modulated his description of his state 
of mind according to the audience.  Other prisoners also appear to have understated their 
remorse in court-related proceedings.  Jeffrey Barney, for example, made very limited 
statements in court about his motivations.  He took responsibility, “Well, I am guilty of 
what I was charged with.  I just wish that the sentence would be carried out,” and he 
explained, “I don’t feel like sitting the rest of my life in the Texas Department of 
Corrections” (March 11, 1986 hearing at 17).  To a jail chaplain, he would say “he is 
guilty and has made it right with the Lord and has to pay his debt with society” 
(Associated Press 1986).   In his final statement, by contrast, he expressed his remorse 
more clearly: “I’m sorry for what I’ve done.  I deserve this.”  Then he either said, “Jesus 
forgive me,” (Crawford 2006) or “I hope Jesus forgives me” (Associated Press 1986).   
Religious beliefs 
 
I coded liberally for “religious beliefs,” more interested in whether prisoners 
claimed a sacralizing frame than whether they were attributing their decision to religion.  
Therefore, if a prisoner announced “I believe in Jesus Christ,” I included him in this 
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category, even though the idea was followed by another subject.  Leo Jenkins, for 
example, said in his final statement, “I would like to say that I believe that Jesus Christ is 
my Lord and Saviour.  I am sorry for the Kelly[‘s] loss, but my death won’t bring them 
back.  I believe that the state of Texas is making a mistake tonight.  Tell my family I love 
them” 30 (Crawford 2006)).  Similarly, while religion does not seem to have been a strong 
motivator for Charles Rumbaugh, his final statement borrowed from religious language 
(“although you don’t forgive me for my transgressions, I forgive yours against me” 
(Crawford 2006)).  I included him in this category as well.    
Several execution-hasteners cited religious beliefs more directly.   In addition to 
Moreno, above, Anthony Cook said in his final statement, “I just want to tell my family I 
love them, and I thank the Lord Jesus for giving me another chance and for saving me” 
(Texas Department of Criminal Justice Executed Offenders, Cook Final Statement).  
Richard Foster, a longtime death row prisoner who led Christian study groups, said:  
I have been crucified with Christ. It is no longer I who lives, but Christ who lives 
in me.  So for the life for which I live now in the flesh, I live by faith in the Son of 
God who loved me and gave himself for me.  I love you, Annie.  You have been 
the best friend I have ever had in the world.  I'll see you when I get there, okay?  I 
am ready warden (Texas Department of Criminal Justice Executed Offenders, 
Foster Final Statement).   
 
Larry Hayes appreciated his time of death row because it gave him the 
opportunity to “make peace with God” and prepare to die (Kimberly 2003).   
                                                 
30 This statement may reflect that his unhappiness that his execution had become a major media event 
(complete with an HBO documentary).  Jenkins’ execution was the first one victim survivors were 
permitted to view.  In fact, the survivors in his case led the political battle to obtain the right to attend his 
execution. While press reports suggested Jenkins supported the victims’ survivors viewing his execution, 
one informant contradicted this (Inf. 37:10).  
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Michael Rodriguez in his final statement linked religion to his apology to the 
survivors:  
I know this no way makes up for all the pain and suffering I gave you.  I am so so 
sorry.  My punishment is nothing compared to the pain and sorrow I have caused.  
I hope that someday you can find peace.  I am not strong enough to ask for 
forgiveness because I don't if I am worthy.  I realize what I've done to you and the 
pain I've given.  Please Lord forgive me.  I have done some horrible things.  I ask 
the Lord to please forgive me.  I have gained nothing, but just brought sorrow and 
pain to these wonderful people.  I am sorry.  So so sorry.  To the Sanchez family 
who showed me love.  To the Hawkings' family, I am sorry.  I know I have 
affected them for so long.  Please forgive me.  Irene, I want to thank you and 
thank your husband Jack.  I'll be waiting for you.  I am so sorry.  To these families 
I ask forgiveness.  Father God I ask you too for forgiveness.  I ask you for 
forgiveness, Lord.  I am ready to go Lord.  Thank you.  I am ready to go.  My 
Jesus my Savior there is none like you.  All of my days I want to praise, let every 
breath.  Shout to the Lord let us sing (Texas Department of Criminal Justice 
Executed Offenders, Rodriguez Final Statement). 
 
Another believed it important to get to heaven as soon as possible in order to 
apologize to his victims.  “He wanted to die so he could go to Heaven” (Inf. 84:3).  “God 
had told him to waive the appeal so that he could be with the victims quicker.  And to 
then apologize to them quicker.  He indicated to him that that was very important to him, 
that he apologize to them for what he had done” (Inf. 84:2)   
Some prisoners, however, expressed thanks to God without linking it to their 
culpability for the offense.  Stephen Morin, whose story of being spiritually reborn is 
available on DVD sold by Focus on the Family in conjunction with Christianbook.com, 
said in his final statement:  
Heavenly Father, I give thanks for this time, for the time that we have been 
together, the fellowship in your world, the Christian family presented to me  (He 
called the names of the personal witnesses.). Allow your holy spirit to flow as I 
know your love as been showered upon me. Forgive them for they know not what 
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they do, as I know that you have forgiven me, as I have forgiven them. Lord 
Jesus, I commit my soul to you, I praise you, and I thank you (Texas Department 
of Criminal Justice Executed Offenders, Morin Final Statement). 
 
Robert Anderson invited execution witnesses to join in his religious beliefs.   
To Audrey's grandmother, I am sorry for the pain I have caused you for the last 15 
years and your family.  I have regretted this for a long time.  I am sorry.  I only 
ask that you remember the Lord because He remembers us and He forgives us if 
we ask Him.  I am sorry.  And to my family, and my loved ones - I am sorry for 
the pain for all those years and for putting you through all the things we had to go 
through.  I ask the Lord to bless you all. Tammy, Irene, Betty, Dan, Judy – I love 
you all. And Jack, thank you. Warden (Texas Department of Criminal Justice 
Executed Offenders, Anderson Final Statement). 
While Informant 13 believed that the pains of imprisonment on death row and the 
prisoners’ assessment of their legal cases were the primary motivators, he recognized that 
religion framing seemed to offer comfort to some: “I’ve gotten myself into this.  Is there 
any hope left for me anywhere?” (Inf. 13 pt. 1:12”40, 12”47).  Informant 25 thought 
those who find religion on death row are “the lucky ones;” they are the “only ones that 
aren’t scared” (Inf. 25: 2”44).  They also offered an escape from one’s prior sins; their 
“slate was clean” (Inf. 25:44”46). 
Informant 13 also suspected that some death row spiritual advisors may have 
encouraged death row prisoners to hasten execution by framing it in positive spiritual 
terms.  The chaplains may have communicated that asking for forgiveness also meant 
accepting the consequences of one’s actions.  Accepting execution was a way to get right 
with God (Inf. 13 pt. 1:12”47).  Susan Blaustein’s article about Anthony Cook’s 
execution suggests the complexity of the role of death row spiritual advisors: 
 
Jack Wilcox had nothing but enthusiasm for the force of Cook’s conversion.  “We 
walk into the death house, and he [Cook] says to me, ‘Hey, Jack, I’m excited!’  
Two hours before he’s going to die, and he’s excited?  I say, ‘Fantastic!  That’s 
great!’ . . . This man saw prison five times, he committed a horrible kidnapping 
and murder … a sure loser!” exclaimed Jack, who himself had found the Lord 
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after a life on the streets. “And then three year later, you be lookin’ at a person 
prayin’ to God.” 
 
“We would have like to have seen him continue with his appeals, because he was 
a great witness,’ [Jack’s wife and fellow volunteer chaplain] Irene interrupted, 
“but he believed in the death penalty.” 
 
Jack jumped back in, impatient.  “It’s not for us to say.  A lot of men [on the row] 
are upset because he gave up his appeals.  I say, ‘Look, the man’s been prayin’ to 
God for two years – you don’t get because a man and his prayers.’  We wanna let 
God drive the car,” he explained (Blaustein 1994:59). 
The spiritual advisors could offer “enthusiasm” for a decision to die and share a 
profound personal connection through a jointly undertaken spiritual connection.  Irene 
Wilcox may have been uncomfortable with her husband’s support for Cook’s decision, 
but even she saw Cook through his role as an agent for Christianity.  Hastening execution 
by dropping appeals could become a way to demonstrate the power of one’s faith.   
Incarceration, autonomy, and the futility of appeals 
 
Comments about prison were coded as specifically about conditions (as opposed 
to the fact of incarceration) where a particular feature of incarceration was identified 
other than life in a cell.  Alexander Martinez was described “hat[ing] interacting with the 
folks on death row….  [T]he prospect of forty more years around the people that he spent 
time with in prison was intolerable to him” (Inf. 40:3-4).  By contrast, Swift described his 
life on death row as a “battle;” without more, I coded his complaint about conditions of 
incarceration as speculative.   
The pains of imprisonment were plainly an important part of many of the EHs’ 
explanations for their decision to waive appeals.  Significantly, however, more EHs who 
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complained about incarceration were unhappy about the fact of incarceration rather than 
the conditions of incarceration.   
Some prisoners specifically complained about death row conditions.  Larry Hayes 
cited the grim conditions on death row and told a reporter that if people had really wanted 
to punish him, they would have sentenced him to life in prison:  “Executing me is 
sending me to heaven” (Kimberly 2003).  Danielle Simpson complained about leaky 
roofs that flooded cells, broken showers, toilets that would not flush, and unresponsive 
officers (June 9, 2009 hearing, 30-31; McGreal 2009). 
More often, however, prisoners spoke of the pointlessness of prison.  As Barney 
put it, “I don’t feel like sitting the rest of my life in the Texas Department of Corrections” 
(March 11, 1986 hearing at 17).  Some thought appeals were futile, which, combined 
with their sense that incarceration was pointless, led them to abandon appeals.   
He was just, fuck it, they're going to kill me, let's get it over with.  It doesn't make 
any difference what you do.  They're going to kill me.  And you know what, I 
want to die.  There was no desire to being reunited with his lord or anything like 
that.  It was just fuck it.  Even if they give me life, I don't want to live in that box.  
That's no life.  Might as well just kill me (Inf. 23:4). 
 
Where some sounded angry, others seemed resigned.  One prisoner felt that if his 
appeals would lead to his release, he would be interested in pursuing them.  “But if it’s 
just one of these, give me a new sentencing hearing and I have to stay in jail for the next 
however many years, forget it” (Inf. 16:4).  Another speculated: 
But him looking around and seeing … other people that have been on death row 
for thirty some odd years, he just said fuck it. I’ll let them kill my ass rather than 
just sit around being miserable with not much of any expectation for release. That 




Another feared the effects of long-term incarceration on death row.   
“I ain't never in my life seen anybody more ready to die,” said Carl Kinnamon, 
another death row inmate from Harris County, whose cell was next to [EH 
Jerome] Butler’s.  “It's on account of his age he don't want to continue his 
appeals. He doesn't want to be among the walking dead” (Fair 1990). 
 
Butler also echoed another relatively common complaint (N=5): even if he won a 
life sentence, he would be too old have restart a life when released.  “I'm 57 now, and I'd 
be in my 70s when I got out.  What am I supposed to do? Go live under a bridge?” (Fair 
1990).  James Porter wrote the TCCA: 
To be honest I would wrather [sic] be executed than spend my life in prison with 
no chance of ever getting out. (IF) I had the chance of getting out one day while 
still young enough to enjoy life, getting the right help to become a productive 
member of society, (but) I don’t see and want [won’t?] see this [sic] happen in the 
state of Texas prison system (March 2, 2003 Porter “Motion for Apology to 
CCA” at 2).   
 
While many ascribe to EHs a desire to exercise some control in an environment in 
which they have little, the EHs in this study made relatively little reference (N=7) to this 
kind of autonomy.  Esequel Banda was one of these exceptions: “Everyone knows that 
you leave Ellis in a body bag, one way or the other.  This way, I get to choose.  Besides, 
who knows what’s out there?  It might be better.  Can’t be no worse” (Johnston 1998a)  
David Martinez told a prison counselor that “he could never take his own life but would 
maybe like to decide the time so by giving up his appeals he would get some say so” 
(Respondent’s Exh. 11 at 25).  While a more ambiguous explanation of his decision to 
waive, Alexander Martinez’s comment highlights the constraint he felt in prison: “I don’t 
want to be what I have come to be in this life.  I don’t want to simply exist in this life.  I 
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want to live a life where I have free will and choices to make for myself” 
(http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/US/martinez972.htm). 
While not directly expressing the idea of controlling their destiny, some adverted 
to it by expressing their desire to stop playing the “games” of litigation.  James Smith 
told the judge he wanted an execution date because “I refuse to sit up there on that 
fucking death row twelve fucking years while you guys play fucking games” (July 1, 
1985, hearing at 15). Stephen Morin also said did not want to be “a pawn to be bandied 
back and forth in the TX court system for years to come” (Associated Press 1982).   
These assertions of autonomy sometimes appeared to be an interpretive gloss 
imposed by the informant.  Informant 13 stressed:  
[T]he utter lack of control that they have and it is human nature to want …to have 
some sense of “I can do this” and that when it seems like even in your own 
appeals your lawyers are deciding things for you… When you feel that folks who 
say they want to help you really have their own total set of agendas, not yours, in 
order to protect your notion that you’re a human being, sometimes you’ll adopt 
extreme measures to do that.  To cry out to say, you know, I count I matter, I can 
make this decision, even if it’s a decision to die, I want to try to die at least to 
some degree on my own terms.  Just respect me for that and stop trying to tell me 
that I’m nuts” (Inf. 13, pt. 2:0”7). 
 
Another informant believed that the EH’s:  
[D]ecision to drop his appeals and die did not appear to me to be a choice between 
living here for some period of years and dying.  It appeared to be a more poorly 
thought out way to poke the State in the eye over the fact that he didn’t have a 
chance at getting a reversal and getting a fair trial (Inf. 8:9).31 
                                                 
31 Informant 13 the utter lack of control that they they have and it is human nature to want …to have some 
sense of “I can do this” and that when it seems like even in your own appeals your lawyers are deciding 
things for you… When you feel that folks who say they want to help you really have their own total set of 
agendas, not yours, in order to protect your notion that you’re a human being, sometimes you’ll adopt 
extreme measures to do that.  To cry out to say, you know, I count I matter, I can make this decision, even 
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While believing some of this EH’s motivation consisted of a desire to control his 
destiny, in this informant’s opinion, he was not motivated, by a feeling of, “oh my god, I 
would rather die than live here” (id.).  Instead he felt the EH was asserting himself to 
punish the State, even though it meant cutting off his nose to spite his face.   
Another informant also described an EH’s decision as a combination of desires 
for autonomy, dignity, and to express hostility toward the system:  
In his case, it was a conscious “screw you” to everybody else, combined with a 
decision that he was not going to live like they wanted.  And this was part of it.  
Like they wanted him to live, like an animal.  And I don't mean to ennoble this in 
an odd way.  But in the sense that it was the thing within his control to decide. … 
This was something that he wanted for the statement.  Not control over his 
environment but control over what was going to happen.  And I don't think he 
needed that, I think he just chose it.  … He said this was a fuck you.  Bring it.  
And said, I'll accept this, fine, I'll do this.  You're not going to get a cry out of me, 
you're not going to get a whimper, you're not going to get a beg (Inf. 40:9-10). 
Complaints about criminal justice system 
 Danielle Simpson, for example, complained that judges just “just do what they 
want to do”: 
And then the way the appeals process is, to me, in my own opinion, there is really 
no such thing as the law because the way I see it, they're going to do what they 
want to do regardless, I mean, whether it's a judge or prosecutor or whoever. 
There is no such thing as the law. When them cases go through there, they really 
don't even take the time to look at those cases and review them thoroughly. They 
just do what they want to do. They decide who's going to get action and who's 
not. That's not justice. That's not justice.   
 
And, I mean, I refuse to just live like that any longer. I'm ready to get this over 
with as soon as possible. I'm well aware of the situation and the process of the 
execution. I've already done, you know, prepared myself for it; and, therefore, I'm 
ready. I'm ready to get it over with as soon as possible. That's all I'm asking. (June 
                                                                                                                                                 




9, 2009 hearing, 31-32). 
 
Rumbaugh accused the State of hypocrisy in executing him: 
Just as I realize and acknowledge that I can proffer no excuse for my actions in 
causing the death of a human being, so must I state my clear and emphatic belief 
that neither can society proffer any righteously acceptable or defensible excuse 
for the imposition of the death penalty.  My crime was an individual one 
committed by me alone and the responsibility is therefore mine alone, whereas 
society’s crimes are concerted ones committed in the name of and by the authority 
of each and every citizen and therefore the responsibility is that of each and every 
citizen.  Murder is Murder!  Just as society condemns me, so must it condemn 
itself.  Just as society labels me a ‘murderer’ for causing the death of a human 
being, so must it label itself for knowingly, intentionally, premeditatedly and 
hypocritically causing the deaths of each an[d] every human being throughout this 
country whom it has put to death.  And the only possible ‘right’ that society can 
claim i[s] the RIGHT of MIGHT! (Crawford 2006 Appendix 1). 
 
Ramon Hernandez lodged one of the more peculiar complaints.  As the Houston 
Chronicle recounts, Hernandez refused to ask for a stay of execution because he believed 
that he could not represent himself because the court had appointed counsel to assist him.  
This was not correct.  The state court had removed counsel from the case at the execution 
date setting hearing, but Hernandez apparently believed that they had not been properly 
removed by the court.  Hernandez reportedly “believe[d] that he would waive claims to 
grounds for appeal if he now authorizes a lawyer to take his case.  As a result, he [was] 
resigned to die to show the inequities of the court system” (Klimko 1987).  Hernandez 
told a reporter, 
Nobody wants to die….  But sometimes people have to make a stand.  I have a 
paramount right to represent myself.  If I get a stay, I won’t be making a stand.  
Seeing that I’m a human being, it’s very important for me not to die.  But at the 




Hernandez did not file any appeal on his own, and he complained that he was not 
able to represent himself because he was not given a complete copy of the trial transcript.  
The prosecutor ascribed Hernandez’s complaint to “his warped sense of the law and the 
judicial process” (Klimko 1987).  A veteran defense attorney agreed: “The guy has a 
whole misconception of the law….His point ain’t going to help him.  He can take his 
point to heaven with him” (Associated Press 1987a). 
Hernandez’s complaints about his legal representation resemble in some ways his 
furious preoccupation during his trial with his attorneys and the appointment process, 
among other things, as reflected in many of his pro se motions (CR 48-52; CR 276-81, 
CR 312-323).  This was also not the first time he made apparently contradictory choices.  
For example, he vigorously litigated his case during trial and in its immediate aftermath, 
filing over 75 pro se motions, and complained that his lawyers were ineffective, 
withholding information from him, and conspiring with the court:  “[B]ecause this 
attorney’s did not prepare for this case the Petitioner shall die” (CR 352, CR 383).  At 
trial, however, Hernandez testified and asked for the death penalty.     
While it is not clear, Hernandez may have been principally concerned that his 
lawyers failed him in defending him during the guilt/innocence portion of the case.  It is 
nonetheless troubling no mental health examination of Hernandez was ever conducted.  
He opposed in court his lawyer’s pretrial motion for a psychiatric examination (RR 1:22).  
He subsequently refused to cooperate with mental health evaluators his lawyers sent to 
evaluation.  (Hernandez complained that he did not consent to this examination and he 
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had the right to be examined by the expert of his choice) (CR 180-81).  A court order 
denied the effort of one of the trial attorney to intervene as a “next friend” because there 
was “nothing in the record which cases any doubt upon the mental competence of 
Hernandez” (Lovelace v. Lynaugh 1987).   
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
Expressions of remorse and acceptance of punishment feature prominently in 
EHs’ explanations of what they are doing.  This supports that aspect of the theoretical 
model that hypothesizes that criminological characteristics may increase their sense of 
culpability.  Further, “individuals in the Western world can make use of suicidal actions 
to transform the meanings of themselves, of what they fundamentally are” (id., 286) 
(emphasis in original).  By linking accountability to execution, many EHs not only draw 
on prevailing attitudes about the moral legitimacy of death as punishment for murder, but 
they also try to reclaim something positive from their profoundly spoiled and stigmatized 
identity.  Like Douglas’ “atonement suicides,” these prisoners seek to transform not only 
themselves to themselves, but also their meaning in the eyes of others.  “[T]he killing… 
of oneself can be used as a general indication of how serious, sincere, committed one is” 
(Douglas 1967:301) (emphasis in original). 
In addition, as Douglas points out, Western traditions see death as “a permanent 
transformation of the substantial self from the realm of the time-bound, space-bound, 
worldly, everyday meanings to the realm of the timeless, infinite, other-worldly 
meanings” (1967:285).  Statements of religious beliefs intertwined with statements of 
remorse and responsibility to create a hopeful sequence of accountability, soul 
transformation, and entry into a better place.   
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Religion played a few different roles, however.  Having a religious frame at 
execution did not necessarily mean that the prisoner felt positively about his execution.  It 
could, as with Jenkins and Rumbaugh, be offered to demonstrate some commonality to 
preface their criticism of some aspect of their executions.  Further, while complaints 
about the criminal justice system as a whole were not often articulated, they were clearly 
sufficiently present to undercut ideas of EHs as all satisfied with their execution.  A 
number complained about the appellate process and about the death penalty.   
 In addition, in an interesting choice of words, one informant described death row 
spiritual advisors as telling prisoners that giving up appeals was a way to “man up” by 
accepting consequences.  If this happened, this framing plainly drew on masculinity 
norms in an environment where perceptions of masculinity are essential for self-respect 
and survival.  This translation of abandoning appeals could help offset the perceptions of 
weakness Informant 93 reported are associated with hastening execution.   
Conversely, stepping down from a decision to waive appeals may also require 
face-saving strategies. In a poignant moment, one EH expressed fear as he was about to 
be executed.  He told his lawyer: 
‘Man, it’s nothing like I thought it would be,’ he said.  He was fidgeting and 
scared, and finally had his feelings of imminent death.  He repeated this thought 
again.  I asked him if he wanted me to file the stay.  He hesitated, but said no.  I 
knew that he was concerned he would be perceived as weak if he ‘back out’ now.  
I told him this decision did not belong to the guards or other inmates back in Ellis, 
none of whom knew what this was like.  Both of us were familiar with the macho 
mythology of the Ellis Unit that decides who died like a man and who didn’t.  He 
seemed comforted, but said to file nothing.  I stayed as long as I could, but I knew 
he had come too far for his ego to let him change his mind. 
 
The guards finally said I’d have to go.  I asked one last time, got one more ‘no’ 
and left.  Going out, the guard said contemptuously, ‘looks like this one can’t 
make up his mind’ (Johnston 1998b). 
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Imperatives of masculinity may also account for the general preference for 
complaining about the fact of incarceration rather than the specific conditions.  This may 
reflect that EHs generally decide to abandon their appeals before they arrive at death row, 
before they know what the conditions will be.  In addition, however, this framing draws 
on ideas of “don’t fence me in” and “death before dishonor” that resonate more heroically 
than complaints about corrupt guards and dirty food trays.  After reciting a litany of 
complaints about the prison, Danielle Simpson interjected to a reporter, “I refuse to let 
the system or the officials see me in any kind of suffering or emotion.  I refuse to let them 
see me like that, knowing they brought on some of that” (McGreal 2009).  He might as 
well have been paraphrasing Sykes:  “the man who can ‘take it,’ who can endure the 
regime of the custodians without flinching, is the man who wins the admiration and 
respect of his fellow captives” (1958:100-01).32   
Masculine norms of independence and strength in an environment where 
complaining about conditions may help combat perceptions among other prisoners that 
the complainer is too weak to survive prison.  In addition, it may help the prisoner 
reclaim a sense of dignity within his subordinated status.  The relative absence of 
“autonomy talk” may be because the loss of autonomy is subsumed by the meaning of 
incarceration.  At the same time, complaints about a lack of autonomy may make too 
explicit their subjugated status.  This could account for why autonomy concerns seem to 
be more often voiced by people other than the prisoners.   
                                                 
32 Simpson, along with most of the other prisoners who complained explicitly about the conditions, lived at 
the Polunsky unit.  The isolation confinement conditions have attracted criticism from the outside world.  
This may have destigmatized to some extent complaints about conditions and transformed the complaints – 
and their request for execution – into a form of protest.   
107 
 
Many of those who expressed the futility of appeals suggest a pessimism that 
resonates with Blume’s (2005:963) report that 39% of his respondents cited hopelessness 
as a factor in the EH’s decision to abandon appeals.  Hopelessness is a feeling closely 
associated with suicide (Nock et al. 2008).  While some seem resigned or depressed, 
others appear to have expressed their hopeless anger through self-destruction.  What 
gives force to this hopelessness is the sense that time in prison is pointless.  This also 
reflects a pain of imprisonment.  It highlights the difficulty some have finding ways to 
create meaningful lives, whether through self-improvement, social connection, or by 
making amends, while in prison.     
Inferring too much from this small population is obviously inappropriate, but 
some differences in patterns of explanations may warrant further investigation.   
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Table 17:  Explanations of death by race/ethnicity. 
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White EHs in this population were more likely than African-American or Latino 
EHs to embed their explanations of death and death-seeking in statements of remorse 
and/or religiosity.  Unlike whites seeking physician-assisted suicide because of a fear of 
losing autonomy (Oregon Public Health Division 2011; Washington State Department of 
Health 2010),
33
 the white prisoners in this study did not define their decision in those 
terms.  In addition, this difference – again, among a very small group – raises the 
possibility of different trajectories to hastening death.  African-Americans can be more 
cynical about the criminal justice system (Sampson and Bartusch 1998; Hagan and 
Albonetti 1982).  These attitudes may contribute to discounting their interest in pursuing 
appeals and living in prison.  Many believe that whites experience incarceration 
differently because they find it harder to assert race privilege in prison.  They may 
embrace their punishment both as a way to escape a dissonant racial experience and to 
reclaim a more positive identity as a “good” death row prisoner. 
  
                                                 
33 In Oregon, 90.9% explained their decision to pursue physician-assisted suicide as a result of “losing 
autonomy;”  88.3% attributed it to being “less able to engage in activities making life enjoyable;” 82.7% to 
“loss of dignity;” 53.7% to “losing control of bodily functions;” 36.1% to being a “burden on family, 
friends/caregivers;” 22.6% to “inadequate pain control or concern about it; and 2.5% to “financial 
implications of treatment” (Oregon Public Health Division 2011).  Washington state reported that in 2010, 
of those who used PAS (and for whom it received After Death Reporting Forms), 90% were concerned 
about loss of autonomy; 87% about losing the ability to participate in activities that made life enjoyable, 




LEGAL STRUCTURING OF EXECUTION-HASTENING 
Chapter 6 
The Legal Process as Deviance Reduction34 
 While the preceding chapter described common frames for EHs’ death, but it did 
not situate them.  This chapter examines more closely how meaning can be constructed 
within a particular setting.   Specifically, this chapter examines legal proceedings and 
how they can serve as a forum in which social deviance (seeking to hasten execution) is 
neutralized by stock penal narratives.  Prisoners marshal explanations that resonate with 
broader cultural beliefs about the death penalty, prison, and the legal system.  They 
thereby deflect other interpretations, such as “suicide by cop,” that are socially deviant, if 
apparently legally acceptable under Rumbaugh.   
Sociolegal studies of courtroom narrative have generally analyzed verbal 
exchanges (Donovan and Barnes-Brus 2011), the role of larger cultural scripts (Donovan 
and Barnes-Brus 2011; Fleury-Steiner 2002; Umphrey 1999), the impact of laws and 
legal rules (Fraiden 2010; Ewick and Silbey 1995), and the disposition of individual 
judges (Lens 2009).  Less common are studies that include in their analysis dynamics of 
the legal process.  Susan Bandes’ (1999) examination of court narratives of police 
brutality, for example, explains how institutional resistance to claims of police brutality, 
legal standards for civil rights lawsuits, the larger common law litigation paradigm, and 
                                                 
34 A version of this chapter is forthcoming in Law & Society Review.   
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unequal resources available to litigants transform evidence of systemic government 
misconduct into anecdotes.   
This chapter similarly integrates a discussion of the broader legal process with the 
content of narratives of death-seeking.  It contends that the proceedings draw on a 
repertoire of cultural beliefs affirming the death penalty system.  At the same time, this 
evidence is shaped by legal rules and practices that constrain the presentation of deviant 
counter-narratives.  While legal rules “regulate what is able to be narrated” (Umphrey 
1999: 403), so does the evidence.  Some courtroom stories are more compelling than 
others not simply because they, for example, incorporate hegemonic beliefs, but because 
they are supported or contradicted by evidence that permits an alternative story to be told.  
Exploring the context from which courtroom narratives emerge is essential to interpreting 
the law’s stories.  Using Texas as a case study, this article considers execution-seeking 
narratives within a particular set of legal ethical rules, problematic mental health 
practices, and a larger legal culture that devalues and underfunds adversarial litigation.    
In presenting these data, I do not seek to arbitrate whether a particular prisoner 
was correctly deemed competent.  Each subject has been executed and without the ability 
to gather a more comprehensive account of a prisoner’s mental capacity, there is no way 
to discern the “right” answer in these cases.  Further, I do not argue that efforts to hasten 
one’s own execution are per se evidence of incompetence.  Instead, I contend that 
American culture generally views efforts to hasten death and the death penalty as deviant, 
and that (at least) lawyers see legal appeals as important in death penalty cases.  The 
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prisoners’ accounts help neutralize the deviance of the prisoner’s effort to die.  They do 
so by drawing on broader cultural narratives about penality and criminality, and 
marginalizing possible evidence of distress and suicidality.  Further, the legal structures – 
here competency determinations – can privilege some stigma-defusing narratives over 
others, while the absence of an adversarial process hides counter-narratives.  
 This chapter first reiterates the legal standards for hastening execution.  Next, it 
describes the ways in which prisoners who seek the death penalty are deviant.  Then, it 
offers some background from the sociological literature about how narratives can 
neutralize deviance.  This prefatory discussion is followed by research findings regarding 
the kinds of stories death-seeking prisoners tell courts to hasten execution, as well as the 
legal structures from which these stories emerge and in which they are accepted.  It 
concludes with a discussion.   
LAW OF WAIVER 
As outlined more extensively in Chapter 2, courts evaluate an EH’s decision to 
abandon appeals according to four criteria: the prisoner must make a knowing, voluntary, 
and intelligent waiver of his rights to appeal and must be mentally competent (Godinez v. 
Moran 1993; Rees v. Peyton 1966; Brady v. United States 1970).  In both Rumbaugh v. 
Procunier (1985) and Godinez v. Moran (1993), courts confronted defendants with 
notable histories of depression and suicidality.  In affirming Moran’s competence, the 
Supreme Court essentially announced a unitary standard for mental competence in legal 
proceedings (Blume 2005, Poythress et al. 2002).  The standard for mental competency to 
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waive appeals and expedite execution is the same as the standard for mental competency 
to stand trial, and as Moran and Rumbaugh make clear, mental competence is not a high 
bar to cross.  The Supreme Court in Indiana v. Edwards (2008:178) recognized that this 
standard permits even severely mentally ill defendants to be found competent.  Many 
lawyers casually refer to competence as requiring only that their clients be “oriented 
times three,” i.e., are aware of time, place, and person, screening out only the most 
psychotic defendants.   
Court proceedings to determine competence combine a low legal standard with 
highly subjective evaluations that generally eschew empirically-based, standardized 
measures of competency assessment (Zapf et al. 2004; Bardwell and Arrigo 2002; 
Poythress et al. 2002).  Maroney complains that “adjudicative competence, despite its 
enormous importance, is on the whole a surprisingly ramshackle affair [as] [i]t is poorly 
understood, under-theorized, and inconsistently implemented” (2006:1380).  While this 
“ramshackle affair” may be unsatisfactory from the perspective of reliability and validity, 
its relatively unstructured quality makes it a rich source of sociolegal data.   
Studies examining the context of legal decisions about mental status are scarce.  
In his study of legal proceedings on involuntary commitment for psychiatric 
hospitalization, James Holstein (1993) examined the “constitutive practices” of civil 
commitment courts.  Holstein considered how clinical recommendations and legal 
decisions to commit individuals for involuntary psychiatric treatment were framed by 
ways in which, for example, the legal system was organized, how participants interacted 
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with each other, and the cultural scripts, such as those surrounding gender, age, and 
“home,” informed the process.   
EHs do not present themselves to court with the same regularity as candidates for 
involuntary psychiatric treatment.  Therefore, they do not have the uniquely constituted 
environment Holstein observed.  Instead, EHs thrust themselves into the workaday 
criminal court world of routine arraignments and guilty pleas, with most of the 
participants – judges and attorneys alike – taken aback at the prisoner’s request and 
uncertain of the law.  Because we cannot understand EHs as Holstein did, through a 
dedicated, specialized court, this study relied not on courtroom observations, but court 
documents, including hearings and expert competence evaluations.   
HASTENING AS DEVIANT 
 For some imagining life on death row, nothing may seem more understandable 
and rational than an attempt to end the pains of imprisonment and seize control of the 
process by ending appeals.  Nonetheless hastening execution by abandoning appeals is a 
socially deviant act.  Most death row prisoners are committed to pursuing their appeals.  
EHs represent about 11% of those executed, not of those sentenced to death.  EHs seek to 
expedite execution within a local death row culture where hastening is not the norm, and 
also within a larger culture that has historically criminalized and stigmatized desires to 
die.  The Supreme Court in Washington v. Glucksberg (1997) considered a statute 
prohibiting doctors from acceding to the request by terminally ill patients for assistance 
in hastening death.  It canvassed a wide range of social concerns associated with 
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hastening death of others, and noted that bans on assisting suicide are widespread and 
“longstanding expressions of the States’ commitment to the protection and preservation 
of all human life” (710).  Whether to help someone hasten death is a question 
fundamental to the moral fabric of the country: “Indeed, opposition to and condemnation 
of suicide – and, therefore, of assisting suicide – are consistent and enduring themes of 
our philosophical, legal, and cultural heritages” (710).  It cited “a consistent and almost 
universal tradition that has long rejected the asserted right, and continues explicitly to 
reject it today, even for terminally ill, mentally competent adults” (723). 
The Glucksberg Court was troubled at the prospect of facilitating suicide:  “all 
admit that suicide is a serious public-health problem, especially among persons in 
otherwise vulnerable groups. …The State has an interest in preventing suicide, and in 
studying, identifying, and treating its causes” (730).  The Court was particularly 
concerned by the problem of accurately diagnosing and treating depression, and cited 
empirical data linking depression, mental disorders and desires to hasten death (730-31).     
The response to Glucksberg’s invitation to the states to experiment with different 
physician-assisted suicide legal regimes also reflects the strength of the concerns 
expressed in that case.  While the “right” to die under certain circumstances has gained 
some popular and political support within the past 20 years, physician assistance in dying 
is clearly legal in only two out of 50 American states, is highly regulated, and is a right 
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relatively rarely exercised35 (Hillyard and Dombrink 2001; Oregon Death With Dignity 
Act 1997; Washington Death With Dignity Act 2008).  Reflecting recurrent concerns 
regarding requests to hasten death, the two states that do permit physician-assisted 
suicide prohibit assistance to any terminally ill individual who suffers from “a psychiatric 
or psychological disorder or depression causing impaired judgment” (Oregon Death With 
Dignity Act 1997, O.R.S. 127.825 § 3.03; Washington Death With Dignity Act 2008, 
RCW 70.245.060).    
Schmeiser has observed that in execution-hastening cases, “[t]he specter of 
suicide, and the potential for judicial complicity in a private act that takes on 
emphatically public dimensions here, in fact haunts courts as they reason through their 
decisions” (2011:89).  One legal case (from Nevada, not Texas) illustrates tensions courts 
may feel in accepting the full implications of Rumbaugh.  In that case, the court took 
pains to discredit an expert’s finding of the prisoner’s suicidal ideation, even as it noted 
that suicidality did not indicate incompetence (Dennis ex rel. Butko v. Budge 2004:892-
93). 
Further, death penalty appeals are generally understood (at least by lawyers) to 
play an important role in the American death penalty, which relies heavily on a system of 
legal procedures for its legitimacy (Garland 2010).  “Death is different,” and in capital 
cases, courts are instructed to insist on “super due process” (Gardner v. Florida 
                                                 
35  In Oregon in 2010, 59 patients died as a result of ingesting lethal physician-prescribed medications; six 
patients died after ingesting medications prescribed prior to 2010 (Oregon Public Health Division 2011).  
In Washington in 2010, 51 patients were known to have died as a result of ingesting lethal physician-
prescribed medications (Washington Department of Health 2011).  
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1977:357-358; Ford v. Wainwright 1986:405).  Supreme Court opinions have cited the 
existence of legal appeals – namely appeals of trial error (“direct appeals”), as opposed to 
post-conviction collateral attacks such as petitions for writs of habeas corpus – in finding 
the death penalty constitutional in 1976 (Jurek v. Texas 1976:276; Whitmore v. 
Arkansas, Marshall, J., dissenting).  Even in Texas, the value of appeals should not be 
wholly discounted.  Since the return of the death penalty in 1977, only 44% of those 
sentenced to death in Texas have been executed, with almost 22% winning reversals or 
commutations (Snell 2010). 
A few judges in this study expressed their concern with bypassing appeals.  As 
one judge said: 
This is a very unusual situation, it is for me, for the system that we operate 
under.  To me it is just – to me it is just not normal that you want to do 
what you want to do.  It is almost like assisting you in a suicide, because 
you want to represent yourself on a case of this type” (Gonzales RR 
2:40).36 
 
Another judge refused to permit a prisoner to waive his appeals even though he 
had found him competent to do so:  
[I]t would be my statement on the record that before any man is executed 
out of this court, that my conduct, as well as counsel’s conduct and the 
jury’s conduct be thoroughly examined from every angle whatsoever, 
regardless of any request by a defendant to be put to death (Hayes, July 6, 
2000 hearing at 20-21). 
 
Permitting a prisoner to sidestep this process runs contrary to this foundational 
belief in the importance of appeals. 
                                                 




Finally, embracing punishment is deviant.  As Susan Schmeiser has argued, these 
prisoners challenge a core belief about the purpose of punishment:  “Revenge… seems 
less sweet and justice less pure when punishment finds a willing recipient” (2011:73).  
By inviting the death penalty, these prisoners threaten to “convert what passes for just 
punishment – and the rational adjudication that undergirds it – into a damning theater of 
self-immolation” (2011:76).   
As noted, under Rumbaugh, even apparent suicidality is no legal bar to expediting 
execution. The low legal standard for establishing competence therefore invites inquiry 
into purposes of the more elaborate explanations presented in many of these cases.  I 
argue below that the EH narratives, in conjunction with the legal system, distance the 
prisoner’s request from these concerns.   
EXECUTION-HASTENER ACCOUNTS 
Sociologists have long observed that people explain deviant behavior by 
“align[ing] their behavior with culturally acceptable language to restore order and 
interaction” (Orbuch 1997:463).  Whether described as “vocabularies of motive” (Mills 
1940), “narratives,” or “accounts” (Orbuch 1997),37 they are designed to “display[ ] the 
reasonableness, rationality, and legality of the business at hand” (Holstein 1993:35).  
Accounts reflect normative structures of the social setting and the audience (Mills, 1940; 
                                                 
37  Orbuch explains that while theoretically narratives and accounts differ in some ways, “the distinct 




Sykes and Matza 1957; Scott and Lyman 1968), and are most persuasive when they 
incorporate prevailing normative frameworks (Orbuch 1997).   
Certainly the death penalty specifically, and penality generally, are embedded 
within larger normative systems.  Christian beliefs, for example, have also been 
intertwined with the death penalty since the American colonial era.  Executions are seen 
as a catalyst for the prisoner’s religious renewal and redemption (Banner 2002; Mason 
2006).  The ascendance of retributive punishment policies meant a return to older ideas of 
law-breakers as evil, rational, and exercising free will unconstrained by a broader social 
context (LaChance 2007:703-704; Garland 2001:184).  American penality is also 
suffused with popular desires for suffering by lawbreakers.  Because they are 
fundamentally bad people, they deserve harsh punishment, and the popular legitimacy of 
the death penalty relies heavily on this strain of retributive animus (LaChance 2007:703-
704; Sarat 2001).  Particularly in Texas, the death penalty is seen as a legitimate and 
desirable punishment for murderers (Vollum et al. 2004).   
While constitutionally important, appeals by death-sentenced prisoners are often 
portrayed as frivolous and manipulative (Amsterdam 1999 (analyzing language Supreme 
Court uses to denigrate and dismiss death row appeals); Wallace 2006: 728 n.222 
(Congressional criticism of capital appeals); Alper 2011:881 n.83 (media criticism of 
capital appeals)).  At the same time, the American death penalty is also informed by 
larger cultural and legal narratives of due process, rights, autonomy, and the sanctity of 
the individual (Garland 2010).   
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Based on the sociological research, one would expect prisoners’ death-seeking 
narratives to use a “vocabulary of motives” to reduce their perceived deviance.  
Narratives expressing an acceptance of the death penalty grounded in one (or more) stock 
penal scripts, and/or invoking a right to choose that punishment could accomplish that 
task.  
Narratives not only reflect cultural norms and hegemonic beliefs, but they are also 
constructed by social processes that can “conceal the social organization of their 
production and plausibility” (Ewick and Silbey 1995:214).  In other words, the legal 
process constructs narratives by creating and following rules that privilege certain 
narratives and obscure others.  Ewick and Silbey cite the Supreme Court’s 1987 decision 
in McCleskey v. Kemp as an example.  In that case, the Court refused to connect the 
individual case with broader social patterns when it rejected a statistical study of racial 
disparities in the administration of Georgia death penalty.  It instead focused on a 
narrative of whether the prosecutor or jury had engaged in racial discrimination.  The 
Court then demanded evidence of the jurors’ thought processes that, by legal rule, are 
specifically shielded from judicial review.  Therefore, legal claims about racist 
prosecution of the death penalty could thereafter only prevail if they mustered evidence 
about an individual prosecutor’s racist conduct in the case at bar.  The fact that statistical 
evidence demonstrated the importance of race in determining who was sentenced to death 
in a particular jurisdiction did not matter because the legal rules deemed that information 
irrelevant.  This transforms the legal story of racism and the death penalty.  The 
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organization of the legal process thereby produces a certain kind of story that becomes 
taken for granted (1995:215, 217).   
Based on Ewick and Silbey’s insight, this paper analyzes the prisoners’ narratives, 
as well as the ways in which the legal system relies on rules and practices that promote 
the plausibility of the prisoners’ narratives by concealing other information.  Whereas 
Ewick and Silbey accomplished this through a kind of “top down” approach – that is, 
they showed how a high court decision can organize the social reality of a death penalty 
case by deciding what evidence counts – this paper instead adopts a “bottom up” inquiry, 
exploring how the combination of cultural beliefs, legal rules, and forensic practices also 
contribute to court narratives.   
FINDINGS 
Contents of accounts 
 Of those 20 EHs38 for whom I found court accounts for their decisions, I 
identified four commonly recurring themes. They are similar but not in all ways identical 
to those identified in Chapter 5.  Twelve said their execution was fair and appropriate for 
their crime.  Another twelve (and one by inference) sought execution because death was 
preferable to continued life on death row.  Ten framed their decision as an assertion of 
                                                 
38 These prisoners were Robert Atworth; Richard Beavers; Richard Foster; Aaron Foust; Joe Gonzales, Jr.; 
Larry Hayes; Ynobe Matthews; Alexander Martinez; David Martinez; Steven Morin; James Porter; Steven 
Renfro; Michael Rodriguez; Charles Rumbaugh; Danielle Simpson; James Smith; Richard Smith; 
Benjamin Stone; Christopher Swift; and Charles Tuttle.  Although the state courts refused to permit Larry 
Hayes to waive his appeals, I included him in this study because the trial court found him mentally 
competent in making a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his appeals. 
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their rights.  Eight cited religious beliefs.  These explanations were not mutually 
exclusive.   
Death penalty as a fairly imposed and/or appropriate punishment   
Twelve EHs endorsed capital punishment as a correct punishment, whether for 
legal or moral reasons (and often both).  Texas’s first EH – Stephen Morin – stated 
simply: “I’ve been convicted.  I accepted the Court’s ruling on that, and I ask the Court to 
proceed” (RR 25:3).  Benjamin Stone wrote:  “I am satisfied with my sentence and find 
no error in my trial.  Therefore, I am requesting that the Death Warrant be issued in order 
for the sentence to be carried out” (Oct. 10, 1996 letter to TCCA).  Richard Beavers 
stated simply:  “I have a debt to pay and I’m ready to pay it” (March 2, 1994 hearing at 
13).  Alexander Martinez emphasized the link between dropping his legal appeals and 
taking moral responsibility for his offense in asking the trial court to “help me in moving 
my appeals faster so that justice may be served fully to its extent.  I am not retarded and 
eccept [sic] my punishment as given” (Aug. 10, 2004 hearing, Exh. 2 at 3).  None told the 
court, as Charles Rumbaugh wrote just prior to execution: “Just as the State of Texas has 
indicted me for the offense of Capital Murder, so do I indict each and every adult citizen 
of the State of Texas for the premeditated murders of nine men thus far, and further, for 
conspiring to murder over 200 others who are now incarcerated under sentence of death” 
(Crawford 2006:Appendix I). 
 In addition to those who explicitly connected their executions with their crimes, 
some prisoners asserted they would pose a future danger – a criteria for sentencing an 
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individual to death in Texas (Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 37.071) – if not 
executed.  Two told the jury they would be violent in prison (Gonzales RR 7:230-31; 
Renfro RR 28:3671), and another communicated his dangerousnessness during his 
competency evaluation (A. Martinez, Aug 10, 2004 hearing, Exh. 2 at 5).  While not 
directly stating that the death penalty is an appropriate punishment, these assertions 
implicitly endorse one of its fundamental premises. 
 None asserted innocence in court,39 and 11 stated they were guilty.     
EHs also generally, but not always, refrained from criticizing the legitimacy of the 
death penalty appeals process.
40
  Those few prisoners who referred to their lawyers 
generally expressed their appreciation or emphasized that their decision to waive appeals 
was unrelated to dissatisfaction with their lawyer (Gonzales pro se appellate brief at 4; 
Tuttle, Dec. 1997 letter to trial court; Atworth CR 46-47).  Where the record reflects a 
                                                 
39  Because I have only the court’s order and not the hearing transcript, I did not count Richard Foster in 
this category.  In his waiver hearing, however, Richard Foster apparently stated that he had not committed 
the murder intentionally, making his offense a non-capital murder (Texas Penal Code Ann. §§19.02, 
19.03).  The court notably emphasized the fact of his admission, however, rather than his legal innocence: 
“Before this court and in this hearing, Foster, apparently for the first time, admitted that he had committed 
the crime, claiming only that the taking of the decedent’s life during the commission of the robbery was not 
intentional”  (Foster v. Johnson, March 14, 2000 Order at 3).  James Smith asserted variously that he was 
guilty and not guilty during his trial, but during his successful effort to expedite his execution, Smith did 
not speak of his guilt or innocence.  By contrast, in his final statement, Smith stated he was innocent 
(Crawford 2006: Appendix I). 
40  James Smith explained he “did not want to be involved in what I perceive to be a farce and a sham of 
the appellate procedure,” which “only works to accumulate lots of money for the state from the people … 
it’s obscene… it’s done by the courts and the legislatures at the expense of the inmate who is subjected to 
sub-human conditions…it’s physical and psychological abuse” (Smith, May 18, 1990 competency 
evaluation).  Swift speculated that the trial judge wanted him to appeals because “death penalty appeals 
may provide greater pay than normal cases” (Swift letter to CCA, July 30, 2005 at 3). Danielle Simpson 
complained that “the way the appeals process is…there is really no such thing as the law because the way I 
see it, they’re going to do what they want to do regardless (June 9, 2009 hearing at 31-32).  Perhaps 
predictably, none of these three are included in the “death penalty as a fairly imposed and/or appropriate 
punishment” category.   
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few prisoners making statements about the pointlessness of appeals, they generally 
discussed this only with the mental health evaluator (Tuttle, J. Smith, and A. Martinez), 
and one lawyer put it in a pleading (D. Martinez).  Another prisoner (Simpson) 
emphasized in his live testimony that futility was not the primary reason for his desire to 
waive appeals; he simply did not want to continue living on death row while on appeal.  
By contrast, in addition to the 11 who asserted they were guilty, four described their trials 
as fair.  Another four asserted further appeals would waste taxpayer money.  Hayes and 
Tuttle emphasized the victims’ survivors need for closure, and Swift reminded the court 
that the victims’ survivors had expressed at trial their desire that he receive the death 
penalty (Hayes, July 6, 2000 hearing at 7; Tuttle, Dec. 22, 1997 McNeel letter at 3; Swift, 
Feb. 2, 2006 hearing at 19). 
Death was better than continued life on death row   
 
One prisoner, Richard Smith, sought to abandon his appeal after receiving a 
diagnosis of terminal kidney cancer.  Another 12 prisoners said they simply could not “do 
time” or found death row particularly difficult.  Life on death row is hard without a doubt 
(Arriens 2005; Jackson and Christian 1980).  James Smith described conditions as 
“subhuman” (May 18, 1990 competency evaluation).  Another complained about the 
tedium of death row, but also stressed “how frightful and ‘hazardous’ his condition is 
while he has been in TDC….[H]e is fearful of bodily harm on a daily basis” (Tuttle, 
McNeel report at 7). 
Danielle Simpson wrote the Fifth Circuit: 
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“Kill Me”.!!  
… 
[B]eing locked up in a [sic] isolated solitary cell of confinement 23 and 24 hours 
per day isn’t justice nor is it considered living – its [sic] cruel and unjust, 
therefore I’m really looking forward to my execution because its just “me against 
the world”. . .( Simpson v. Quarterman, Aug. 12, 2009 opinion: 2, 4). 
 
More commonly, prisoners (N=12) echoed Foust’s complaint that life in prison is 
not a life:  “I am just ready to hurry things along, you know.  Prison is not really the place 
to live.  It’s not like living out in the world, you know.  It’s not really a life, and that’s my 
sentence, so I am ready to speed it up” (Foust, July 16, 1998 hearing at 4).   
Assertions of rights and autonomy   
These emerged in ten narratives.  Stephen Morin “demand[ed]” an execution date 
(Nov. 10, 1983 letter to trial court).  Steven Renfro told the court and jury that he 
believed he should have the choice between life in prison or death (RR 28:3664).  More 
commonly, however, these prisoners invoked their real or imagined legal rights.  For 
example, Aaron Foust wrote, “sir, I do believe it my right to die as soon as possible” 
(Letter to trial court, filed June 10, 1998).  Benjamin Stone asserted: “I see no reason for 
not being allowed to represent myself on this or any other matter on my own behalf under 
my Sixth Amendment right” (Oct. 10, 1996 and Jan. 11, 1997 letters to TCCA). 
One mental health evaluator drew on conventional notions of criminality in 
explicitly ascribing this reasoning to one EH: 
In some bizarre way, consistent with his life-long, maladaptive, 
sociopathic behavior, he has chosen to die prematurely because, in this 
examiner’s opinion, in all medical probability, it is the only thing that he 
can control now that will render the efforts of his counsel and the legal 
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system ineffective and futile (A. Martinez, Aug 10, 2004 hearing, Exh. 2 
at 5). 
 
These claims for authority and autonomy were much more common in 
correspondence with the court, rather than in face-to-face hearings.   Consciously or not, 
the prisoners may have recognized that in seeking the sovereign’s permission, they were 
better off acceding to its power rather than insisting that the court recognize that they 
have rights and claims requiring respect and accommodation.  James Scott Porter, for 
example, who sent unusually abusive, coarse, and threatening letters to the TCCA 
demanding to halt his appeals, ultimately failed in waiving his appeal.  The TCCA 
instead simply affirmed his conviction and death sentence after considering the appellate 
briefs filed by his lawyers, making no comment or ruling on Porter’s right to waive those 
appeals.41   
Christian beliefs 
 
Eight of the EH accounts cited religious beliefs, with six incorporating Christian 
beliefs regarding spiritual rebirth, the divine forgiveness flowing from that experience, 
and heaven.42   Charles Tuttle “state[d] that he is a Christian and he has found peace with 
his belief in the hereafter and sees that as his only reasonable and logical way out and 
                                                 
41  This outcome resonates with Schmeiser’s observation that EHs “may not evince the sort of narcissism 
that threatens to usurp legal prerogative, but must demonstrate an autonomy that recognizes and properly 
internalizes law’s authority.  A volunteer who flouts legal authority ceases to be a proper executable 
subject, so adjudicative processes must reaffirm law’s dominion over death” (2011:103).  Porter met with 
greater success in federal district court where he was permitted to waive his appeals after a hearing at 
which he explained his desire for execution was a product of this religious beliefs (Porter v. Dretke, Jan. 
30, 2004 hearing). 




wants to accelerate that time frame” (McNeel report at 3).  Porter explained to the federal 
district court: “my salvation, God, is more important than this physical body” (Porter v. 
Dretke, Jan. 30, 2004 hearing at 28-29).  
Beliefs about heaven made prison life even more unappealing (Simpson v. 
Quarterman, June 9, 2009 hearing at 18-19).  Christopher Swift saw his death as a way to 
reunite with his victims (his wife and mother-in-law) (Supp. CR 39).  Further, the 
afterlife had to be better than his current existence, which he “emphasized [as] plagued 
by dissatisfaction and turmoil” (Supp. CR 39).  Swift also anticipated that heaven would 
deliver him from the pains of his schizophrenia (July 30, 2005 letter to TCCA at 3).  
Perhaps less confident in his destination after death, Ynobe Matthews framed his desire 
to drop his appeals as part of his spiritual evolution and resulting desire to turn his fate 
over to divine authority: “I believe I done come to grips with my religion and with God, 
and I think that I’ll just let me and him deal with this now” (11.071 CR 162).  
The Process Generating These Accounts 
 
While EHs plainly hew to certain conventional narratives, Ewick and Silbey 
remind us to look more broadly at how the legal system structures the production of these 
accounts.  As described below, these prisoners’ accounts emerge from a legal process that 




Assessments of mental functioning were subjective, truncated, and minimized mental 
dysfunction or distress 
 
By the time the EH appeared before the court to waive his appeals, he had been 
tried, convicted and sentenced.  Embedded within each step were explicit or implicit jury 
findings of sanity at the time of the crime, and at least for cases tried after 1991,43 no 
evidence of mental dysfunction sufficient to persuade the jury to impose a sentence less 
than death.  Further, due process prohibits trying criminal defendants while they are 
mentally incompetent, and the court has an independent responsibility to inquire if it has 
bona fide doubt as to the defendant’s competence, even if the criminal trial is underway 
(Medina v. California 1992; Drope v. Missouri 1975; Pate v. Robinson 1966).    
 The judge considering the prisoner’s request is usually the same judge who 
presided over the trial, and while the cumulative momentum of those determinations may 
not be expressed, the trial judges in these cases freely drew on their observations of the 
prisoner during the trial in concluding the waivers met the legal standards (R. Smith, May 
14, 1999 hearing at 3; Tuttle, Dec. 12, 1997 hearing at 7, 60). 
In some cases, no mental health expert was consulted.  Two prisoners were 
simply asked by the judge whether they had a history of mental illness (Foust, July 16, 
1998 hearing at 6; Matthews, Sept. 17, 2002 hearing at 165-166).  Where mental health 
                                                 
43  Prior to 1991, Texas juries were generally instructed to answer only two questions on capital 
sentencing, one asking whether the defendant’s homicidal conduct had been committed “deliberately,” the 
second asking whether the defendant would likely be a danger in the future.  The special issues were 
modified in 1991; the deliberateness question was removed, and a new question was added to enable juries 
to consider broadly evidence that mitigated the defendant’s moral culpability (Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman 
2007; Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 37.071). 
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evaluations were conducted, only three used a standardized competency assessment tool 
(Atworth, 11.071 CR 44; Porter, Nov. 3, 2003 Scarano Report;  Swift S-CR 37)  Instead, 
they relied heavily on interviews with the prisoner, including for the prisoner’s mental 
health history.  In addition to the significant stigma of mental illness, EHs know that 
perceived mental competence is essential for them to waive their appeals.  In his 
December 1997 letter to TCCA, Tuttle wrote, “Moreover, I am competent to make this 
decision, as I am sure the trial authorities will recognize.”  Hayes wrote, “I understand 
psycological [sic] testing will be required before this can be done and I am ready and 
willing for this to be done any time” (July 5, 2000 letter to TCCA).  The prisoners, 
therefore, have ample reason to understate any history of mental dysfunction.   
Christopher Swift, whom a court-appointed psychiatrist had previously found 
insane at the time of the crime (CR 165), was the sole source of information for his 
mental health assessment at the time he sought to waive his appeals.  Swift acknowledged 
his schizophrenia, but emphasized that he was much better than he was at trial when he 
was beset by auditory hallucinations.  The hallucinations “don’t lead me to hurt myself or 
others” and the “voices are significantly less intense, frequent and meaningful” (Supp. 
CR 40.)  After his evaluation, he wrote a frantic letter to the TCCA, explaining that he 
“had been manipulated into giving an interview which could potentially destroy my 
chances of foregoing an appeal(s)” (Supp. CR 63).  At the subsequent hearing on his 
competency, he clarified:  “At the time of my examination with Dr. Martinez I believe six 
or more months ago, I confessed that to a small degree I still heard strange voices 
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although these voices did not dictate my actions.  Since that time and thanks be to God 
and my Christian friends who have encouraged me so, I have been freed completely from 
these voices” (Feb. 2, 2006 hearing at 19).    
Joe Gonzales, Jr. described his previous experience with psychiatric treatment as 
undertaken solely to appease his fiancée, with headaches as the only lingering sequelae to 
a month-long coma he experienced after a car accident (CR 47).  These assertions were 
never explored beyond Gonzales’s representations (CR 46, 50).  In Danielle Simpson’s 
case, the examining psychiatrist never corroborated Simpson’s claim that he was given 
Thorazine, a powerful antipsychotic used to control mania, only as a sleep aide (National 
Library of Medicine 2011; June 3, 2009 Price report).  Alexander Martinez forbad an 
examiner from contacting any of his intimates, and the examiner complied (Aug. 10, 
2004 hearing, Exh. 2 at 1 (“Mr. Martinez refused to allow this examiner to contact 
individuals who were familiar with him or his current situation.  After reviewing his 
records and evaluating him on two occasions, this examiner decided to comply with his 
demands”).  Not only were the mental health evaluations based primarily (and sometimes 
solely) on the information the prisoner sought to present during the interview, but some 
examiners also failed to consider readily available information from other times in the 
prisoner’s life, such as mental health evidence presented at trial.  One evaluator, for 
example, reflected no awareness of psychological evidence presented at trial regarding a 
prisoner’s brain impairment, history of head trauma and very serious drug abuse, as well 
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as his history of depression, anxiety, guilt internalization, fear, and distress (Tuttle, 
Appellant’s brief at 25).44  
These examples contrast sharply with a federal court hearing in Arizona in which 
a psychiatrist spent over 50 hours over a 11 month span in “in depth, broad range, and 
comprehensive sessions with [the Arizona EH] revealing his life, his mental status, 
observing and assessing his ability to process information, looking at his mood and … the 
modulation of his mood in response to various situations that arouse, looking for 
consistency and symptoms or behaviors over time;” interviewed personally “a number of 
people directly who would have had the short and long-term opportunity to review [the 
prisoner’s] mental status;” and used contrary opinions of another psychiatrist to test and 
review her own professional opinion (Comer v. Stewart 2002:1040, 1053). 
The anguish of incarceration and life under a death sentence are also understated, 
even by the prisoners.  While a few prisoners were somewhat plaintive, most offered the 
court only thin descriptions of what made life in prison unbearable.  They did not present 
accounts of suffering designed to evoke compassion, a common narrative in the context 
of physician-assisted suicide (Hillyard and Dombrink 2001).  Their accounts left 
undisturbed assumptions about how prison has to be.  Suffering in prison has become 
normalized, and even desirable, within the highly retributive American penality (Ribet 
2010; Cusac 2009).  It is an “illegitimate” and deserved pain (Kenney and Slowey 2010).  
That death-sentenced prisoners require special – and especially oppressive – prison 
                                                 
44  The evaluator’s report was based on a two-hour interview with Tuttle and a letter Tuttle wrote to the 
court seeking to waive appeals (Tuttle Supp. CR 4:1)). 
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housing is all but unquestioned (Ferrier 2004).  The pains of life in isolation confinement 
and under a death sentence have been documented (Oleson 2006; Arriens 2005; Johnson 
1990).  While recording the prisoners’ distress in living on death row, the mental health 
evaluations of EHs did not address the psychological and psychiatric consequences of 
living under a death sentence or on death row.  Instead, this distress became part of the 
narrative of rational choice, rather than an exploration of the conditions that cause 
suffering (See Atworth 11.071 CR 47; Simpson v. Quarterman, June 9, 2009 hearing at 
26; Rumbaugh 1985:401). 
Conceptual frameworks of free will 
 
Texas courts relied on the standard language and conceptual framework of guilty 
pleas in determining the voluntariness of these waivers, even though courts have 
acknowledged the possibility that prison conditions could coerce a waiver (Comer v. 
Stewart 2000; Smith v. Armontrout 1987; Groseclose ex rel. Harries v. Dutton 1984).  
Judges simply asked the prisoner whether some individual forced the prisoner into his 
decision (“Based on Defendant’s statements, no one has coerced or persuaded Defendant 
to make his request” (Hayes, July 6, 2000 hearing at 9); “All right, has anyone threatened 
you or forced you in any way to answer any of my questions that I have asked you 
today?” (Stone, June 19, 1996 hearing at 5-6).  As Ewick and Silbey noted, legal 
narratives prefer situating the litigant as an autonomous actor, removed from broader 
social forces (1995:217).  These legal narratives about the voluntariness of the prisoners’ 
decisions are no exception.   
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In addition, the way in which problematic prison conditions were presented in the 
course of the EHs’ legal process, the courts had no power to address what may be 
genuinely unconstitutionally cruel and unusual conditions of confinement.  Not only was 
the legal vehicle incorrect – the prisoner, after all, was not filing suit to reform his prison 
conditions – but, because of legal ethical rules discussed below, the prisoner’s counsel 
may have been reluctant to present to the court evidence about particularly painful or 
degrading prison conditions that would make the prisoner’s decision look more like a 
statement of suicidal despair.  
Non-adversarial litigation 
 
None of the successful Texas EHs appears to have had an adversarial hearing in 
which, for example, counsel marshaled lay and expert witnesses to attack assertions that 
the prisoner was competent and waiving his rights knowingly, voluntarily and 
intelligently.45  This may be attributable at least in part to legal ethics rules that ostensibly 
limit the lawyers’ role, as well as a broader, less adversarial Texas legal culture.   
The legal ethics of representing a EH are the subject of considerable debate within 
the legal academy (Oleson 2006; Mello 1999).  This study found that, though they 
expressed discomfort in enabling their clients’ execution, and many sought to dissuade 
                                                 
45 In two cases (Swift and Rodriguez), counsel actively advocated against their clients’ wishes in the 
course of the hearing on the waiver, but in both cases, counsel relied primarily on legal argument.  Through 
cross-examination they challenged some evidence, but they presented no evidence or experts of their own.  
According to a press report, Stephen Morin’s counsel sought a stay of execution to raise the issue of mental 
competency, but the trial judge, based on his observations of Morin, concluded Morin was mentally 
competent and refused a hearing (Crouse and Donahue 1985).  Ramon Hernandez’ trial counsel 
unsuccessfully sought a stay of execution as a “next friend.”  Hernandez’ former counsel argued that 
Hernandez’ waiver was based on a mistake of law, not mental incompetence (Lovelace v. Lynaugh 1987). 
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their clients from waiving appeals, in practice lawyers generally saw themselves as bound 
by the client’s wishes (Foust, Oct. 6, 1998 Ford letter to TCCA; Tuttle Jan. 9, 1998 
hearing at 7, 43-44).  This reflects the most straightforward reading of the Texas legal 
ethics rules, which require lawyers to act as their client’s agent, except where the lawyer 
is convinced of the mental incompetence of the client.46  The Texas Disciplinary Rules of 
Professional Conduct require that, under most circumstances, “a lawyer shall abide by a 
client's decisions… concerning the objectives and general methods of representation” 
(Rule 1.02 (a) (1)).  If the lawyer doubts the client’s competence, she is instructed to seek 
the appointment of a guardian (Rule 1.02 (g)).  If she does not do that, however, she is 
required to accede to the wishes of her client.  The rules do not require a lawyer to obtain 
any kind of mental health evaluation of the client before concluding the client is not 
mentally competent, nor do they require the lawyer to demonstrate any proficiency in 
assessing the client’s mental competence.47   
Once counsel decides her responsibility is to advocate on behalf of the client’s 
goal – here, execution – no evidence will be tested.  She cannot, and the attorneys for the 
State may be reluctant or unprepared to do so.  Further, the Disciplinary Rules restrict the 
                                                 
46 One possible way out of this ethical quandary would be for courts to appoint counsel to represent the 
prisoner in seeking to waive his appeals, as well as counsel to challenge the legality of the waiver (State v. 
Ross 2005; Comer v. Stewart 2002; O'Rourke v. Endell 1998; Mason By and Through Marson v. Vasquez 
1993).    
47  Just as I do not second-guess the courts’ decisions in these individual cases, I do not question here any 
of these attorneys’ assessments of their clients’ ability to waive appeals, nor do I discount the difficulty of 
the decisions they confronted in dealing with a death-seeking client.  That is not the focus of this article.  
Although it may be possible to establish a legal standard for waivers that safeguards both the prisoner’s and 
the legal system’s interests (Blume 2005), here I present the current legal framework, which is premised 
upon principles of an adversarial system, within which these attorneys act.   
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information an attorney may disclose regarding her client (Rule 1.05).  In Danielle 
Simpson’s hearing, the State’s attorney was the first to stumble upon the inconsistency 
between Simpson’s courtroom testimony about his history of anxiety and depression 
medications and what he told the examining psychiatrist.  (The State’s lawyer promptly 
terminated this line of questioning.)  As noted above, no one questioned Simpson’s 
assertion that he was prescribed an antipsychotic solely to help him sleep.  While all 
lawyers are bound by an ethical duty to act with “candor toward the tribunal,” in the 
context of execution-hasteners, that responsibility is met by “not knowingly … mak[ing] 
a false statement of material fact …to a tribunal … or offer[ing] or us[ing] evidence that 
the lawyer knows to be false” (Rule 3.03(a)).  The lawyer only “knows” a fact is false if 
she has “actual knowledge of the fact in question” (Texas Disciplinary Rules of 
Professional Conduct “Terminology”).  Without asking TDCJ physicians whether they 
had prescribed Thorazine for sleep – a fact apparently not in the client’s interest – the 
lawyer may not have actual knowledge that this contention was false, and she may 
believe it is disloyal to the client to investigate.   
Further, counsel’s ethical confusion is situated within Texas’ legal culture, which 
historically has neither promoted nor funded the kind of aggressive adversarial litigation 
more common in other states (Steiker and Steiker 2006; Texas Defender Service 2000 
and 2002).  Some publicity has surrounded Texas death sentences that were upheld 
despite compelling evidence that the defense lawyers in those cases were asleep or 
addicted to drugs and alcohol during trial (Duggan 2000).  These cases represent only 
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particularly colorful instances of Texas’ systematically casual attitude toward capital 
legal process.  As Steiker and Steiker (2006) outline, until 1995, death-sentenced 
prisoners were not appointed counsel to investigate and prosecute state habeas appeals, 
even as trial judges set execution dates to move the litigation along.  After state law 
changed in 1995 to provide counsel, courts provided limited funds to pay counsel and to 
fund investigation and consultations with experts.  No mechanism exists to help prisoners 
whose court-appointed lawyers failed to provide competent representation.  Courts – 
especially state courts – rarely order hearings at which they can observe witnesses and 
rule on their credibility before adjudicating disputed facts.  The lower courts generally 
decide the case based on the documents submitted by counsel, and rule on the case by 
adopting verbatim a proposed order drafted by the State’s lawyers.  The reviewing court 
usually issues a one-page order adopting the lower court’s order without comment.  
Prisoners’ lawyers almost never present oral argument during the state habeas process, 
and on direct appeal, where the reviewing court sets a date and time for oral argument, 
the prisoners’ lawyers are permitted to – and do – waive their opportunity to present their 
arguments to the court and answer the court’s questions (Steiker and Steiker 2006:1880-
89).  Some Texas condemned prisoners have more extended legal proceedings by some 
combination of aggressive counsel, less aggressive prosecutors, thoughtful (or slow to 
act) judges, and luck.  However, as Steiker and Steiker observe:  
[T]he legal process that follows the return of a death sentence is far more 
likely to be nasty, brutish, and short. Counsel are less likely to file 
substantial briefs; reviewing courts are less likely to hold hearings;  and 
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the entire process moves much more quickly, often expedited by the early 
setting of execution dates (2006:1915 (footnotes omitted)). 
 
Certainly in the EH cases, the prisoners’ lawyers do not appear to have 
interrogated the complexities and limits of their ethical responsibility toward their clients.  
The court records do not reflect motions for appointment of unconflicted counsel.  
Similarly, the court records do not contain motions for the appointment of their own 
mental health expert to advise counsel, and instead the only experts involved in the case 
reported to the court.  The general failure to contest the assessments of the court-
appointed mental health professionals (with, e.g., experts or lay witnesses of their own) 
may stem from their interpretation of their duty to their clients, to evaluations and 
consultations that were never made part of the court record, or simply the low standard 
for legal competency.  However, in light of the complete absence of any adversarial 
proceedings in any of the successful EH cases, it is impossible to discount the influence 
of this larger legal culture. 
Judges also participate in and shape this legal culture.  In Beavers, the prisoner’s 
appointed counsel argued strenuously for production of Beavers’ psychiatric records prior 
to determining his competency.  In addition to denying the motion, the court treated the 
lawyer with impatience and irritation and enjoined him from any further contact with 
Beavers (March 2, 1994 hearing).  Another judge told a lawyer seeking a psychological 
assessment of her client’s competency that he was not sure she was legally entitled to do 
so: “The Court is having problems finding that [the attorney] even has standing in 
bringing the Application for the Writ [raising the concern about competency] in that Mr. 
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Barney has made statements quite contrary to the matters raised in the Application for the 
Writ” (Barney, March 11, 1986 hearing at 5).  While the court records do not reflect, e.g., 
counsel’s motions for their own expert, judges may have discouraged counsel off-the-
record from filing these motions by communicating that any motions for funds to retain 
experts would be denied.48   
Given the fact that legal competency is seen as a low legal standard, one could 
argue that the lack of an adversarial culture is inconsequential – that is, a judge likely 
would have inevitably found the defendant competent to waive even with an adversarial 
process.  However, a review of one outlier case – the only Texas case I have found in 
which the prisoner was found incompetent to waive his appeals – gives a glimpse of what 
can emerge in a genuinely adversarial process. In this singular case, counternarratives 
highlighting the social deviance of the request, rather than its normative conformity, 
emerged from hearing more information about the prisoner and persuaded the judge to 
deny his request.   
In Cockrum, the prisoner’s lawyers opposed the prisoner’s efforts to drop his 
appeals and relied on conventional adversarial litigation techniques to overturn the 
conventional account (In re Cockrum 1994).49  Cockrum expressed several reasons for 
wanting to waive his appeals, including some commonly cited by successful EHs.  He 
                                                 
48 The Supreme Court in Panetti v. Quarterman (2007) criticized a Texas trial court for considering only 
evidence from experts it appointed and for failing to appoint mental health experts to assist a habeas 
petitioner who, according to his counsel, was incompetent to be executed.  
49 Perhaps significantly, attorneys associated with a specialized death penalty defense organization were 
“heavily involved” in the litigation of this case (personal communication with subsequent counsel for 
Cockrum, Mandy Welch (9/9/11)).   
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believed in capital punishment; his trial and appeals were fair; any further litigation was 
for delay and not reversal; continuing his appeal would be frivolous and harmful to those 
death row prisoners with meritorious claims; and continuing his frivolous appeal was a 
waste of public funds (1994:488).  Crucially (and enabled by Cockrum’s lawyers’ 
evidence and advocacy), the court did not simply take Cockrum’s explanations at face 
value.  Instead it examined them critically, concluding, for example, that “[a]lthough it 
may be rational in certain circumstances for an individual to conclude, based on his own 
acts and culpability, that he deserves the death penalty, the evidence demonstrates that 
the applicant has a different reason for wanting to die” (1994:492).  Through their own 
experts and evidence, Cockrum’s lawyers created an alternate narrative that highlighted 
distress and suicidality.  Where the court-appointed mental health experts had ruled out 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), in court, they agreed that Cockrum had been 
exposed to stressors that could have led to PTSD, namely the circumstances of his 
father’s death, his violent victimization in childhood, and (in marked contrast to the other 
EH cases) his time on death row (1994:486 n.2).  The PTSD frame enabled the judge to 
revise his understanding of Cockrum’s courtroom manner as the product of PTSD’s 
“restricted affect.”  Cockrum’s efforts to circumscribe inquiry into his father’s death were 
seen as symptomatic of his mental distress, and consistent with an effort to suppress 
evidence of his symptoms in the course of the competency evaluations (1994:487).   
Where the court-appointed experts found no suicidal thoughts, the court was 
persuaded by the experts presented by Cockrum’s lawyers and their articulation of “a 
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broader range of self-destructive behavior, which [the psychiatrist] termed ‘passive 
suicide,’ and which they maintain has been life-long pattern for [Cockrum], continuing 
through his present desire to waive further review of his death sentence” (1994:492). The 
federal district court opinion explicitly situated Cockrum’s request to waive review 
within this larger framework: “The applicant’s tragic personal history was universally 
viewed as critical to a determination of his current competency to waive further review” 
(1994:484).  The court described Cockrum’s violent, abusive father, early use of illegal 
drugs, delinquent behavior, and identified a crucial turning point in Cockrum’s life: when 
Cockrum shot his father during one of the father’s abusive episodes.  The father 
eventually died of his wounds, but told authorities that the shooting was an accident.  
Cockrum was never prosecuted, but in the court’s view, this event weighed heavily on 
Cockrum in the years following, and led to his marital instability, escalating drug use, 
suicide attempts, and ultimately the drug-fueled murder that landed him on death row 
(1994: 485-86).  Even though Rumbaugh makes clear that neither suicidal thoughts nor 
actions are necessarily contrary to legal competency, the court in Cockrum refused to find 
Cockrum competent to waive appeals.  
Cockrum’s case suggests aggressive, independent litigation could affect the 
narrative produced by the legal process.  Certainly, a lawyer may not always be able to 
change the narrative, whether because she lacks resources to obtain expert assistance, 
because diligent investigation of the client’s situation reveals no viable alternative 
explanation, or because the court simply does not want to hear one.  Cockrum’s case 
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serves as an example, however, of the ways in which a non-adversarial legal process can 
obscure more complex EH narratives.    
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
 
I found that EHs most commonly used four themes to try to win permission to 
drop their appeals:  the death penalty was a fairly imposed, appropriate punishment; the 
prisoners had a right to make this decision; death was better than continued life on death 
row; and Christian beliefs made them want to expedite their deaths.  These accounts are 
grounded in narratives of the moral legitimacy of the death penalty.  The system’s 
success in convicting only the guilty spares the court from endorsing the notion that the 
appellate process was a meaningless and futile exercise for death-sentenced prisoners.  
Their embrace of the fairness and justness of their death sentences, particularly when 
combined with fundamentalist Christian beliefs, reaffirms deeply rooted ideas that some 
crimes deserve the death penalty and that the death penalty spurs spiritual redemption.  
The Christian narrative also helps mute concerns that the prisoner (rather than God 
perhaps) seeks to take away the power to punish from the courts.  In addition, they 
“demonstrate[e] obeisance to law” because “the prisoner’s desire is not for death qua 
death but for responsibility and recompense” (Schmeiser 2011:75). 
 For a prisoner to voice the brutishness, pointlessness, and hopelessness of prison 
gratifies popular retributive preferences for prison life (Mason 2006; Garland 2001; Clear 
1994).  That the convict’s incorporation of those aspects into his narrative could be 
persuasive to a judge (especially a popularly-elected state court judge) is unsurprising.  
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Narratives that emphasize the pains of imprisonment safeguard a retributive return 
otherwise diminished by a consensual execution.  At the same time, these prisoners’ 
invocation of their legal rights and autonomy enables courts to frame EH requests as an 
opportunity to demonstrate a cultural commitment to the sanctity of the individual.  
Recognizing some fundamental autonomy of the condemned – while having formally 
denied him the right to live – is consistent with important cultural and legal imperatives, 
but is also somewhat unexpected in light of broader hegemonic ideas of the criminal and 
the efforts in capital trials to dehumanize the defendant and construct him as monstrous 
and fundamentally other (Garland 2010:95-96; Haney 2005:141-161).   
This contradiction may explain some courts’ efforts to transform the EH’s 
identity.  Some judges complimented the prisoners on their courtroom manner, 
intelligence, or articulateness, signaling that these are the “good” death row prisoners.  
One judge remarked that the letter the prisoner sent seeking to waive his appeals was 
“probably one of the most rational, concise, articulated expressions of opinion that a 
defendant has sent to the Court regarding his case that I’ve ever received.  And I’ve been 
on the bench for thirteen years” (Tuttle, Jan. 9, 1998 hearing at 7).  In at least two cases, 
the judges deviated from well-established courtroom norms for adult litigants by referring 
to the prisoners repeatedly by their first names (Gonzales RR 2:12, RR 6: 2, 4, 5; 
Beavers, Aug. 3, 1993 hearing at 8, March 2, 1994 hearing at 16, 25-26).50  The judge in 
                                                 
50  Judges have a duty to maintain courtroom decorum by treating participants with dignity and courtesy 
(Alfini et al. 2007:3-1-3-46).  This injunction is generally understood to require addressing participants by 
their last names.  See, e.g., Travis County Courts as Law (2011) (“The Judge, the attorneys, and other 
officers of the court will refer to and address other court officers and other participants in the proceedings 
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Beavers’ case positioned himself as the condemned’s protector, asking him whether he 
wanted the attorney enjoined from communicating with him (Beavers, March 2, 1994 
hearing at 10).  (The attorney sought to delay the prisoner’s execution date until 
documents pertaining to his mental competence could be obtained and reviewed).  
Perhaps by demonstrating commitment to norms of accountability and/or religious faith, 
some of these prisoners overcame the fundamental otherness ascribed to them.  By 
speaking their commitment to mainstream values, they promoted their claims to 
autonomy (Duff 2001:76).  At the same time, treating the condemned as childlike, 
vulnerable, and requiring the judge’s protection against his attorney is in tension with 
granting only the adult and mentally healthy the privilege of autonomy.   
Undergirding all these accounts are powerful narratives of rationality and free 
will.  The prisoners’ waivers must, after all, be mentally competent, knowing, and 
intelligent.  Voluntariness is narrowly construed by separating the condemned from his 
environment.  These legal rubrics square nicely with conventional views of criminals as 
calculating free actors and “reproduce[ ] the ideology of individualism” (Dunn and 
Kaplan 2009:265).  In affirming these cultural constructions of the death-sentenced, these 
narratives help resolve anxieties about death-seeking and bypassing appeals in a death 
penalty case.   
These accounts echoing stock penal stories are also noteworthy in what they do 
not do.  Unlike Theodore Kaczynski (Mello 1999), these EHs do not assert radical or 
                                                                                                                                                 
respectfully and impersonally, as by using appropriate titles and surnames rather than first names.”); Rozier 
E. Sanchez Judicial Education Center of New Mexico (2011) (“Address all individuals by last name and 
appropriate titles in the public setting.”).  
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subversive narratives.  They do not, for example, claim they are prisoners trapped in a 
racist, rigged legal system that provides only notional due process and is incapable of 
truly administering justice.  They do not say their anguish at their crime or their living 
conditions makes them want to kill themselves.  Only two prisoners, Charles Tuttle and 
Michael Rodriguez, clearly expressed remorse at the time of the waiver.51  Otherwise, 
only a few thin expressions of remorse made their way into the courtroom.  Stephen 
Morin (for whom no competency hearing was apparently held) told the jury in closing 
argument at his trial, “I ask you to believe from the evidence that has been presented 
every penance is made or was made and there is a very deep remorse to what transpired.”  
He then quoted Bible verses about God wiping away tears and eliminating “pain for the 
former things passed away.”  RR 23:133.  The report on the mental health evaluation in 
Stone’s case began with a description of why he sought to waive his appeals, citing his 
confession, continuous assertion of guilt, the fairness of his trial, his preference for death 
over live in prison, and not wanting to waste time on appeals.  Finally, only on the last 
page (of three), under a section entitled “special preoccupations” that listed his 
annoyance with the jail conditions, his problems with drinking, his pride that drinking 
never interfered with his work, and his experience with occasionally hearing things that 
other did not, did the report state without elaboration that Stone “felt terrible about killing 
his ex-wife and her daughter” (Nov. 7, 1996 letter to court).  
                                                 
51 By contrast, at least three others expressed remorse in their final statements (Texas Department of 
Criminal Justice 2010).   
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Perhaps prisoners were afraid that expressing these feelings might make them 
appear driven to suicide because of guilt.  Ben Stone responded to his attorney’s request 
for a competency evaluation by saying, “I’ve already been given competency tests and 
stuff like that before trial to make sure I wasn’t crazy.  I know exactly what’s going on.  
I’m not grief stricken.  I’m not just doing this out of grief either” (October 30, 1996 
hearing at 9).  In addition, the court inquiry surrounding the waiver could marginalize 
expressions of remorse because it is focused on other legal questions.  At Danielle 
Simpson’s waiver hearing, the mental health evaluator was asked whether Simpson had 
expressed remorse or a sense of responsibility.  The evaluator responded, “Well, the issue 
of the purpose of the execution, the purpose of his punishment, did not come up.  I didn’t 
ask that; he didn’t express that” (June 9, 2009, hearing at 23).   
The legal proceedings systematically minimized evidence that increased the 
deviance of the desire to die, particularly by marginalizing the discovery of evidence that 
could be linked to suicidality.  These data reveal that the legal system – at least in Texas 
– did not complicate the EH narratives, instead reinscribing hegemonic beliefs through a 
non-adversarial process.  Truncated mental health inquiries disconnected the prisoner’s 
decision from his broader social and psychological environment.  Formal ethical rules 
mandating the lawyer’s loyalty to his client’s goals, as well as through a generally non-
adversarial legal culture limited alternative narratives.  As Cockrum – the case in which a 
defense attorney successfully challenged his client’s competency – makes clear, while 
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Rumbaugh created a legal rule, it did not necessarily overcome normative anxiety about 
desires to hasten death.    
In sum, the narratives studied here trade in ideas of the death penalty as fair, 
deserved, and for some, soul-saving.  Prison is so tough that it breaks even these 
criminals.  And these narratives are those of criminals – rational and calculating – rather 
than of vulnerable, traumatized, mentally impaired individuals.  As scholars of the 
sociology of accounts have observed, these accounts incorporate prevailing normative 
frameworks.  At the same time, the legal process, itself embedded within these normative 
frameworks, contributes to narratives about the necessity and appropriateness of the death 
penalty by making contradictory narratives harder to see.  Studying accounts in this 
context offers a window on how legal structures organize how narratives are developed 





Rights to Die 
The normative confrontation Rumbaugh presents would not exist without legal 
standards defining as competent a prisoner who charges an armed law man in hopes of 
being shot to death.  This chapter examines the “right” of death row prisoners to die, not 
to debate the doctrinal question of whether Gilmore and other execution-hasteners have 
such a Fourteenth Amendment right,52 but instead to illuminate how the legal framework 
governing execution-hastening constructs the “executable subject” (Sarat and Shoemaker 
2011).  This chapter situates the practices discussed in the preceding chapter into a larger 
sociolegal framework.  It argues that the overall legal framework facilitates execution-
hastening by confining the legal rules of engagement to a narrow inquiry into competence 
and organizing the legal inquiry in a way that reinforces stereotypes of criminality.  At 
the same time it denudes the legal discourse of arguments grounded in the broader social 
values, including those which promote the systemic legitimacy of the American death 
penalty through adversarial litigation.   
Minding Garland’s admonition for sociologists to identify the “intrinsic 
rationality” of the death penalty, this chapter also focuses how the EH legal framework 
makes sense in the context of execution-hasteners and extends Garland’s theory 
                                                 
52 For discussion of whether death-sentenced prisoners have such a constitutional right, see Dama 2007; 
Milner 1998; Johnson 1991; Urofsky 1984).  An analysis of their reasoning is beyond the scope of this 
chapter, but data from this study and others invites another look at their reasoning.  For example, they 
generally presumes execution is essentially inevitable for individuals sentenced to death, and they 
presuppose a higher level of judicial scrutiny of the convictions and sentences of execution-hasteners than 
is occurring, at least in Texas.  
147 
 
regarding the role of rules and rights in death penalty (Garland 2010).  In addition to 
providing insight into the operation of the American death penalty, this chapter also 
highlights the importance of examining the sociolegal context in which rights – here, the 
right to die – are embedded.  Comparing the legal approach to rights to die of those with 
terminal illness and those who seek to expedite execution offers a window onto a 
differential “process of collective definition” (Blumer 1971) of desires to hasten death, 
and reveals how historical contingencies, normative beliefs, and different legal logics can 
shape legal responses to demands for rights. 
THE RIGHT TO DIE HELD BY TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS 
 
Beginning in the mid-1970s, state courts, based on legal theories of informed 
consent, right to privacy, and proscriptions against battery, concluded that competent 
individuals may elect to discontinue medical treatment, even if doctors believe it would 
cost them their lives (Eaton and Larson 1991).  The Supreme Court then held in 1990 that 
a competent person has a right to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration even if that 
refusal would cause or hasten her death.  The Court noted, however, that individual right 
is not absolute.  Instead, it must be balanced against State interests (Cruzan by Cruzan v. 
Director, Missouri Dept. of Health 1990:269-70). 53   
The debate then moved from discontinuing life-sustaining interventions to 
permitting efforts to hasten the death of terminally ill patients.  In Washington v. 
                                                 
53 Prisoners’ right to refuse medical intervention is less clear, and decisions involving prisoners appear to 
weight the state’s interests more heavily (McNabb v. Washington Department of Corrections 2008; 
Freeman v. Berge 2006; Ross v. Emerson 2005). 
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Glucksberg (1997), the Supreme Court considered whether a Washington statute 
restricting a doctor’s ability to prescribe medications to a terminally ill patient seeking to 
end his or her life violated the patient’s right to die without interference from the State.54  
The Supreme Court considered whether individuals have a “fundamental” right to 
assistance in hastening death, and if not, whether the state’s restrictions on the individual 
right were rationally related to its interest in limiting that right. 
As recited in Chapter 6, the Supreme Court grounded its analysis not only in 
historical prohibitions on assisting others to die, it also in those on suicide.  Further, and 
consistent with the framing of the issue as a Fourteenth Amendment claim, it conceived 
of the legal question as one which require balancing the individual’s interests against the 
State’s.  Because the right for help in hastening death is not a fundamental liberty 
interest, the State could legitimately prohibit such assistance.  The Court identified State 
interests commonly cited in cases involving the right to discontinue life-sustaining 
medical intervention: “preserving life; preventing suicide; avoiding the involvement of 
third parties and use of arbitrary, unfair, or undue influence; protecting family members 
and loved ones; protecting the integrity of the medical profession; and avoiding future 
                                                 
54 While the request to discontinue appeals appears analogous to a request to discontinue medical 
treatment, I use Glucksberg’s reasoning, believing it to be in fact a more apt analogy.  Not only does 
abandoning appeals not necessarily entail execution (if a county does not seek execution, a prisoner can 
continue to live on death row after appeals have ended).  Like the patients in Glucksberg and unlike those 
patients who simply seek to stop medical intervention and let nature take its course, if the county does not 
seek an execution date, prisoners must actively seek their own deaths, by, e.g., writing courts to demand an 
execution date.  In addition, as Blume has noted, “the right to refuse life-saving medical treatment, 
assuming there is such a right, is grounded in the individual's right to bodily integrity, which is not at issue 
in the volunteer context. Furthermore, in the refusal-of-treatment situation, a third party does not have to 
take action to bring about the person's death, which again is not true in the volunteer context” (2005:947). 
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movement toward euthanasia and other abuses” (Washington v. Glucksberg 1997:728 
n.20). 
EXECUTION-HASTENING THROUGH THE LENS OF GLUCKSBERG 
Less protective legal standard 
Assessing competence and voluntariness 
 
Justice Souter, in his concurrence in judgment in Glucksberg, cited the State of 
Washington’s concern that the “right [to die] could not be confined to the mentally 
competent, observing that a person's competence cannot always be assessed with 
certainty” (755).  Where other, more easily administered, state restrictions might be 
permissible, 
the lines proposed here (particularly the requirement of a knowing and 
voluntary decision by the patient) would be more difficult to draw… than the 
lines that have limited other recently recognized due process rights [that] were 
easy to make with a real degree of certainty. But the knowing and responsible 
mind is harder to assess (783-784) (emphasis added). 
 
Justice O’Connor in her concurrence also expressed concern regarding 
voluntariness: “The difficulty in defining terminal illness and the risk that a dying 
patient's request for assistance in ending his or her life might not be truly voluntary 
justifies the prohibitions on assisted suicide we uphold here” (738). 
In the criminal justice system, these assessments regarding voluntariness and 
competence, far from being too uncertain to hazard, are made routinely.  Courts assess 
voluntariness in every plea agreement, and adjudicate the competency of tens of 
thousands of men and women every year (Maroney 2006:1378).  As Justice Thomas 
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observed for the majority of the Court in Moran, competence, at least in the context of 
the criminal justice system, is just not that big a deal.  “Requiring that a criminal 
defendant be competent has a modest aim:  It seeks to ensure that he has the capacity to 
understand the proceedings and to assist counsel” (1993:402).  That the proceedings 
involve desires to hasten death does not alter the calculability of competence. 
Preventing suicide 
In upholding restrictions on this right to hasten death, the Glucksberg Court 
credited the State’s interest in preventing suicide and noted the link between depression 
and suicide (730-31).  The Supreme Court’s sensitivity to suicide in this context contrasts 
sharply with its prior decisions involving execution-hasteners, and with data from the 
Texas execution-hasteners.  Prisoners have higher suicide rates than non-prisoners, and 
death row prisoners have higher rates of suicide as compared to non-death row prisoners 
(Baillargeon et al. 2009; Tartaro and Lester 2008).  Suicidality and depression featured in 
the Supreme Court cases on execution-hastening.  The dissenters in Gilmore (1976), 
Moran (1993), and Demosthenes v. Baal (1990), among others, cited depression and 
suicide attempts in arguing against accepting the prisoners’ waiver.  In the Texas cases, at 
least 15 had a history of depression, and at least 14 had a history of suicidal gesture, 
ideation, and/or an elevated suicide scale. 
Charles Rumbaugh’s case is the most dramatic of the Texas courts’ acceptance of 
depression and overt suicidality in death row prisoners’ desires to hasten death, but he 
was not alone.  Steven Renfro, another Texas death row prisoner, was described at trial as 
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having attempted “suicide by cop” at the time he was arrested.  The State’s psychiatrist 
interviewed Renfro for four hours prior to trial, and testified: “He made it clear that he 
wanted it to end it that day [of his arrest], to have been shot and killed.  Renfro wanted to 
be and intended to be killed that night by the police officers [and] wants to die now” (RR 
27: 3438, 3450, 3481).  The defense psychiatrist at trial also found Renfro depressed and 
suicidal.  In addition, he believed his suicidality preceded the homicide, and that he 
needed assistance in hastening death because of his religious beliefs:   
Mr. Renfro … [is] profoundly depressed.  …  He was suicidal before he killed 
anyone that night.  He was writing out a will before he killed anyone that night.  
His belief is, as you mentioned earlier, his belief that if he kills himself, he’ll go 
to hell.  And so he wants – he was suicidal before the murders and he is still 
suicidal, but he doesn’t want to go to hell, so he wants someone else to kill him.  
He’s in a lot of pain.  He’s in a lot of emotional pain.  His depression hasn’t been 
treated.  I expect he will always carry with him the guilt.  He may not – if 
appropriately treated, he may not always be suicidal (RR 29:3744-45). 
 
Social vulnerability and desires to hasten death 
 
The gap between the Supreme Court’s concern in Glucksberg for suicidality 
among very ill patients and its indifference to it among death-sentenced prisoners 
formally differentiates between the two, with suicidal death-sentenced prisoners 
obtaining less protection under the law.  Yet, the Court in Glucksberg was not insensitive 
to the problems of social marginalization and desires to hasten death.  It expressed 
concern that legalizing assisted suicide would expose “vulnerable groups – including the 
poor, the elderly, and disabled persons” to “abuse, neglect, and mistakes” (731)  Quoting 
the New York Task Force, the Court wrote: 
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Legalizing physician-assisted suicide would pose profound risks to many 
individuals who are ill and vulnerable.... The risk of harm is greatest for the many 
individuals in our society whose autonomy and well-being are already 
compromised by poverty, lack of access to good medical care, advanced age, or 
membership in a stigmatized social group (Id. at 732). 
 
It is difficult to imagine a more profoundly stigmatized social group than death-
sentenced prisoners55 – perhaps justly – and the concerns the Court identifies regarding 
compromised autonomy and lack of access to good medical care apply with full force to 
prisoners.  Indeed, the courts in Rumbaugh cited the poor mental health care in prison as 
a reason to permit Rumbaugh to waive his appeals:  “[Rumbaugh’s] ability to make the 
life/death choice is apparent from his comments … that if he thought that meaningful 
treatment were available and if it were offered, he would probably change his decision 
not to appeal” (Rumbaugh 1985:402). 
More expansive right 
Crediting of poor quality of life with no requirement of imminent death 
 
While prisoners have less legal protection when it comes to suicidality, 
competence, and voluntariness, they simultaneously enjoy a more expansive right than 
individuals with terminal illnesses with respect to the importance of the individual’s 
quality of life, social connectedness, and prognosis for survival.  In Glucksberg, the State 
of Washington identified its “interest in preserving the lives of those who can still 
                                                 
55 In addition to the stigma of their crime and punishment, death-sentenced prisoners tend to be drawn 
from marginalized groups.  Justice Douglas noted in Furman:  “Former Attorney General Ramsey Clark 
has said, ‘It is the poor, the sick, the ignorant, the powerless and the hated who are executed.’  One searches 
our chronicles in vain for the execution of any member of the affluent strata of this society” (1972:251-52).  
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contribute to society and have the potential to enjoy life” (729)  While this argument 
plainly leaves room for the State to abandon its interest in the lives of those too ill to 
contribute to society and to enjoy life, the Supreme Court upheld Washington’s 
“insist[ence] that all persons' lives, from beginning to end, regardless of physical or 
mental condition, are under the full protection of the law. …  [States] may properly 
decline to make judgments about the ‘quality’ of life that a particular individual may 
enjoy” (729). 
As discussed above, EHs frequently cite life in prison in explaining their desire to 
die.  They enlist their poor quality of life to explain (successfully) why they should be 
allowed to hasten death.  Therefore, the painfulness of daily life enables prisoners to 
hasten executions where very sick patients may not.   
Further, the “right to die” movement has long struggled with whether to advocate 
for a right to die for individuals with chronic and debilitating illnesses in addition to those 
with terminal illnesses.  Courts have been forced to decide whether the right to refuse 
treatment extended only to people with terminal illnesses, or whether people suffering 
from chronic but non-lethal illnesses could also refuse treatment.  In Bouvia v. Superior 
Court (1986), the plaintiff wanted a nasogastric feeding tube removed.  She did not have 
a terminal condition, but was quadriplegic, and required assistance to eat or drink.  She 
sought to halt artificial nutrition and hydration because she no longer wanted to live.  The 
California court sided with the plaintiff, and required the hospital to remove the feeding 
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tube.  What mattered to the court was that Bouvia had decided her life was not worth 
living: 
In Elizabeth Bouvia's view, the quality of her life has been diminished to the point 
of hopelessness, uselessness, unenjoyability and frustration. She, as the patient, 
lying helplessly in bed, unable to care for herself, may consider her existence 
meaningless (1142-43). 
 
More commonly, however, the law distinguishes between those with a terminal 
illness and those without.  In McKay v. Bergstedt (1990), the Nevada Supreme Court held 
that non-terminal patients must obtain judicial approval prior to having life-sustaining 
treatment withdrawn, presumably because of a heightened state interest.  The court 
defined “terminal” as the patient having less than six months to live.  The Death With 
Dignity Acts passed in Oregon and Washington restrict the availability of physician-
assisted suicide solely to individuals who, two doctors attest, have “an incurable and 
irreversible disease that has been medically confirmed and will, within reasonable 
medical judgment, produce death within six months” (ORS 127.800 §1.01(12), §2.01; 
RCW 70.245.010(13); 70.245.020).   
By contrast, Texas execution-hasteners, who overwhelmingly seek execution very 
early in the appellate process, successfully hasten death when their execution would be 
years, and not months, away.  Further, execution after the resolution of their appeals is by 
no means a certainty.  Even Texas, an exceptionally active death penalty state, has not 






Justice Stevens, while citing “history and tradition” and “the State's paternalistic 
interest in protecting the individual from the irrevocable consequences of an ill-advised 
decision motivated by temporary concerns” (740-41), also pointed to the importance of 
recognizing the individual’s social embeddedness. “The value to others of a person's life 
is far too precious to allow the individual to claim a constitutional entitlement to 
complete autonomy in making a decision to end that life” (Id. at 741 (footnote omitted)). 
As described above in Chapter 4, most EHs do have some social connections.  
The legal framework for execution-hastening nonetheless excludes these relationships.  
While noting that “last minute petitions from parents of death row inmates may often be 
viewed sympathetically,” the Supreme Court determined that the voices of families and 
friends are relevant only if the prisoner is first determined to be mentally incompetent 
(Baal v. Demosthenes 1990).  If the prisoner is adjudged mentally incompetent, a “next 
friend” can step in for the prisoner and, under certain conditions, direct the litigation.  
Outside of this very narrow area, family and friends have no legal relevance. 
Few next friend cases have been brought on behalf of Texas execution-
hasteners.56  In the Texas competency hearings, while families are not always invisible, 
no one represented their interests.  In Joe Gonzales’ case, the judge, clearly concerned 
about the life-ending decisions this prisoner was making, asked Gonzales whether he had 
a chance to speak with his family:  
                                                 




Court:   This is a very unusual situation, it is for me, for the system that we 
operate under.  To me it is just – to me it is just not normal that you want to do 
what you want to do.  It is almost like assisting you in a suicide, because you want 
to represent yourself on a case of this type. 
 
… I wanted maybe a family member of yours to visit with you about 
reconsidering allowing the Court to appoint you an attorney to represent you.  
And since you have approached that subject, or brought that subject up,57 do you 
think that would be helpful or necessary at all? 
 
Gonzales:  I don’t think it would be necessary, because I have talked to – at length 
to most of my family, and my children about this.  And they say I’m in charge of 
my life.  What I do with my life is now my choice.  They don’t – they’re not 
condemning me for doing it, and I’m not saying they’re accepting it, because they 
do believe it is wrong.  But this is something that I have thought about for quite 
some time, and this is what I want. 
 
Court:  Okay.  So you don’t think it is necessary that I ask [your lawyer] to bring 
some of your family members to visit with you about this decision? 
 
Gonzales:  If you think it would make a difference, I would say that you could 
bring some of my family members, as long as I was to pick which ones. 
 
Court:  Well, -- 
 
Gonzales:  For instance, my sister, Tina, she is like a mother to me, since my 
mother passed away.  And she will be totally against it.  I don’t want to put her 
through something like that.  My other sister, Nan, we have talked about – at 
length about this, and she is in my corner. 
 
Court:  Okay. 
 
Gonzales:  She’s more understanding. 
… 
Attorney:  After speaking with Joe for as long as we have been together, I think he 
is trying to say, having family come here and discuss this or have a discourse with 
the Court might make it easier for the Court to allow him to proceed pro se.  Is 
that right, Joe? 
 
                                                 




Gonzales:  Let me put it this way.  My family – none of my family members will 
change my mind.  I am set on doing what I’m going to do.  There is nothing they 
can say that could make me change my mind. (Gonzales RR 2:40-42) 
 
Gonzales subsequently explained that at least one reason he seeks to hasten his 
execution was because of his family: 
And I cannot see myself going to prison, let’s say for a life sentence, and 
have to do 35 years.  I cannot put my children through that.  I would not 
put my father through that for what they would have to go through 
(Gonzales RR 3:12).   
 
 Very unusually, in Porter’s case, the prisoner’s lawyer called Porter’s mother to 
the stand.  If she was to offer her perspective on whether she wanted her son to die, she 
was not asked about it.  She was either not prepared by counsel to offer it, or simply did 
not want to do so.  Instead, the questioning succeeded only in confirming that Porter had 
had the chance to discuss his decision with her.   
Attorney:   And are you acquainted with James Scott Porter? 
Mother:   Yes. 
Attorney:   How are you related to him? 
Mother:   I'm his mother. 
Attorney:   His natural mother? 
Mother:   Yes. 
Attorney:  You are aware of your son's wish to end any further legal judicial 
proceedings to challenge his conviction for capital murder and 
death sentence? 
Mother:   Yes.  He wrote and told me he was going to do it. 
Attorney:   When did you first become aware of that? 
Mother:   About six months ago. 
Attorney:   Okay.  Had he consulted with you earlier about that? 
Mother:   No. 
Attorney:   Did you have any reason to believe that he wanted to dismiss his 
appeals or writs? 
Mother:   No. 
Attorney:   Okay.  Six months ago when he wrote to you, did he want to speak 
  with you about it?  Tell us what the tenor of his letter was? 
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Mother:   It's just that he was going to do it because it would be easier on us 
and none of us would have to suffer with. 
Attorney:   Did you visit him and discuss it with him in person? 
Mother:   I did visit with him; but no, we didn't discuss it. 
Attorney:   Did you want to discuss it with him? 
Mother:   Yes, but he had already told me he wasn't changing his mind. 
Attorney:   So he had an opportunity to talk with you about it, anyway? 
Mother:   Yeah. 
Attorney:   Is there anything more you would like the court to know before we 
release you? 
Mother:   The court? 
Attorney:   Yes, ma'am. 
Mother:   No. 
Attorney:   Okay. 
Mother:      No. 
Attorney:   Okay.  Your Honor, I have no more questions for this witness. 
Court:   Do you have any questions, counsel for the State? 
State’s attorney:  No, your Honor (Porter Hrg at 32-33). 
 
The Court did not refer to her testimony in its ruling, nor did counsel referred to 
her testimony in argument. 
 In Gonzales’ and Porter’s cases, unusual for involving family in the first place, 
family were seen as agents to dissuade the prisoner from ending his life or attest to his 
fixity of purpose.  Testimony about what the prisoner means to them, whether he has 
children who would suffer from his death, and whether they think his incarceration is a 
terrible burden on them is not included in the court’s calculus of permitting the prisoner 
to take steps to hasten his execution.  Justice Souter, recognizing that our lives are 
intertwined with others, was troubled at the prospect of individual making unilateral 
decisions to end their lives.  By contrast, because the EH legal framework is structured 
around a waiver, rather than a balancing of interests, once the prisoner establishes mental 
competence, he is given complete autonomy in deciding whether to end his life. 
159 
 
CREATING THE FRAMEWORK 
 
What accounts for these differences in judicial thinking about terminally ill and 
death-sentenced people?  This section examines the historical context which legitimated 
both decisions to hasten death, and a legal and social backdrop that led to their very 
different framing. 
Historical context 
Gary Gilmore takes the stage 
 
While conventional legal inquiry into appeal waivers usually begins its analysis 
with Rees v. Peyton, Gary Gilmore’s case is ultimately more important in defining the 
modern “volunteer.”  While much of Gilmore’s case seems peculiar to Gilmore – 
certainly no other execution-hastener inspired a Pulitzer Prize winning book, two 
television movies, the cover of a national newsweekly, a Saturday Night Live skit, and a 
pop song (Blume 2009) – in Gilmore’s case we see not only the seeds of future death 
penalty cases, but also different logics that help explain how the Supreme Court came to 
take such a different stance toward death-seeking prisoners and death-seeking patients. 
Melvin Rees sought to withdraw his Supreme Court appeal in 1965, as support for 
the death penalty waned (Banner 2002:244-247).  After failing to coax the parties into a 
negotiated resolution of the case, the Court ordered the lower court to adjudicate Rees’ 
competence.  After multiple evaluations, Rees was found incompetent by the lower court, 
which filed its report to the Supreme Court in 1967.  The Supreme Court never formally 
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acted further on Rees’ case.  Only after Rees’ natural death did the Court dismiss his 
case, despite occasional prodding from the State of Virginia (Crocker 2004). 
Gary Gilmore was not so easily put off.  With the ink scarcely dry on the Supreme 
Court’s Gregg decision reviving capital punishment in the United States, Gary Gilmore 
dared the State of Utah to kill him.  At a trial court hearing after sentencing, Gilmore told 
the court, “You sentenced me to die.  Unless it’s a joke or something I want to go ahead 
and do it” (Mailer [1979] 1993:467).  In a perfunctory hearing before the Utah Supreme 
Court, Gilmore, represented by counsel who assisted rather than opposed his efforts, 
testified that he knew he had a right to appeal; that he had told his attorneys that he did 
not want to appeal; that he had told him during the trial that if found guilty, he would 
prefer death to imprisonment; and that he preferred to keep the originally scheduled 
execution date.  Despite protests from Gilmore’s prior lawyer, no formal mental 
competency or waiver hearing was conducted (Blume 2009:213).   
Less than five months after his crime and two months after his sentencing, 
Gilmore’s case went before the United States Supreme Court (Gilmore v. Utah, 
1976:440).  Gilmore’s mother, Bessie Gilmore, asked the Court as a “next friend” to stay 
Gary Gilmore’s execution, arguing that he was not competent to knowingly and 
intelligently waive his rights.  Bessie Gilmore’s stay application informed the Court of 
“petitioner’s history of suicidal tendencies, his November 16, 1976, suicide attempt, and 
his repeated request to be executed [to] indicate that petitioner’s original waiver of appeal 
is an attempt to commit suicide” (Gilmore v. Utah 1976, Application for Stay of 
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Execution (“Stay App.”):31).  It cited psychiatric sources discussing the “impulse to 
suicide as a form of mental illness” (id., 31-32).   
In addition to having a markedly swifter adjudication than Rees, this set up a very 
different mental health contest.  Where Rees was delusional and psychotic (Crocker 
2004), the Gilmore litigation instead focused on rival interpretations of his suicidality and 
its implications for his competence to waive his appeals (Stay App., 31-32).   
The Attorney General responded: 
The dynamics of Gilmore’s position demonstrate that his suicide attempt 
is not indicative of mental incompetence.  After a trial in which he had not 
only the opportunity but ability to make a rational assessment of the 
evidence against him, Gilmore expressed his philosophical acceptance of 
the court’s judge and asked to be allowed to respond with dignity.  It was 
only after the first of what he feared could be many postponements that he 
apparently attempted to effectuate the sentence himself [by taking an 
overdose of pills].  Mr. Gilmore had sufficient experience of prison life 
that he was able to form an accurate estimation of what it would be like 
for him to languish in prison.  The very report which warns of his suicidal 
tendencies does so within the specific context of the present situation and 
his perception of futility with the situation as it existed (Gilmore v. Utah 
1976, Response to Application for Stay of Execution (“Stay Resp.”):56-
57).   
 
In other words, Gilmore’s post-death-sentencing suicide attempts were not 
pathological, but simply an “attempt[ ] to effectuate the sentence himself.”   His desire to 
die was rational:  “Mr. Gilmore had sufficient experience of prison life that he was able 
to form an accurate estimation of what it would be like for him to languish in prison” 
(Stay Resp., 56-57).  Gilmore should be accorded the “right to make a rational choice 
within the framework of his circumstances and personal philosophical constructs” (id., 
57).   
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The Supreme Court stayed Gilmore’s execution on December 3, 1976, to give it 
time to review certain documents.  Ten days later, it lifted the stay, summarily finding 
that Gilmore was mentally competent and had made a knowing and intelligent waiver 
(1976:437).  Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall dissented, complaining that without 
appellate review, no one could know whether the Utah death penalty statute was 
constitutional.  This question needed to be resolved since Gilmore could not, under the 
Eighth Amendment, consent to an unconstitutional punishment.   
Justice Marshall’s dissent also paints a picture of informal, rushed, and (in his 
view) unreliable proceedings: 
Less than five months have passed since the commission of the crime; just over 
two months have elapsed since sentence was imposed. That is hardly sufficient 
time for mature consideration of the question, nor does Gilmore's erratic behavior 
from his suicide attempt to his state habeas petition evidence such deliberation. 
No adversary hearing has been held to examine the experts, all employed by the 
State of Utah, who have pronounced Gilmore sane.  … In the transcripts that the 
[Utah Supreme] court prepared for us, it omitted a portion of its proceedings as 
having “no pertinency” to the issue of Gilmore's “having voluntarily and 
intelligently waived his right to appeal.” That “irrelevant” portion involved a 
discussion by Gilmore's trial counsel of his opinion of Gilmore's competence and 
the constitutionality of the Utah statute. It is appalling that any court could 
consider these questions irrelevant to that determination. It is equally shocking 
that the Utah court, in a matter of such importance, failed even to have a court 
reporter present to transcribe the proceeding, instead relying on recordings made 
by dictating machines which have produced a partly unintelligible record 
(Gilmore 1976:440 (footnote omitted)). 
 
Justice Marshall also observed that “the Prison Psychiatrist, the only doctor who 
has considered Gilmore's competency since the waiver decision was publicly announced, 
was based [his opinion of competency] on a review of Gilmore's medical records and a 
one-hour interview” (id. 440, n.2). 
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We see in Gilmore’s case at least some of the problems plaguing the adjudication 
of execution-hasteners, at least in Texas.  Questionable mental health assessments and 
non-adversarial proceedings can be acceptable.  Desires to hasten execution can stand 
alongside with suicide attempts without defeating competence.  The mother’s interest in 
preventing execution is entirely contingent on the competency finding.  The state interest 
in the legality of the conviction and sentence was a concern to no one but the dissenters. 
Shifts in legal and political debates in criminal justice and the death penalty 
 
Blume notes “the path was set” when the Supreme Court permitted Gilmore to 
waive his appeals (2009:228).  Without disputing the contingent importance of Gilmore, 
the larger sociopolitical context helped cement and extend the Court’s decision. 
The 1970s witnessed important shifts in the American criminal justice system.  
The mobilization of pro-death penalty activists after Furman, and the rise of “law and 
order” politics alongside more retributive penal policies have been chronicled elsewhere 
(Garland 2010: 231-55; Simon 2007:116-30; Banner 2002:267-84).  As Gilmore would 
be the first person executed in the modern death penalty era, his case also became a 
battlefield for the death penalty itself.  National media covered Gilmore’s case; activists 
mobilized; anti-death penalty lawyers launched multifarious efforts to halt Gilmore’s 
execution (Mailer [1979] 1993; Blume 2009). 
Executing Gilmore provided death penalty proponents with the opportunity to 
demonstrate the necessity of the death penalty (Blume 2009:227).  Certainly Gilmore, 
with his extensive juvenile and adult history of crime and imprisonment (Blume 2009), 
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exemplified the failure of the rehabilitation model (Martinson 1974).  One television 
writer reportedly said at the time that Gilmore’s case was “an open commentary on the 
utter failure of our prison system to rehabilitate anybody” (Mailer [1979] 1993:572).  As 
Blume (2009) points out, Gilmore presented none of the familiar concerns about the 
death penalty.  He was white, unrehabilitated after repeated stints in prison, and not 
plainly mentally ill.  He appeared intelligent, remorseless, and obnoxious, and admitted 
guilt consistent with other compelling evidence.  Add to that the fact that Utah did not 
have the cultural baggage of the former Confederacy, Gilmore became, “in many 
respects, the perfect person to usher in the new era of executions” (Blume 2009:226). 
Simultaneously, the Supreme Court was in the middle of the contentious debate 
regarding rights held by those accused of crimes.  Most relevant here is the Court’s 
landmark decision in Faretta v. California (1975).  In Faretta, the Supreme Court 
decided that individuals have a constitutional right to represent themselves.  They must 
not be required to have a lawyer “forced” upon them, even at a cost of a less reliable 
proceeding. 
The right to defend is personal. The defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, 
will bear the personal consequences of a conviction. It is the defendant, therefore, 
who must be free personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to 
his advantage. And although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to his 
own detriment, his choice must be honored out of that respect for the individual 
which is the lifeblood of the law (Faretta v. California 1975: 834 (internal 
citations and punctuation omitted)). 
 
The dissenters inveighed against this individualistic stance that it believed would 
undermine the criminal justice system as a whole: 
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That goal [of justice] is ill-served, and the integrity of and public confidence in 
the system are undermined, when an easy conviction is obtained due to the 
defendant's ill-advised decision to waive counsel. The damage thus inflicted is not 
mitigated by the lame explanation that the defendant simply availed himself of the 
‘freedom’ ‘to go to jail under his own banner.’  The system of criminal justice 
should not be available as an instrument of self-destruction (Id. at 839-40 (Burger, 
C.J., dissenting) (internal citations and punctuation omitted.)). 
 
Gilmore’s symbolic importance could be seen as extending beyond a message that 
the death penalty was once again a punishment available to states.  When the Supreme 
Court refused to stay Gilmore’s execution, it may also have been signaling that it would 
limit the reach of cause lawyers58 by strengthening the agency of the condemned 
individual, to the exclusion of broader systemic considerations. 
In addition, as Gilmore himself noted, his desire to hasten death was situated 
within a cultural moment when a discourse of rational suicide and a right to die gained 
national prominence against a backdrop of the civil rights movements of the 1960s and 
1970s (Hillyard and Dombrink 2001).   
You know, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that you have a right to die.  I’m 
talking about the Karen Ann Quinlan case.59  I don’t even really think that enters, 
if I want to press for my civil rights.  I could raise issues like that, but I’m not 
(Utah Board of Pardons Hearing 1976:12). 
 
While questions of mercy killing and euthanasia were hardly new concepts by the 
1970s, the social movement to establish a right to die coalesced with Quinlan’s case 
(Lavi 2005:166; Hillyard and Dombrink 2001).   By late 1976 and early 1977, when 
                                                 
58 Gilmore’s mother was represented by Anthony Amsterdam.  He exemplified the anti-death penalty 
cause lawyer, having argued Furman (1972) and by the time of Gilmore’s case, appeared before the 
Supreme Court on at least eight death penalty cases. 
59 The New Jersey Supreme Court, not the United Supreme Court, decided the Quinlan case in March 1976 
(In the Matter of Karen Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976)).  Gilmore’s reference to this case, however, 
reflects its cultural currency at the time he sought to be executed. 
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Gilmore’s case was being litigated, Karen Ann Quinlan’s face had already appeared on 
the cover of Newsweek surrounded by the title “A Right to Die?” (Newsweek 11/3/75).  
A national discussion legitimating decisions to hasten death had begun in earnest. 
Logic of death penalty law 
While a discourse legitimating decisions hastening death in the medical context 
swirled around Gilmore, different conceptualizations of rights to die begin to account for 
their different outcomes.  Where decisions to hasten death in the context of medical 
interventions require weighing state interests against the individual’s desire, execution-
hasteners require no such balancing.  Instead, execution-hasteners offer a window onto 
how hermetic the “intrinsic rationality” (Garland 2010: 286) of the death penalty can be.  
Because a death-sentenced prisoner’s desire to hasten death is conceptualized solely 
within the framework of rules and waiver, the concerns that we see in the context of the 
right to die of the terminally ill cannot penetrate. 
Garland argues that American death penalty jurisprudence evolved to distance the 
death penalty from lynching, and one strategy included “rationalizing and juridifying”60 
the application of the death penalty (2010:262).  The Supreme Court, Garland explains, 
developed a “discipline of legal rules and procedural propriety” … to “us[e] the values of 
liberalism (rule-based restraints on state power, respect for the individual, due process, 
                                                 
60 Garland defines juridification as “the regulation of state power by reference to legal rules and 
procedures” (Garland 2010:264).  Other strategies included “civilizing and humanizing” the punishment 
by, e.g., excluding juveniles or those mentally ill at execution, and “democratizing and localizing” by 
shifting death penalty decisions to local participants (2010:268-80). 
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legality) to reshape America’s capital punishment practice” (Garland 2010:263-65).  The 
existence of rules and procedures, in other words, contributed to constituting a legitimate 
death penalty.  Hand in hand with a logic of rules is the idea that rules can be waived, 
provided, of course, that the waiver follows certain rules.  The waiver model works well 
– indeed, it can only exist – within a discourse of rules.  It acknowledges the existence of 
rules, even as the individual invokes a desire not to take advantage of them. 
Consistent with this conceptualization is the function of mental illness in 
Gilmore’s case.  Both the Application for a Stay of Execution filed by Gilmore’s mother, 
as well as the response from the Attorney General of Utah spoke directly to Gilmore’s 
efforts to kill himself (Stay App., 31-32; Stay Resp., 56-57).  The desire to hasten death, 
however, was legally relevant only to the extent that it signified mental illness that 
undercut the validity of the waiver.  Bessie Gilmore’s stay application argued, “To permit 
a man to kill himself through legal process by his lack of rational choice affronts a most 
basic sense of justice,” and specified that a proper waiver is the mechanism for protecting 
justice (Stay App., 32) (internal punctuation omitted).  It did not draw on, for example, 
the historical proscriptions elaborately described by the Supreme Court in Glucksberg.  
Where the Supreme Court in Glucksberg struggled with weighing well-established 
countervailing interests to individual autonomy and defining a point on the continuum at 
which restrictions on decisions to hasten were acceptable, in the context of the death 
penalty, it conceived of decisions to hasten death among death-sentenced prisoners within 
a paradigm of rules.  More generally, desires to hasten death in this population are not 
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interpreted as suicidal, but as legal decisions to abandon appeals.  Further, the fact that 
many execution-hasteners tie their desire for execution to their beliefs in the death 
penalty affirms the legitimacy of the death penalty. 
Cultural frames of mental illness and criminality 
 
Execution-hastener cases and Glucksberg also present very different concerns 
about depression.  With condemned prisoners, depression is not seen as a condition that 
impairs the prisoner’s ability to make decision about hastening death.  This may be part 
of a larger cultural ambivalence regarding depression as a form of mental illness, and the 
law generally fails to acknowledge the impact of impaired affective (as opposed to 
cognitive) states on decisionmaking (Pilgrim 2007; Maroney 2006).  Certainly Melvin 
Rees, with his delusional thinking and psychotic preoccupations, conformed more closely 
to widespread ideas of what mental illness looks like than did Gary Gilmore (Perlin 
1997).  Notably, the Supreme Court has expressed greater concern over the reliability of 
the procedures to evaluate mental competency in both Ford v. Wainwright (1986) and 
Panetti v. Quarterman (2007), both of which involved prisoners with serious delusions, 
than it has in execution-hastener cases.61 
This difference in interpreting depression and suicidality may also reflect a bias 
against recognizing mental dysfunction in criminals as it contradicts prevalent ideas 
about criminal intentionality and autonomy (LaChance 2007:703-704; Garland 
                                                 
61 These cases also involved a different legal question – competency to be executed.  Among other things, 
and generally unlike the Texas execution-hasteners cases, this meant that the prisoners’ lawyers sought 
genuinely adversarial proceedings to test the mental health evidence.   
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2001:184).  A Newsweek magazine cover62 featuring Gary Gilmore evokes romantic 
notions of death-seeking.  Gilmore looks directly at the camera, with what could be 
construed as a lopsided, and perhaps slightly menacing, grin on his face.  He wears a 
short-sleeved prison jumpsuit that reveals handcuffs and his tattooed forearms.  “Death 
Wish” is stamped in red on Gilmore’s torso.  It is easy to read into the image that 
Gilmore has a “death wish” because he is a thrill-seeking outlaw, not because he is 
depressed and sees no point to living. 
SUMMARY 
 
Justice Scalia, rarely a friend to the death row prisoner, quoted from 19
th
 century 
court opinion in objecting to arguments for a fundamental right to die: 
The life of those to whom life has become a burden – of those who are hopelessly 
diseased or fatally wounded – nay, even the lives of criminals condemned to 
death, are under the protection of the law, equally as the lives of those who are in 
the full tide of life's enjoyment, and anxious to continue to live” (Cruzan 1990: 
296 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted)).   
 
In fact, the law does distinguish the “hopelessly diseased” from the condemned.  
While Gary Gilmore left an unmistakable imprint on the right to hasten death accorded 
death row prisoners, the continuing power of his example reflects that the law is guided 
by a particular definition of the social problem, namely, that of capital punishment.  By 
not only involving criminal cases, which implicate normative ideas of who commits 
crimes and why, but also the death penalty, with its own logics and history, execution-
                                                 




hasteners have developed a right to die substantially removed from the wider social and 
legal debates over hastening death.  Where this wider discussion has defined the problem 
as the hypermedicalized, debilitating, and painful “bad” death, it has also had to contend 
with the negative history of euthanasia, concern for marginalized, suicidal, and/or 
vulnerable individuals, and fears of a slippery slope into abusive or coercive efforts to 
end lives (Hillyard and Dombrink 2001).  These legal differences therefore reflect not 
simply the unsurprising conclusion that death-sentenced prisoners have an easier time 
dying than most others.  Instead, this difference is constructed by historical contingency, 
the logic of the American death penalty, cultural attitudes regarding mental dysfunction 
and criminality. 
 







 This dissertation integrates the study of execution-seeking individuals into a 
larger social scientific literature on desires to hasten death.  It approached the question of 
execution-hastening by conducting a type of “sociological autopsy,” using individual 
cases, but maintaining a social focus  (Scourfield et al. 2012).  As Scourfield and his 
colleagues also found, this method is not without problems.  The passage of time may 
have intensified the tendency to attribute a motivation for hastening execution that drew 
more from conventional ideas rather than from what the EH said.  All sources of 
information, whether human or documentary, are also irreducibly partial.  Further, the 
work of research has inevitably simplified ambiguities and contradictions as I created 
categories and identified meaningful variables.  Becoming an execution-hastener is a 
complex process that this dissertation is able to illuminate only in part. 
Nonetheless, it contributes to the very little we know empirically about this 
population.  I found, for example, that Texas EHs in this study resembled those who 
commit suicide in prison in certain respects.  As with prison suicides, most EHs acted on 
the desire to hasten death before age 35.  In addition, and also like prison suicides, EHs 
tend to act early.  The EHs’ early desire to hasten execution is consistent with the prison 
research finding that the risk of suicide is particularly elevated early in the criminal 
justice process.   
Also like prisoners who suicide, EHs are more likely to have prior criminal 
convictions than non-execution-hasteners.  The exception to this was among those 
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sentenced to death for offenses involving a domestic crisis.  The IPV-EH subgroup 
appears overrepresented in Texas executions.  While 21% of the Texas EH population 
committed an offense related to a domestic dispute, only 33, or 7.4% of the 444 non-
consensual executions of men who committed similar crimes.   
While the numbers are too small to make any strong claims about connections 
between intimate partner problems and execution-hasteners, the Texas data suggest that 
exploring this connection further with national data because of the resemblance to 
characteristics of homicide-suicides and homicide-parasuicides.  As one informant said 
about an IPV-EH, he was “more or less a dead man since it happened” (Inf. 33:11).    
Consistent with the literature, some of the IPV-EH, particularly those who had killed a 
romantic partner, had a less significant criminal history and were older, were early and 
aggressive advocates for their execution (namely Larry Hayes, Steven Renfro, and 
Benjamin Stone).  Hayes and Renfro were also believed to have attempted “suicide by 
cop” when they were arrested.  As with the murder-suicides, they may have been 
motivated by these same feelings of guilt, a desire to reunite with the deceased, and at the 
same time, understood that they would struggle to create a new identity.   
EHs, as compared to non-EHs, on average are more likely to have been convicted 
of crimes against people and had prior experiences with incarceration.  They were more 
likely to have used a gun in the murder, and less likely to have committed the crime with 
another person.  This could contribute to desires to hasten execution by increasing the 
prisoner’s sense of social culpability. 
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The comparison group of non-EHs appeared to have more social support, 
although the measures should be improved.  I found some difference in the vulnerabilities 
condemned prisoners brought to death row, but again, more information (particularly 
information that does not rest on court documents) is necessary.   
Unlike other studies linking isolation confinement with increases in suicide, my 
data do not draw a strong connection between conditions of confinement and hastening 
execution.  The slight increase in proportions hastening execution at the segregation 
prison is confounded by other factors, such as changes in the law and increase in 
executions overall.   
The role of prison conditions should be more closely examined in light of the very 
early point at which most EHs articulate and often act upon their desire to hasten 
execution.  The conditions may not instigate desires to hasten execution, but they may 
strengthen commitments to waive appeals.  My research also suggests that prison culture 
and architecture may amplify or inhibit the effect of one prisoner’s desire to hasten 
execution.   
If EHs are in fact largely steadfast in their desire to die – and I want to emphasize 
that none of the informants had more than episodic contact – this would distinguish EHs 
from those with terminal illness and for that reason may illuminate an important 
alternative understanding of desires to hasten death.   Research suggests that those with 
terminal illness experienced desires to hasten death at certain junctures (Nissim, 
Gagliese, Rodin 2009).  It is easy to identify some analogs between the experiences of the 
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patient with a terminal illness and the capital defendant.  The conviction or sentence (or 
crime) is the diagnosis; the waiting for medical appointments is the process of applying to 
courts for legal relief; the disappointing test results, the court losses.  Because the 
transience of desires to die appears so regularly in the medical context, it would be useful 
to understand why the death row population would be so unwavering, and if they are, 
whether this is attributable to their greater psychological and psychiatric burden 
(Cunningham and Vigen 2002).   
The fact that most EHs seek execution so early also warrants more empirical 
investigation because of its implications for the criminal justice system.  Understanding 
of why some seek the death penalty even prior to arriving on death row, often prior to 
trial, is essential to keep death penalty trials from becoming empty rituals enabling the 
execution.  As this research shows, when the law permits motivated prisoners to waive 
early, they often do.  Given that the criminal justice system interacts to shape the EH 
experience, identifying whether patterns of when individuals express a desire for 
execution, when they act on it, and when they are permitted to abandon hold true in 
jurisdictions with a less active death penalty should be examined.  This could improve 
our understanding of how legal processes interact with desires to die, and inform policy 
debates about the importance of legal safeguards to the adversarial system.  
The meanings associated with hastening execution reveal the symbolic 
significance of death in this context.  Prisoners subverted the execution’s intended 
meaning by enlisting it in their campaigns of defiance and demonstrations of disinterest.  
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They recharacterized it as the lesser penalty.  If you really wanted to punish me, you’d 
have given me a life sentence!  Others embraced it to vouchsafe their remorse and expiate 
their sins, enacting their integration into a larger normative order.  While we may not be 
prepared to lift the noose from their necks the way our Colonial forebearers might have 
done (Banner 2002), they raise the question whether these are really the people we are so 
keen to kill.   
Of course, some observers reject this reframing.  For example, Eliseo Moreno 
went to fairly extensive lengths to express his remorse.  Among other things, he wrote 
letters to survivors of his victims to ask for forgiveness, and in his final statement, he 
emphasized his guilt and the religious justification for his execution.  The sheriff from the 
county that prosecuted him was unmoved, “skeptical” of Moreno’s prior suicide attempt 
and:  
[U]nconvinced by Moreno's expressions of remorse, saying religion is often used 
by death row inmates to evoke sympathy or mask their true feelings.  “It’s been 
said that God lives at TDC,” [the sheriff] said. “I saw him (Moreno) at the trial.  I 
saw no remorse in his face.  If he’s got religion, fine.  That’s between him and the 
man upstairs” (Bragg 1987).   
 
One informant described another EH as always having a “poor me” attitude.   
While the EH had made profoundly remorseful statements, the informant described his 
attitude: 
Nobody has compassion for him.  And that’s just the kind of guy he was.  Put me 
to death because nobody cares about me…. Typical addict.  It’s all about me 
attitude.  And then a couple days after he murders two people, hey, you people-.  
Nobody likes me.  This is about me.  I'm hurt…. Depressed.  He was very, very, 
very depressed.  And still, it was all, you've got to feel sorry for me type 
depression.  Nobody feels sorry for me (Inf. 33:2, 3). 
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For this informant, even as he recognized the EH’s depression, he coded – and 
denigrated – it as “typical addict.”  The EH’s criminality trumped the redeemed identity 
the EH sought to construct.   
To the extent that EHs use frames of meaning to manage the deviance of, e.g., 
their embrace of execution and/or of their stigmatized identity, understanding how they 
manage challenges to the meanings they construct could offer insights into the sociology 
of deviance.  In addition, further study of disjunctures of meaning, where the act of self-
destruction is characterized as cynical or self-pitying by some, could offer insight why 
attitudes and behaviors that in the free-world connote suicidal depression and precipitate 
a mental health intervention become normalized in the criminal justice context.  
The law also participates in the symbolic life of the death penalty, if more 
covertly.  It selects from a cultural toolkit to create and enforce norms surrounding 
desires to hasten death.  Micro-processes in court proceedings can minimize the deviance 
of requests to die.  Macro-processes create categories of troubling and untroubling deaths.  
By improving our understanding of who and when people seek execution, the law may be 
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